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ABSTRACT PAGE 
This dissertation re-conceptualizes the scandals that engulfed the intelligence community 
in the mid-1970s. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) confronted an unprecedented 
crisis during these years: the Pike hearings in the House of Representatives, the Church 
Committee in the Senate, and an executive branch commission led by then Vice President 
Nelson Rockefeller. Historians and political scientists have studied these events before, 
but I present a nuanced interpretation of the intelligence investigations by placing them in a 
broader political and cultural context. To fully understand the impact of the so-called "Year 
of Intelligence," I argue that scholars need to focus on what was happening outside of 
Congress. The CIA encountered a backlash from both ends of the political spectrum. I 
provide the first history of Counter-Spy, a left wing magazine founded in 1973 that called 
for the abolition of covert action. The magazine's editors directly challenged the "culture of 
secrecy" at the CIA by publishing the names of Agency operatives. At the same time, 
conservatives embarked on a very different confrontation with the Agency. Like Counter-
Spy, they charged that the CIA was keeping secrets from the American people, but their 
concern was with Agency analysis of the Soviet Union, not covert action. I also examine 
Hollywood portrayals of the CIA in this tumultuous era; rather than simply responding to the 
Congressional investigations and the Rockefeller Commission, filmmakers actually 
anticipated the widespread concerns about the complex relationship between espionage 
and democracy. The events of the mid-1970s badly tarnished the CIA's image. In 
response to this rapid decline in popular support, the Agency developed an aggressive 
public relations campaign designed to restore confidence in government secrecy and 
covert operations. This dissertation contains the first systematic history of CIA public 
relations. The public relations staff has consistently portrayed the CIA as the most open 
intelligence agency in the world, heroically protecting national security while accepting the 
necessity of Congressional oversight. But despite these public statements, Agency 
officials worked to revitalize the "culture of secrecy." They have dramatically restricted the 
ability of former employees to write critically about CIA activities; they have successfully 
lobbied Congress for exemptions to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA); and they have 
repeatedly broken promises to de-classify historical records. Agency officials have been 
obsessed with protecting their image, and this obsession has frequently undermined 
historical research. Robert M. Gates launched an openness initiative in February 1992, but 
the culture at the Agency was not fundamentally changed. In fact, George Tenet shut 
down the voluntary de-classification program at the CIA in 1998. A key conclusion of this 
study is that the "culture of secrecy" at the Agency remains firmly entrenched. Since the 
CIA cannot be reformed from within, I argue that outside intervention is required. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Few authors have better understood the "culture of secrecy" at the 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) than Victor Marchetti. In 1966, eleven 
years after joining the CIA as an analyst, Marchetti became the assistant to the 
deputy director, and he worked for the next three years on the elite seventh 
floor of headquarters in Langley, Virginia. There he learned about many of 
the CIA's most guarded secrets: covert operations, budget and personnel 
statistics, front companies (known internally as "proprietary organizations"), 
and propaganda tactics, among others. He resigned from the Agency in 1969 
disillusioned with the Vietnam War, the Agency's old-boy bureaucracy, and 
the reckless use of covert action in the Third World. 
Much to the dismay of his former colleagues, Marchetti soon 
articulated these grievances in The Rope-Dancer, a spy novel about the 
imaginary National Intelligence Agency (NIA). The main character, Paul J. 
Franklin, closely resembles Marchetti. Franklin is the special assistant to 
General Smithy, the NIA's Deputy Director, and he no longer takes pride in 
working for the intelligence community. "I'm fed up with being a careerist in 
an organization that's too big for its own good and out of step with the 
times," he complains to his wife.1 He later tells General Smithy that the 
"Agency has turned into a decrepit bureaucracy, dominated by incompetent 
old fools and self-seeking sycophantic phonies-all being manipulated by the 
1 Victor Marchetti, The Rope-Dancer (New York: Dell Publishing, 1971), 35; 
Henry Allen, "Ex CIA-Man's Ultimate Fantasy: Selling U.S. Secrets," 
Washington Post, 6 November 1971, C1; Henry Allen, "Quitting the CIA and 
Living to Tell About It, More Or Less," Washington Post, 8 October 1972. 
3 
Director for his own gain."2 Franklin is disgusted with the Machiavellian 
director of the NIA, Kenneth Lewis, who refuses to deliver unwelcome news 
to the president and claims that the State Department does not have the right 
to know about an impending covert operation in South America.3 He begins 
selling NIA secrets to the Communists, but in the process, he discovers that 
Director Lewis is also working for the Soviet Union. Franklin regrets his 
betrayal of the United States and ultimately agrees to help the chief of 
counterintelligence, Frank Wellington, in his attempt to thwart Lewis's 
sinister activities.4 
When The Rope-Dancer was published in the fall of 1971, CIA officials 
easily grasped the parallels between the fictional NIA and their own 
institution. Richard Helms, the CIA director between 1966 and 1973, had 
clearly inspired Kenneth Lewis, while Wellington had been patterned after 
James Jesus Angleton, the legendary head of counterintelligence. Like Lewis, 
Helms was a talented Washington insider who understood how to protect his 
bureaucratic turf. Helms did not take kindly to the novel, and he ordered the 
Office of Security at Langley to launch a surveillance operation against 
Marchetti codenamed BUTANE. This secret operation began on March 23, 
1972 and continued for about a month.5 In addition to monitoring Marchetti's 
movements, the CIA used an informant in New York City to obtain a copy of 
2 Marchetti, 280. 
3 Ibid., 20. 
4 Ibid., 98, 291-296. 
5 
"Family Jewels" Report [PDF file], 27. After the report was de-classified in 
June 2007, the National Security Archive posted it on their website. See 
http:/ Lwww.gwu.edu/-nsarchivLNSAEBBLNSAEBB222Lindex.htm 
(accessed July 9, 2007). 
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a book proposal that had been mailed to six publishing firms. 6 Even though 
Marchetti had not written the book yet, Helms claimed that it "[would] cause 
grave and irreparable harm to the national defense interest of the United 
States .... "7 Judge Albert V. Bryan, Jr. agreed and issued a life-long 
injunction against Marchetti in May that required him to obtain the CIA's 
permission before publishing anything in the future. This injunction 
ultimately authorized the Agency to censor all material that was "classified."8 
Marchetti soon joined forces with John D. Marks, a former State 
Department official, to write the manuscript that became The CIA and the Cult 
of Intelligence. After submitting a draft to the CIA in August 1973, they 
discovered that Agency officials defined "classified" rather broadly. 
According to Marks's account, the CIA "said that the book could only be 
published if we deleted 339 items, [an estimated] 15 to 20 percent of the 
book."9 Marks, Marchetti, and the ACLU protested the number of deletions, 
and within five months, the CIA had reduced the list of deleted items to 168.10 
The authors were now allowed to re-insert information that had obviously 
never presented a threat to national security; they could, for instance, tell 
readers that Helms had incorrectly pronounced the name of an African 
country during a meeting, and they also received permission to include 
6 John Marks, "On Being Censored," Foreign Policy 15 (Summer 1974): 96; 
Taylor Branch, "The Censors of Bumbledom," Harper's, January 1974, 56-63; 
VictorS. Navasky, "In Cold Print: Marchetti et AI.," New York Times Book 
Review, 17 February 1974, 2-3; Thomas Powers, The Man Who Kept The Secrets: 
Richard Helms and the CIA (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1979), 282-283. 
7 Helms quoted in Marks, 96-97. 
8 Ibid., 99; David E. Rosenbaum, "Judge Bars Book By Ex-C. I. A. Agent: 
Temporary Order Is Granted to Justice Department," New York Times, 19 
April1972, 9. 
9 Marks, 100. 
10 Ibid., 101. 
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budget information that had been published in The Congressional Record.11 
They decided to sue the CIA over the deletions that remained in effect, and in 
early 1974, Judge Bryan granted them the right to print all but 27 of the 
items.12 When the CIA appealed the case, however, Marks and Marchetti 
published their book in June with the 168 deletions in order to avoid further 
delays. They left spaces in the text to show readers where the Agency had 
censored material.13 
In their legal battle with Marchetti, CIA officials were following a 
precedent that had been established in the 1960s with The Invisible 
Government. This groundbreaking CIA expose, written by journalists David 
Wise and Thomas Ross in the aftermath of the Bay of Pigs invasion, 
threatened the mystique of the intelligence community, and as a result, the 
Agency unsuccessfully attempted to prevent Random House from publishing 
the book.14 In 1972, just months after Judge Bryan issued an injunction 
against Marchetti, CIA management once again attempted to interfere with a 
critical book when they convinced Harper & Row to send them a copy of 
Alfred W. McCoy's The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia prior to its 
publication. Concerned with the accusations leveled by McCoy about the 
CIA's knowledge· of illegal drug trafficking, Agency executives lobbied 
Harper & Row to re-consider sections of the manuscript, but the editors 
11 Ibid., 101-102; Eric Pace, "Cuts That C. I. A. Sought in Book Touch on 
Official Slips," New York Times, 15 April1974, 24~ 
12 Marks, 106. 
13 Ibid., 107. 
14 Evan Thomas, The Very Best Men: Four Who Dared (New York: Simon 
and Schuster, 2006), 319; David Wise and Thomas B. Ross, The Invisible 
Government (New York: Random House, 1964; reprint, New York: Vintage, 
1974), viii. 
6 
refused.15 Since McCoy, then a Ph.D. candidate at Yale University, had never 
worked for the CIA, the Agency could not legally censor his writings. 
The CIA's public image had changed significantly in the decade 
separating the publication of The Invisible Government (1964) and The CIA and 
the Cult of Intelligence (1974). Ramparts magazine had printed multiple 
exposes of the Agency in the mid-l960s that eventually prompted a short-
lived inquiry within the executive branch in 1967.16 In retaliation for the 
articles, the Agency collected information on the citizens involved in 
Ramparts, and President Lyndon Johnson subsequently ordered Richard 
Helms to clandestinely monitor opponents of the Vietnam War.17 This 
domestic covert operation, appropriately codenamed MHCHAOS, 
accelerated during the Nixon administration. Then, after the. botched 
Watergate burglary in 1972, Americans learned that several of President 
Richard Nixon's "plumbers" had connections to the CIA. It later became 
clear that the break-in had been authorized by the White House, not the CIA, 
but revelations about the Agency's initial willingness to cooperate with E. 
Howard Hunt, the retired CIA man who directed the operation, exacerbated 
the public's disillusionment with the intelligence community that had set-in 
15 Seymour M. Hersh, "C. I. A. Aides Assail Asia Drtig Charge," New York 
Times, 22 July 1972, 1; Richard R. Lingeman, "The C. I. A. As Book Reviewer," 
New York Times Book Review, 3 September 1972, 23. 
16 Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones, The CIA and American Democracy, 3rd ed. (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 2003), 153-164. The Ramparts article that 
directly contributed to the inquiry revealed that the CIA had been funding 
the National Student Association (NSA). Nicholas Katzenbach, 
Undersecretary of State at the time of the scandal, chaired the commission, 
and according to Jeffreys-Jones, "[t]he salient feature of the Katzenbach 
reform was its cosmetic, stopgap character." Ibid., 163. 
17 Angus Mackenzie, Secrets: The CIA's War at Home (Berkeley and Los 
Angeles: University of California Press, 1997), 15-25. 
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during Vietnam. According to Thomas Powers, "Watergate did what the Bay 
of Pigs had not: it undermined the consensus of trust in Washington which 
was a truer source of the Agency's strength than its legal charter, and it gave 
outsiders their first good look at CIA files and tables of organization .... 
Watergate, in short, made the CIA fair game."18 
It was around this time that former CIA officers began to speak out. 
Patrick J. McGarvey's C. I. A.: The Myth and the Madness was published in 
1972, and it attempted to provide a more realistic depiction of the intelligence 
establishment. "In contrast to the Hollywood image of rugged 
individualism," McGarvey observed, "today's intelligence scene is dominated 
by the committee, the mainstay for intelligence decision making-belittling 
initiative, rewarding compromise, and contributing to the emergence of 
corporate yes-men."19 In the final chapter, he argued that intelligence reform 
was a necessity, calling the Agency "a tired old whore that no one has the 
heart to take in off the street."20 
As McGarvey had done in The Myth and the Madness, Marks and 
Marchetti focused on the failures of the CIA. The CIA and the Cult of 
Intelligence, however, received far more attention. The CIA's aggressive 
campaign against them provided the authors free publicity, but an equally 
important factor contributing to the book's success was that it became 
enmeshed in a larger series of events leading to three major investigations of 
the intelligence community in 1975 and 1976-what historians refer to as the 
18 Powers, 298. 
19 Patrick J. McGarvey, C. I. A.: The Myth and the Madness (New York: Saturday 
Review Press, 1972; reprint, New York: Penguin Books, 1973), 28. 
20 Ibid., 221. 
8 
"Year of Intelligence." Marks and Marchetti disclosed aspects of CIA covert 
intervention in Chile prior to Salvador Allende's inauguration as the 
president of that South American country in 1970. The discussion of Chile, 
which appeared at the beginning of the second chapter, had been heavily 
censored during the CIA's review process. For instance, the authors were 
forbidden to include Henry Kissinger's now infamous comment at a meeting 
a few months before the Chilean election: "I don't see why we need to stand 
by and watch a country go Communist due to the irresponsibility of its own 
people."21 The CIA also prevented Marks and Marchetti from sharing 
information on what the Agency had done after Allende was democratically 
elected in September 1970. "Attempts were made to undercut Allende 
through continued propaganda, by encouraging a military coup d'etat, and 
by trying to enlist the support of private U. S. firms, namely ITT, in a scheme 
to sabotage Chile's economy," they explained.22 Although this passage was 
withheld from the first edition of the book, journalist Seymour Hersh began 
to put the pieces of the puzzle together, and in early September 1974, he 
wrote a front page story for the New York Times that detailed the CIA's 
destabilization operation against President Allende.23 A few weeks after 
Hersh's story a photograph of then CIA director William Colby appeared on 
21 Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks, The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence 
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 197 4; reprint, New York: Dell Publishing, 1980), 
12. 
22 Ibid., 16. 
23 Seymour M. Hersh, "C. I. A. ChiefTells House Of $8-Million Campaign 
Against Allende in '70-73," New York Times, 8 September 1974, 1; Seymour M. 
Hersh, "Censored Matter in Book About C. I. A. Said to Have Related Chile 
Activities," 11 September 1974, 14. 
9 
the cover of Time with a provocative question emblazoned over his hom-
rimmed glasses: "The CIA: Has It Gone Too Far?"24 
The revelations about the intervention in Chile served as the prologue 
to the most famous news story ever printed on the CIA. On December 22, 
1974, Hersh revealed the existence of Operation MHCHAOS in another New 
York Times front-page scoop, setting the stage for the "Year of Intelligence."25 
President Gerald Ford initially hoped to head off a Congressional 
investigation by appointing Vice President Nelson Rockefeller to launch an 
inquiry into the allegations of domestic wrongdoing. The Rockefeller 
Commission issued a report in the summer of 1975, but it did not prevent 
both houses of Congress from creating separate investigative committees. 
Senator Frank Church (Democrat-Idaho) held hearings in the fall of 1975, and 
his committee published several lengthy reports in April 1976. The 
investigation in the House of Representatives, which was led by 
Congressman Otis Pike (Democrat-New York), received less cooperation 
from the Ford administration than the Church Committee. The Pike Report 
was leaked to The Village Voice in February 1976.26 
Much has been written about the Rockefeller Commission and the two 
Congressional investigations, and historians have debated the impact that 
24 The title of the actual story on the CIA answered the question posed on the 
front cover. See "The CIA: Time to Come In from the Cold," Time, 30 
September 1974, 16-24. 
25 Cynthia M. Nolan, "Seymour Hersh's Impact on the CIA," The International 
Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 12, no. 1 (1999): 18-34. 
26 Kathryn S. Olmsted, Challenging the Secret Government: The Post-Watergate 
Investigations of the CIA and FBI (Chapel Hill: The University of North 
Carolina Press, 1996), 161-162; for a succinct overview of the Pike Committee, 
see Gerald K. Haines, "The Pike Committee Investigations and the CIA," 
Studies In Intelligence (Winter 1998-1999): 81-92. 
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they had on the intelligence establishment,27 In Challenging The Secret 
Government, Kathryn Olmsted argues that the CIA and the other members of 
the intelligence community "clearly emerged the winners of their long battle 
with the investigators."28 Olmsted points out that scholars have exaggerated 
the achievements of the Congressional hearings. Although the Inquiries 
directly contributed to the establishment of permanent oversight committees 
in both the House and Senate, the CIA continued to embark on covert 
operations in countries such as Afghanistan, Angola, and Nicaragua. From 
the perspective of historian Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones, "[a]ttacks of the 'rogue 
elephant' type [from Senator Church] were painful for a while but, in the 
process of being debunked, they actually helped the Agency. The CIA 
emerged from its trial with a refurbished reputation."29 Jeffreys-Jones, 
however, never precisely outlines how the CIA's image was rehabilitated so 
quickly. This study agrees with Olmsted's conclusion that the CIA survived 
the "Year of Intelligence" essentially unscathed, but it disagrees with the 
argument that the investigations "refurbished" the Agency's standing. In 
reality, the events that unfolded in the mid-1970s badly damaged the CIA's 
mystique, which had been assiduously cultivated since the Agency's 
inception in 1947. 
27 Loch K. Johnson, A Season of Inquiry: The Senate Intelligence Investigation 
{Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 1985); FrankJ. Smist, Jr., 
Congress Oversees the United States Intelligence Community, 1947-1994, 2nd ed. 
(Knoxville: The University of Tennessee Press, 1994); for a detailed 
examination of William Colby's role in the investigations, see John Prados, 
Lost Crusader: The Secret Wars of CIA Director William Colby (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2003), 297-330. 
28 Olmsted,169. 
29 Jeffreys-Jones, 214-215. 
11 
With the passage of time, as Jeffreys-Jones suggests, the CIA's image 
did improve, but this development should be attributed at least in part to the 
pu~lic relations strategy of the CIA. Critics of the Agency in the 1970s 
directly challenged the "culture of secrecy" at Langley, and more than 
anything else, CIA higher-ups sought to protect that culture at all costs. In 
The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence, Marks and Marchetti specifically warned 
that "secrecy and deception in intelligence operations are as much to keep the 
Congress and the public from learning what their government is doing as to 
shield these activities from the opposition."30 As the Agency withheld 
information from Congress and the American public, they observed, it 
simultaneously promoted a clandestine mystique "designed to have us 
admire it as some sort of mysterious, often magical profession capable of 
accomplishing terribly difficult, if not miraculous, deeds."31 Marks and 
Marchetti recognized that public relations and government secrecy were 
simply two sides of the same coin, but unfortunately, they failed to elaborate 
on this crucial insight. 
In 1989, Marchetti delivered a paper at a conference that re-visited 
several of the themes that he had raised fifteen years earlier. But rather than 
focusing on the inner-workings of the CIA, he chose to examine the ways in 
which the Agency aggressively guarded its own history. These PR schemes 
presented a unique challenge to scholars interested in studying the Agency: 
"By suppressing historical fact, and by manufacturing historical fiction, the 
CIA, with its obsessive secrecy and its vast resources, has posed a particular 
30 1\-farchetti and Marks, 6. 
31 Ibid. 
12 
threat to the right of Americans to be informed for the present and future by 
an objective knowledge of the past. As long as the CIA continues to 
manipulate history, historians of its activities must be Revisionist if we are to 
know the truth about the agency's activities, past and present."32 My study, 
which traces the history of CIA public relations from the early 1970s through 
December 2007, confirms Marchetti's accusations. In fact, I have found it 
constructive to embrace a research methodology that analyzes both CIA 
secrecy and CIA public relations, since they have been inseparable from each 
other. The study opens with a nuanced discussion of the "Year of 
Intelligence" that illustrates the multi-faceted threat to the "culture of 
secrecy" at Langley. In addition to confronting the Congressional committees, 
I reveal that the CIA had to deal with criticism on the far Left as well as the 
far Right. Chapter 1 provides the first detailed history of Counter-Spy, a left 
wing magazine founded in 1973 that called for the abolition of covert action. 
The magazine's editors directly challenged the "culture of secrecy" by 
publishing the names of CIA operatives. Chapter 2 shows how conservatives 
embarked on a very different confrontation with the Agency. Like Counter-
Spy, they charged that the Agency was keeping secrets from the American 
people, but their concern was with Agency analysis of the Soviet Union rather 
than covert action. In many ways, Hollywood anticipated the pervasive 
backlash against the CIA .. Chapter 3 analyzes several espionage movies 
released between 1973 and 1975. 
32 Victor Marchetti, "Propaganda and Disinformation: How the CIA 
Manufactures History," Journal of Historical Review 9 (Fall1989): 319. 
13 
The dissertation's second section, Chapters 4-7, outlines how the CIA 
has used public relations to fight back against its critics since the 1970s. 
Admiral Stansfield Turner, the CIA director under President Carter, 
established a modern Office of Public Affairs at Langley in 1977. There has 
been tremendous continuity in CIA public relations since then. First, and 
most importantly, the PR staff has attempted to project an image of openness 
and accountability. Second, they have perpetuated the CIA's mystique, 
portraying the Agency as the heroic guardian of national security. 110ur 
failures are known, our successes are not" has been a recurring mantra of this 
initiative. Third, PR officials have done their best to put a positive spin on 
secrecy. Turner's director of public affairs went so far as to suggest that there 
was 11 [m]ore openness with greater secrecy."33 
The history of PR at the CIA may appear fairly innocuous at first 
glance, but this history must be considered in conjunction with the Agency's 
successful efforts to withhold documents from historians and the media. 
While Admiral Turner described the CIA as the most open intelligence 
agency in the world, he was trying to undercut the Freedom of Information 
Act (FOIA) and the ability of former employees to publish memoirs. Turner's 
successor, William Casey, continued the fight against the FOIA and secured 
passage of the CIA Information Act in 1984. He also employed PR in a 
clandestine domestic campaign to win public support for covert action in 
Central America. In the years following the end of the Cold War, the actions 
33 
"ABC GOOD MORNING AMERICA 19 SEPTEMBER 1977," Briefing book 
prepared by Public Affairs Office for Admiral Turner, Document No. 
CK3100202484-CK3100202532, Declassified Documents Reference System 
[DDRS] (Declassified, 11 April1985), Tab E, 2. 
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of CIA directors have repeatedly contradicted their public rhetoric. In 
February 1992, then CIA Director Robert M. Gates boldly promised a new era 
of openness, but he failed to deliver. While claiming in 1998 that the Agency 
did not have enough funds in the budget to continue the voluntary de-
classification program, George Tenet, the CIA chief from 1997 to 2004, had no 
trouble acquiring the money to sponsor a covert program to "re-classify" CIA 
documents at the National Archives. 
The poisonous relationship between PR and secrecy is not unique to 
the CIA. In The Presidency and Individual Liberties, published in 1961, Richard 
Longaker recognized the widespread abuse of the classification system: 
"Exploiting the legitimate claims of secrecy, the executive branch habitually 
overclassifies documents, absurdly segments scientific research, and 
maintains convenient shields to protect administrators from the curiosity of 
the public and the press."34 Unless something was done to challenge the 
excessive secrecy, he warned, "the public will be forced to subsist on the 
. sugar-water of the public relations man, and important aspects of public 
policy as well as administrative errors will go unobserved by Congress, the 
press, and the electorate."35 
Nearly fifty years after Longaker wrote these words, the twin dangers 
of PR and secrecy have assumed more importance than ever before. This 
dissertation will use the CIA as a case study to illustrate how the complex 
interplay between secrecy and public relations undermines historical 
34 Richard P. Longaker, The Presidency and Individual Liberties (Ithaca, New 
York: Cornell University Press, 1961), 175. 
35 Ibid., 181; see also Philip H. Melanson, Secrecy Wars: National Security, 
Privacy, and the Public's Right to Know (Washington, DC: Brassey's, 2001), 183. 
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research. As any institution within a democracy, the CIA must be held 
accountable for its actions-past and present. But by withholding documents 
from scholars, Agency officials have effectively manipulated the historical 
record to create a mystique that has been repeatedly used to thwart calls for 
greater oversight. 
CHAPTER I 
WATCHING BIG BROTHER: COUNTER-SPY, NORMAN MAILER, 
AND THE FIFTH ESTATE, 1973-1976 
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As Norman Mailer approached his fiftieth birthday in 1973, he was 
closely guarding a secret, something so important that he would later 
describe it "as the best political idea in my entire life."1 Mailer, author of such 
classics as The Naked and the Dead (1948) and The Armies of the Night (1968), 
had been deeply influenced by the political and social turmoil of the previous 
decade and had run unsuccessfully for mayor of New York City in 1969 with 
"No More Bullshit" as his campaign slogan. Mailer made it well known that 
he was keeping a secret, and he sent out around five thousand invitations to 
his birthday party, promising to "make an announcement of national 
importance (major)" at the event.2 Given his reputation for activism and his 
legendary combative personality, it is not surprising that over five hundred 
people attended Mailer's party on February 5 at Manhattan's posh Four 
Seasons. Andy Warhol, Bernardo Bertolucci, Pete Hamill, George Plimpton, 
Larry McMurtry, Senator Jacob Javits (Republican-New York), Eugene 
McCarthy, Shirley MacLaine, Jack Lemmon, and Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. all 
showed up to hear Mailer reveal his secret.3 
1 Hilary Mills, Mailer: A Biography (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1984), 394; 
"Mailer Clarifies His 'Fifth Estate': Says Its Goals and Structure Are Still Not 
Decided On/' New York Times, 7 February 1973,84. 
2 Mills, 389. 
3 For descriptions of Mailer's birthday party, see Mary V. Dearborn, Mailer: A 
Biography (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1999), 1-10; Carl Rollyson, The Lives 
of Norman Mailer: A Biography (New York: Paragon House, 1991), 250-251; 
Mills, 388;..392; Mel Gussow, "Mailer's Guests ($50 a Couple) Hear His Plan 
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The evening began around 10:00PM with considerable anticipation, 
but by the time Mailer was introduced, he had downed several glasses of 
bourbon. His speech, which he prefaced with a dirty joke, was incoherent 
and poorly received. He called for a Fifth Estate that would be "a people's 
FBI and a people's CIA to investigate those two [agencies] .... If we have a 
democratic secret police keeping tabs on Washington's secret police, which is 
not democratic but bureaucratic, we will see how far paranoia is justified."4 
The disappointment with the announcement was obvious, and many guests 
simply walked out on Mailer. As Jules Peiffer later explained, "it was a 
wonderful evening that had stayed wonderful until the guest of honor got up 
and made a mess of it."5 One woman complained about the sexist joke he had 
told and proceeded to physically attack him.6 Perplexed by Mailer's drunken 
proposal for a Fifth Estate to monitor the FBI and CIA, but not angered, Pete 
Hamill wondered, "Why couldn't he just give a party and have everyone 
throw balloons?"7 The guest of honor was distraught over the negative 
response, and when someone expressed sympathy with his idea and asked 
for more details, Mailer ended the conversation abruptly: "I don't know. I'm 
too drunk and too stupid."8 At the end of the party, when only a few people 
remained, Mailer entertained them with an impromptu boxing match against 
on 'Secret Police,'" New York Times, 6 February 1973, 23; Linda Francke, "A 
Half Century of Mailer," Newsweek, 19 February 1973, 78; Lucian K. Truscott 
IV, "'People's CIA?': and Mailer's Birthday," Village Voice, 8 February 1973, 1, 
24-26. 
4 Mills, 391. 
5 Peter Manso, Mailer: His Life and Times (New York: Simon and Schuster, 
1985), 533. 
6 Sally Quinn, "Norman Mailer Turns 50," Washington Post, 7 February 1973, 
B7. 
7 Francke, 78. 
8 Quinn, B7. 
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Joe Shaw, a professional fighter. The birthday extravaganza finally came to 
an end shortly after 3:30AM.9 
If nothing else, Mailer had boldly and sensationally declared war on 
the "culture of secrecy" at the CIA and FBI. Yet when he awoke after the 
evening of heavy drinking, he immediately recognized that his performance 
at the Four Seasons had jeopardized his vision of a Fifth Estate. He appeared 
at a press conference to clarify his proposal where he declared it was time "to 
face up to the possibility that the country may be sliding toward 
totalitarianism."10 Mailer specifically mentioned the need to further 
investigate the findings of the Warren Commission and the Watergate break-
in, extending the hope that the Fifth Estate would someday compare to the 
ACLU in stature. "When you have a country as morally dastardly as this," he 
said, "you begin to question the whole shape of the country."11 He explained 
that a steering committee would be assembled to supervise the creation of the 
Fifth Estate, and rather than running the organization himself, he wanted to 
have "an umbilical relationship" with it. 12 As he was wrapping up the press 
conference, Mailer acknowledged that the project might be a failure: "This 
may appeal to only 10 percent of the people. There may be apathy because 
people don't like to be told they're impotent."13 
Mailer was suggesting that the Fourth Estate (the media) was poorly 
equipped to expose government conspiracies. Such conspiracies, if they 
9 Francke, 78. 
10 
"Mailer Clarifies His 'Fifth Estate': Says Its Goals and Structure Are Still 
Not Decided On," 84. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid. 
13 
'"I Was a Hint Too Drunk, Quote Unquote,"' Washington Post, 7 February 
1973, B7. 
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existed, required years of detailed scholarly research to uncover. Not 
surprisingly, most accounts of the birthday party did not take the Fifth Estate 
proposal seriously. When a reviewer for the New York Times took aim at the 
idea a few weeks after the announcement, Mailer, never afraid to pick a fight 
with his critics, responded to the attack with a lengthy essay that offered a 
more coherent outline of the Fifth Estate. He admitted that his drunken 
announcement at the Four Seasons "was a disgrace. It had neither wit nor 
life-it was perhaps the worst speech on a real occasion that the orator ever 
made."14 But despite the inadequate presentation of his idea, Mailer believed 
that there were larger reasons why so few people were expressing interest in 
the Fifth Estate. He made reference to the assassinations of John and Robert 
Kennedy, Malcolm X, Martin Luther King, Jr., and the attempted murder of 
George Wall ace. Having confronted so much violence and national tragedy 
in recent years, Americans were dealing with "surrealistic shock," and Mailer 
concluded that, as a result, "we must probably numb ourselves in advance in 
order to bear the next disaster."15 
He worried that the emotional toll of this shock was leading to both 
apathy and conspiracy thinking. Sinc.e people are naturally inclined to create 
explanations for events that they cannot fully understand, blaming tragedy 
on shadowy conspiracies was inevitable. Yet Mailer was concerned that no 
one was checking out any of these theories. "Is our history developing into a 
string of connected conspiracies, or is there less ground finally for our 
14 Norman Mailer, "The Morning After," New York Times Book Review, 11 
March 1973. 
15 Ibid. 
20 
national paranoia than any have supposed," he asked.16 Perhaps after 
thorough investigation, it would turn out that Lee Harvey Oswald was truly 
a lone gunman. Perhaps the Watergate break-in was simply a botched 
burglary and nothing more. Once again, Mailer emphasized the limitations 
of "the walled-in eyes of the poisoned Fourth [Estate]" that only could be 
corrected with an organization devoted to intensive research of controversial 
events of national importance.17 He suggested that there might be some 
cooperation between the Fourth and Fifth Estate. Because the media often 
received obscure leads on a variety of stories that they did not properly 
explore given limited resources and tight deadlines, Mailer thought that the 
Fourth Estate could possibly share information with the Fifth Estate after it 
developed into a reputable organization.18 
According to Hilary Mills, one of Mailer's many biographers, the 
prolific author eventually discussed "his counterintelligence Fifth Estate plan 
on more than twenty campuses and would compile a list of several hundred 
people interested in watching the CIA and FBI."19 Although Mailer's critics 
considered him a paranoid, the investigative reporting of Bob Woodward and 
Carl. Bernstein ultimately demonstrated that there was indeed a massive 
conspiracy surrounding Watergate. These revelations prompted Frank 
Crowther, who had helped organize Mailer's birthday party in February, to 
write an article in the Village Voice that attempted to revive his friend's image. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid. 
181bid. 
19 Mills, 394. 
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"Not only was Mailer right," argued. Crowther, "he was prophetic."20 Mailer 
had long suggested that there was a story behind Watergate, but when he had 
proposed the Fifth Estate, he was apparently unaware that a similar 
organization already existed. Nat Hentoff brought this to Mailer's attention 
in his Village Voice column one week after Crowther's article. Hentoff 
explained that a group of former intelligence officers had formed the 
Committee for Action/Research on the Intelligence Community (CARIC) 
back in 1972. They published a magazine known as Counter-Spy, and after 
hearing about Mailer's call for a Fifth Estate, they attempted to contact him. 
As they told Hentoff, however, "we've never been able to get past his 
[Mailer's] secretary."21 Hentoff encouraged readers to provide support to 
CARIC, because "in following and expanding his [Daniel Ellsberg's] lead, 
[CARIC] is working full-time for all of us."22 He even made a direct appeal to 
Mailer: "Norman, these three ex-intelligence agents are legitimate. I mean 
really legitimate."23 
The three former intelligence officers that Hentoff referred to were 
Winslow Peck, Tim Butz, and Kenneth Barton Osborn. "Winslow Peck" was 
actually the pseudonym of Perry Fellwock. After spending about four years 
in Air Force intelligence working in collaboration with the secretive National 
Security Agency (NSA), Fellwock left the intelligence community and 
eventually revealed his secrets to Ramparts magazine in 1972 using his 
2° Frank Crowther, "Mailer's 5th Estate: Who's Paranoid Now?," Village Voice, 
12 July 1973, 12; Angus Mackenzie, Secrets: The CIA's War at Home (Berkeley 
and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1997), 58. 
21 Nat Hentoff, "After Ellsberg: Counter-Spy," Village Voice, 19 July 1973, 28. 
22 Ibid. . 
23 Ibid; Mackenzie, 59. 
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pseudonym. James Bamford, the leading expert on the NSA, observes that 
while some of Fellwock's revelations proved inaccurate, "the majority of the 
sixteen-page article was, unfortunately for the [NSA], quite accurate."24 
Around the time he decided to tell his story to Ramparts, Fellwock developed 
the idea for an organization to monitor the intelligence establishment. He 
explained to Hentoff that when he joined the Air Force, he "was apolitical at 
the time. But then I went to Vietnam for NSA, and that was no game. I was 
killing people."25 
Like Fellwock, Tim Butz had served in Vietnam with Air Force 
intelligence where he provided ground support for the aerial reconnaissance 
missions of a RF4C Phantom 2 spy plane; in addition to collecting intelligence 
on North Vietnam, these flights also routinely entered the airspace of Laos 
and Cambodia.26 Hoping to put his life back together after returning from the 
war, Butz became a student at Kent State University. Allison Krause, one of 
the four students killed by the National Guard at Kent State in May 1970, was 
Butz's friend. As Angus Mackenzie observes, Butz's outrage over the tragedy 
convinced him to establish a local branch of Vietnam Veterans Against the 
War at the university. He later joined forces with Fellwock, a fellow member 
of the anti-war organization, and early in 1973 they began to publish Counter-
Spy out of Butz's apartment in Washington, DC.27 
The other founding member of CARIC was K. Barton Osborn. 
Assigned to Army intelligence in Vietnam during the late 1960s, his tour of 
24 James Bamford, The Puzzle Palace: A Report on America's Most Secret Agency 
(New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1982; reprint, New York: Penguin, 1983), 334. 
25 Hentoff, 23. 
26 Mackenzie, 59; see also Hentoff, 23. 
27 Mackenzie, 59. 
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duty disillusioned him, and he became involved in the protest movement as 
well. Claiming direct knowledge of Operation Phoenix, the CIA's 
controversial counter-insurgency program against the Viet Cong, Osborn told 
a House Subcommittee in 1971 that the CIA was fully aware of severe 
prisoner abuses. The CIA had established interrogation centers in every 
province of South Vietnam, and based on his experiences in Quang Nam, 
Osborn explained to the subcommittee: "I never knew in the course of all 
those operations any detainee to live through his interrogation .... There was 
never any reasonable establishment of the fact that any one of those 
individuals was, in fact, cooperating with the VC, but they all died and the 
majority were either tortured to death or things like thrown out of 
helicopters.1128 Osborn was initially an editor of Counter-Spy along with Butz 
and Fellwock, and starting with the fall issue in 1974, he moved to the 
magazine's advisory board. 
Soon after Mailer discovered the existence of CARIC, he met with Butz 
and Fellwock at the bar inside the Watergate complex. He agreed to support 
28 Osborn quoted in Douglas Valentine, The Phoenix Program (New York: 
William Morrow, 1990), 347; Kenneth Barton Osborn, "The CIA Scalpel Cut 
Deep," Playboy, August 1975, 58; see also Hentoff, 23; it should be noted that 
MarkMoyar has challenged the accuracy of Osborn's 1971 testimony, 
accusing historians of "a disturbing unwillingness to investigate the 
truthfulness of his claims." Moyar's main evidence against Osborn is the 
report of an investigation performed by Army intelligence officials after 
Osborn went to Congress with his allegations. Since Moyar criticizes other 
historians for failing to critically evaluate their sources, it is somewhat strange 
that he does not explore the potential weaknesses of the internal investigation 
of Osborn, for it should be obvious that Army intelligence had much to gain 
by discrediting him. It is certainly possible that Osborn exaggerated at times, 
but until more documents about Operation Phoenix are de-classified, the 
debate surrounding his role in the program will probably remain 
inconclusive. See Moyar, Phoenix and the Birds of Prey: The CIA's Secret 
Campaign to Destroy the VietCong (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute 
Press, 1997), 94. 
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them financially, and his funding continued until early 1976?9 It is important 
to emphasize here that Mailer did not create Counter-Spy; in fact, by the time 
of the meeting at the Watergate, two issues of the magazine had been 
published already.30 The first issue of Counter-Spy, which came out in March 
1973, began with a one-page description of CARIC, which included the 
following declaration: "We all know that Big Brother is watching, but no one 
in our government has taken the time to explain who is being spied upon, 
and why we are being watched. Too often, we American citizens don't even 
know who Big Brother is."31 The members of CARIC announced that their 
organization would "serve as an independent 'watchdog' on the government 
spy apparatus" and inform the public of their findings; they made it clear that 
because of the people's right to know, "[t]he secrecy with which the 
government surrounds itself must stop."32 The inaugural issue featured an 
article about FBI infiltration of right wing groups in San Diego that raised 
questions about the use of informants. Counter-Spy contended that the FBI 
was abusing their authority and collaborating with local police deparbnents 
29 Mackenzie, 59-60; Dearborn, 395. 
30 According to Mary Dearborn, "Tim Butz and Winslow Peck [Perry 
Fellwock], leaders of the group [CARIC], had approached Norman in 1972 
and asked him to join." In other words, Dearborn's narrative wrongly 
suggests that Mailer was aware of CARIC prior to his birthday party on 
February 5, 1973. Mailer's meeting with Butz and Fellwock took place in 
1973, not 1972. CARIC did attempt to contact Mailer before Hentoff' s column 
in July, but there is no evidence that they were successful. See Dearborn, 6; 
Philip Agee, a former CIA official who became an advisor to Counter-Spy, has 
also mistakenly given Mailer credit for founding the magazine. See Agee, On 
The Run (Secaucus, New Jersey: Lyle Stuart, 1987), 100. 
31 
"Why CARIC?," Counter-Spy 1 (March 1973): 1; Mackenzie, 59. 
32 
"Why CARIC?," 1. 
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to disrupt groups that they perceived to be subversive, which, in many cases, 
were a~tually committed to non-violent protest.33 
The second issue contained a detailed examination of pacification 
efforts in Vietnam that attempted to place the CIA's Phoenix program in 
historical context. The article discussed the French counter-insurgency 
strategy in Vietnam after World War II. Using information gleaned from The 
Pentagon Papers and other sources, Counter-Spy traced the gradual escalation 
of American intervention in the aftermath of the French withdrawal in the 
mid-1950s. They assessed early CIA involvement under the leadership of 
Edward Lansdale, the failure of the agroville project, and the similar fate of 
the Strategic Hamlet Program in the 1960s. From the perspective of Counter-
Spy, "the pacification effort has been do9med to failure from the inherent 
contradiction of the American involvement-trying to make peace by waging 
war .... "34 Frustrated by the continued instability in the country, the CIA 
formulated a counter-insurgency program that evolved into Operation 
Phoenix, described by Counter-Spy as "a systematic murder program" that 
"had the counterproductive effect in the provinces of instilling fear and hate 
for the GVN [government of South Vietnam] in the hearts and minds of an 
over-taxed and exploited rural population."35 Included at the end of the 
article were diagrams of the command structure for both Operation Phoenix 
and its successor program, F-6.36 
33 
"The FBI and the Paramilitary Right: Partners in Terror," Counter-Spy 1 
(March 1973): 4-12. . 
34 
"Pacification: The 100 Year Flight of the Phoenix," Counter-Spy 1 (May 
1973): 5. 
35 Ibid., 21-22. 
36 Ibid., 26-27. 
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Through their expose of Phoenix, Counter-Spy clearly wanted to hold 
American officials accountable for their actions. They printed the names of 
individuals involved in the various pacification campaigns, and this list 
included Thomas Polgar, then CIA Station chief in Saigon, in addition to his 
five predecessors.37 Accusing William Colby of committing perjury when he 
testified to Congress about Operation Phoenix, Counter-Spy called on him to 
resign. Anyone with "a career of directing assassination and torture 
programs can play no legitimate part in US government," they charged.38 
Despite the controversy over Colby's role in the Phoenix program, however, 
Richard Nixon appointed him to replace James Schlesinger as DCI later that 
year, and the Senate confirmed him. It appeared that few people were 
listening to Counter-Spy, but the editors remained determined to uncover 
evidence of malfeasance within the intelligence community. In the next 
issue, they wrote another story about American intervention in Southeast 
Asia, claiming that the intelligence establishment had helped overthrow the 
Cambodian government in 1970. The article blamed the United States for 
failing to accept Cambodia's neutralism and also criticized the Cold War 
mentality of "equating a nationalistic anti-imperialism with communism."39 
After the issue on Cambodia in the fall of 1973, Counter-Spy was not 
published again until the following summer. The summer edition, which 
contained both the fourth and fifth issue of volume one, obviously benefited 
from Mailer's donations. The magazine, now published from Suite 519 of the 
Dupont Circle Building, soon expanded to over fifty pages and displayed 
37 1bid., 7 . 
38 1bid., 24. 
39 
"TARGET: Sihanouk," Counter-Spy 1 (Fall1973): 5. 
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improved copy-editing, although it still contained some typographical errors. 
CARIC's new name was the Organizing Committee for a Fifth Estate, a 
change that Mailer apparently requested to Butz and Fellwock. The summer 
issue of Counter-Spy in 1974 was devoted to terrorism. The magazine 
predicted that the topic was destined to receive increasing attention in the 
years ahead: "the focus of security agencies in the United States has shifted 
from combating monolithic communism and dissent at home to the new 
focus of counter-terrorism. Terrorists are being promoted within the security 
community as the new 'Bogey Men,' and agencies are requesting less 
restraints and more money to develop new techniques."40 In keeping with 
the terrorist theme of the issue, Butz wrote a story on the FBI's 
counterintelligence program (COINTELPR0).41 In retrospect, there was 
undoubtedly a conspiracy theory dimension to the issue's coverage of 
terrorism, but recent events have demonstrated that their underlying 
prediction in 1974 was accurate, since counterterrorism has certainly emerged 
as the primary mission of the American intelligence establishment.42 
In the second volume of Counter-Spy, the editors became far more 
focused on the activities of the OA. Perry Fellwock, for instance, published a 
detailed overview of the relationship between the CIA and organized labor. 
He discussed Jay Lovestone's role in charting the AFL-CIO's foreign policy; 
"He, more than any other man, was responsible for shaping that policy, 
40 The issue was titled "Terrorism: What's Behind It?" "Editorial," Counter-
Spy 1 (June 197 4): 2. 
41 Tim Butz, "COINTELPRO: An Analysis of the FBI Memos," Counter-Spy 1 
(June 1974): 19-25. 
42 The editors warned "that terrorist groups will either be formed or 
manipulated to justify the designs of those persons who have made security 
their lives." Counter-Spy 1 (June 1974): 2. 
28 
including its allegiance with the CIA."43 Because of the AFL-CIO' s 
willingness to cooperate with the Agency, "the CIA has been able to establish 
a pro-CIA infrastructure among foreign labor. This infrastructure has been 
used to gather information on foreign workers, governments and Third 
World national liberation movements," Fellwock alleged.44 Compelling 
evidence indicated that the CIA manipulated an organization called the 
American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD) in order to collect 
this intelligence, and according to Fellwock, "a CIA case officer is undercover 
in almost every AIFLD office abroad."45 
The subsequent Counter-Spy, an issue dedicated entirely to the CIA, 
provided even more information on AIFLD, and it also told readers of 
another organization that the CIA had infiltrated.46 A woman named Ann 
Roberts had brought her concerns about the Overseas Education Fund (OEF) 
to the Fifth Estate. After further investigating the OEF, a branch of the 
League of Women Voters, Counter-Spy fout:td significant interlocking 
relationships with CIA officers that strongly suggested OEF was gathering 
"intelligence data under the guide [sic] of international sisterhood" 
unbeknownst to most of its members.47 The story about the CIA and OEF, 
43 Winslow Peck [Perry Fellwock], "Oandestine Enforcement of U. S. Foreign 
Labor Policy," Counter-Spy 2 (Fa111974): 38. 
44 1bid., 27. 
45 1bid., 43; for a good overview of the CIA-AIFLD connection, see Ronald 
Radosh, American Labor and United States Foreign Policy (New York: Vintage 
Books, 1969), 431-433; for more on Jay Lovestone's ties to the CIA, which were 
confirmed when his personal papers were opened to the public, see Ted 
Morgan, A Covert Life: Jay Lovestone (New York: Random House, 1999), esp. 
Chp. 12 and Chp. 13. 
46 
"AIFLD Order of Battle," Counter-Spy 2 (Winter 1975): 38-42. 
47 
"CIA TARGET: WOMEN: The Inside Story of the Overseas Education 
Fund," Counter-Spy 2 (Winter 1975): 11. 
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however, was a relatively minor feature of the winter edition of 1975. This 
issue, the most famous ever published by Counter-Spy, devoted a section to 
the identification of over one hundred CIA station chiefs around the world. 
"The time has come for the cloak of secrecy surrounding the activities of the 
CIA to be examined and cut down to size, a size that reflects the people's 
right to know," said the magazine's editors in a preface to the list of CIA 
officials.48 For every chief of station and chief of base mentioned, Counter-Spy 
provided their address-typically an American consulate or embassy-and a 
few pieces of biographical information. In the same issue, Philip Agee, who 
had just published a controversial book detailing the operations that he 
learned of while a CIA officer in Ecuador, Uruguay, and Mexico, praised the 
magazine for naming names: "Having this information, the peoples 
victimized by the CIA and the economic exploitation that CIA enforces can 
bring pressure on their so-often compromised governments to expell [sic] the 
CIA people. And, in the absence of such expulsions, which will not be 
uncommon, the people themselves will have to decide what they must do to 
rid themselves of CIA."49 
It was not the first time that Counter-Spy had revealed the identities of 
CIA officers, but the scope of the revelations gave many observers the 
impression that Agee was responsible for them. He had attached a twenty-
five page appendix to Inside The Company that was a "list of CIA employees, 
agents and collaborators and of organizations which ... were either financed, 
48 
"Chiefs of Station: Who's Who and What They Do," Counter-Spy 2 (Winter 
1975): 23. 
49 Philip Agee, "Exposing The CIA," Counter-Spy 2 (Winter 1975): 20. 
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influenced or controlled by the CIA,"50 so he was a ~ogical suspect. In reality, 
however, Counter-Spy had learned how to identify CIA officials using two 
State Deparbnent publications. John Marks, who co-authored The CIA and the 
Cult of Intelligence with Victor Marchetti, was a former State Deparbnent 
official, and in November 1974, he contributed an article to The Washington 
Monthly titled "How to Spot a Spook" that outlined a detailed method of 
exposing CIA operatives. Marks argued that the CIA was undermining the 
image of the United States by fO<::using too much attention on covert 
operations: "Could any rational person, after surveying the history of the last 
20 years, from Guatemala to Cuba to Vietnam-and now Chile-contend that 
the CIA's clandestine activities have yielded anything but a steady stream of 
disaster? The time has come to abolish them."51 Once the CIA stopped 
intervening in the affairs of other countries, Marks thought that it would be 
better equipped to gather and analyze intelligence. 
By cross-referencing the Biographic Register with the Foreign Service List, 
Marks explained, it was possible to uncover CIA officers stationed in 
American embassies. He pointed out that "more than a quarter of the 5,435 
employees who purportedly work for State overseas are actually with the 
CIA."52 To show how easy it was to pinpoint CIA officers on the Foreign 
Service List, Marks advised readers to look for employees described as Foreign 
50 Philip Agee, Inside the Company: CIA Diary (London: Penguin Books, 1975), 
599. 
51 John Marks, "How To Spot A Spook," Washington Monthly 6 (November 
1974): 11; Agee, On The Run, 100-101; Kathryn S. Olmsted, Challenging the 
Secret Government: The Post-Watergate Investigations of the CIA and FBI (Chapel 
Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1996), 151. 
52 Marks, 6. 
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Service Reserve (FSR) or Foreign Service Staff (FSS).53 Since there were State 
Department employees legitimately designated as FSR and FSS, the proper 
identification of operatives required additional steps. First, employees 
categorized on the Foreign Service List as both FSR and political officers were 
most likely CIA officials. Second, after obtaining the names of suspected CIA 
operatives, their profiles in the Biographic Register were almost always 
different than actual State Department officials. Marks revealed that Agency 
employees typically had short biographies with "gaping holes," and in the 
event that the Register indicated an individual had previously worked as "an 
'analyst' for the Deparhnent of the Army (or Navy or Air Force), you can bet 
that he or she is really working for the CIA."54 
Counter-Spy followed the directions outlined in "How to Spot a Spook" 
to identify CIA station chiefs for the winter issue in 1975. On page twenty-six 
of that issue, there was a brief entry for Richard S. Welch that listed him as 
the CIA's chief of station in Lima, Peru and offered some biographical 
information: "Born Connecticut, December 14, 1929. Graduated from 
Harvard in 1951. Has served in Cyprus, Guatemala, and Guyana."55 The 
editors of Counter-Spy had no idea that the inclusion of Welch's name would 
turn out to be the most controversial item ever printed in the history of their 
magazine. 
Ironically, Welch was actually serving as CIA station chief in Athens, 
not Lima, when Greek terrorists gunned him down on December 23, 1975 as 
53 Ibid. 
54 Ibid., 7. 
55 
"Chiefs of Station: Who's Who and What They Do," 26. 
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he was coming back from a holiday party.56 The Athens News had printed a 
letter to the editor on November 25 from a group that called themselves the 
"Committee of Greeks and Greek Americans to Prevent Their Country, Their 
Fatherland, from Being Perverted to the Uses of the CIA."57 According to 
Kathryn Olmsted, this letter contained Welch's "name, address, and phone 
number."58 It appears, then, that Welch would have been murdered even 
without the Counter-Spy disclosure. But what was the magazine attempting 
to achieve with the exposure of CIA officers? In the issue preceding the 1975 
edition that disclosed Welch's name, the editors had renounced violence. 
"We believe that armed struggle is not, at this time, a valid tactic for opposing 
the forces of reaction," they said. "Such attempts are suicidal, unnecessary, 
and play into the hands of those committed to fascism."59 
Rather than encouraging violence against CIA officials, Counter-Spy 
claimed that they were trying to force the Agency to withdraw their 
operatives, a pivotal step in bringing an end to covert action. Yet there is no 
question that the magazine was taking a radical approach in their opposition 
to the intelligence establishment. Nothing reflects this better than the press 
release that the Fifth Estate issued the day after Welch was killed. According 
to the statement, "if anyone is to blame for Mr. Welch's death itis the C. I. A. 
that sent him there to spy, perhaps even to intervene, in the affairs of the 
Greek Government."60 It also called attention to America's contribution to 
56 Mackenzie, 65; Olmsted, 151; John M. Crewdson, "Slaying of C. I. A. Officer 
Stirs a Debate on Identity Disclosures," New York Times, 4 January 1976, 2. 
57 Mackenzie, 65. 
58 Olmsted, 151; Mackenzie, 65, 89-90 .. 
59 Counter-Spy 2 (Fall1974): 47. 
60 
"C. I. A. Blamed for Death," New York Times, 25 December 1975, 3. 
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government repression in Greece and the CIA's role in "U. S.-supported 
tortures, imprisonment, and death [there], as well as intervention in the 
country of Cyprus."61 In response to the press release, the CIA and its 
supporters immediately went on the offensive. Agee later recalled that his 
friends in the Fifth Estate "were literally under siege-several times [they] 
had to call police for protection after threatening phone calls."62 DCI William 
Colby lashed out at the Fifth Estate's words, arguing that they were 
exploiting the tragedy to further their radical agenda: "The so-called 
Counterspy of The Fifth Estate, without even an expression of human 
sympathy, has issued a statement which can only be called a shocking 
attempt to use the death of a dedicated American as fuel for its irresponsible 
and paranoic [sic] attack on other Americans serving their country here and 
abroad."63 
Counter-Spy ultimately survived the ordeal, but the backlash proved 
costly. The most significant casualty of the negative publicity was Mailer, the 
symbolic leader of the Fifth Estate. Although his main contribution to the 
Fifth Estate was monetary, Mailer had attempted to re-invigorate it in the 
spring/ summer issue of Counter-Spy in 1975. "The irony is that in fighting 
Communism," Mailer warned, "we have come to a point where we have been 
61 Mackenzie, 90. 
62 Agee, On The Run, 132. 
63 
"C. I. A. Blamed for Death," 3; Colby would later downplay the role of 
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destroying our own potential."64 Not surprisingly, he singled out the CIA as 
one institution that undermined this national potential. He referred to the 
Agency as "a sinister element in American life, as capable of destroying the 
reasonably free play of human forces as any other spiritual Mafia," and he 
even suggested that the CIA might be controlling "the Federal Reserve, the 
Securities Exchange Commission, and the stock market."65 Over two years 
earlier, Mailer had wondered out loud in front of his birthday guests "how 
far paranoia is justified."66 He was now convinced that his paranoia was 
totally justified. He proclaimed that the CIA "has manipulated and 
despoliated every left-wing movement in America" and "savaged the heart of 
Black militancy" through "so many dirty tricks and illicit manipulations of 
history .... "67 Despite Mailer's impassioned rhetoric, he stopped supporting 
the Fifth Estate shortly after Welch's death. The IRS had revoked the 
organization's tax exemption, and as Mary Dearborn explains, the 
government "put a fifty-thousand-dollar lien on Norman's Brooklyn Heights 
property, presumably because he was taking deductions relating to the Fifth 
Estate's tax-exempt status."68 
Mailer's withdrawal from Counter-Spy forever changed the magazine. 
Starting with the winter issue of 1976, the editors dropped the hyphen and 
Counter-Spy became CounterSpy, but this was a relatively minor development 
compared to the issues that were dividing the magazine's staff. According to 
64 Norman Mailer, "The CIA vs. Democracy," Counter-Spy 2 (Spring/Summer 
1975): 41. . 
65 Ibid. 
66 Mills, 391. 
67 Mailer, "The CIA vs. Democracy," 41. 
68 Dearborn, 395; Agee, On The Run, 120. 
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the recollection of Agee, a member of CounterSpy's advisory board, financial 
difficulties, fear of prosecution, and personality conflicts "had paralyzed the 
magazine."69 With the problems mounting, the editors continued to expose 
the identities of CIA officers in a section of the magazine known as "CIA 
Around the World." The three issues that appeared in 1976 also included 
more revelations about the intelligence community. The winter issue had a 
story about American intervention in Angola, while the spring issue featured 
yet another examination of the FBI's COINTELPRO program by Tim Butz?0 
The December CounterSpy marked the end of an era. Butz had recently 
left the magazine, and the only editor that remained from the early days in 
1973 was Perry Fellwock, who was still using his pseudonym. Fellwock 
wrote in the issue about the murder of Orlando Letelier, a Chilean diplomat 
who had been deposed along with Salvador Allende in 1973. Fellwock 
accused Pinochet's intelligence service (DINA) of orchestrating the car 
bombing on embassy row in Washington, DC that killed Letelier, but he did 
not end there. Not only did he claim that there were close ties between DINA 
and the CIA, he told readers of an elaborate plot to target left-leaning groups 
throughout Latin America.71 Although Fellwock's article most likely sounded 
like a bizarre conspiracy theory at the time, future revelations about 
69 Agee, On The Run, 220. . . 
70 
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Operation Condor would substantiate the general thrust of his 1976 report.72 
Another article in December 1976 focused on suspicions of CIA maneuvering 
in Jamaica to counter Prime Minister Michael Manley. Ellen Ray, the editor 
who authored the story, had visited Jamaica with Agee, and based on her 
investigation there, she found that Manley's economic program posed a 
threat "to such corporations as Kaiser, Alcoa, and Reynolds, which have 
extensive investments in Jamaica."73 "Though charges of destabilization in 
Jamaica are difficult to prove-just as they were in Chile before the coup-a 
pattern is discernable behind the events which rocked the country for six 
months," she argued/4 noting that eleven Jamaicans died from a recent 
shipment of flour that had been poisoned with Parathion. The substance, 
which must be added intentionally, had previously contaminated flour in 
Guiana prior to the overthrow of Cheddi J agan.15 
Counter Spy would not re-appear for another two years, and by that 
time, the original staff was long gone. John Kelly, the new editor, continued 
publishing the magazine until1984 when it became the National Reporter. The 
magazine's hiatus resulted in part from the creation of a new journal 
dedicated to exposing American covert action, which was established by 
Agee, Lou Wolf, Jim Wilcott, Elsie Wilcott, Ellen Ray, and her husband Bill 
Schaap. The Covert Action Information Bulletin began publication in 1978, and 
72 John Dinges, The Condor Years: How Pinochet and His Allies Brought Terrorism 
to Three Continents (New York: New Press, 2004); Greg Grandin, Empire's 
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in the tradition of CounterSpy, there was a regular "Naming Names" section.76 
The Bulletin continued the coverage of Jamaica that CounterSpy had started in 
December 1976. After a press conference where they identified fifteen CIA 
employees working in Jamaica, shots were fired outside the home of the CIA 
station chief in Kingston.77 The story revived the controversy that had 
surrounded Welch's murder in 1975, and both incidents were later used to 
support the passage of the Intelligence Identities Protection Act in 1982. The 
1982 legislation made it illegal for CounterSpy and the Covert Action 
Information Bulletin to print the names of any intelligence operatives. Rather 
than face the possibility of prosecution, the publications complied with the 
law. Two years later, after over thirty issues, CounterSpy came to an end. The 
Bulletin, on the other hand, survived, but it is now published under a 
different title?8 
Between the first issue of Counter-Spy in 1973 and the Intelligence 
Identities Protection Act, the anonymity of CIA officers was seriously 
threatened. Hundreds of operatives were named in the pages of Counter-Spy 
and the Bulletin, and the CIA believed that these disclosures were 
endangering its employees and national security. Of all the officers identified 
during this time, Richard Welch was the only one harmed. The Agency's 
investigation of his murder strongly indicated that Counter-Spy was not to 
blame, but this conclusion does not necessarily exonerate the magazine's 
radical tactics. The history of the Fifth Estate and their publication begs the 
76 Agee, On The Run, 255. 
77 Ibid., 339. 
78 The Covert Action Information Bulletin became Covert Action Quarterly in 
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question: did the organization threaten national security and jeopardize the 
lives of American spies? Or were the disclosures necessary in the face of 
overwhelming evidence of CIA wrongdoing uncovered by Senator Frank 
Church (Democrat-Idaho) and Representative Otis Pike (Democrat-New 
York)? 
These are emotionally charged questions that are difficult to answer 
objectively. From the perspective of CIA supporters, the Fifth Estate was 
guilty of treason; CIA critics-even those uncomfortable with the radical 
approach of Counter-Spy-would counter that the public had the right to 
know what the Agency was doing with their tax dollars. But what often gets 
overlooked in this debate is the undeniable impact of Counter-Spy. As a 
consequence of the magazine, the organization responsible for monitoring 
enemies overseas ac_tually became the target of surveillance at home. This 
role reversal proved deeply troubling for the CIA's "culture of secrecy," 
especially since the editors of Counter-Spy, who Colby described as "a scruffy 
group of anti-CIA activists,"79 based the vast majority of their revelations on 
open source intelligence. For instance, the realization that so many CIA 
officers could be identified from unclassified State Department publications 
raised embarrassing questions about the Agency's competence. More than 
anything else, though, Counter-Spy argued for the necessity of drastic 
intelligence reform. The founding members of CARIC started with the belief 
that the American people would seriously curtail the clandestine powers of 
the intelligence community if only they were better informed. 
79 Colby, 450. 
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The CIA, thanks to the efforts of William Colby in 1975, gradually 
accepted the inevitability of tougher Congressional supervision, but Agency 
officials aggressively fought against the more expansive definition of reform 
that Counter-Spy had embodied-the· idea that, given the past abuses of the 
intelligence establishment, covert operations had to be abolished.80 And, as 
later chapters will reveal, the CIA mounted a successful public relations 
campaign. By selling the Agency's mystique to politicians and the American 
people, CIA officials actively sought to preserve covert action and the 
"culture of secrecy." 
80 The editors of CounterSpy eventually called for the total abolition of the CIA 
"not only because we recognize that the CIA serves only the multinational 
corporate empire, which is thoroughly anti-democratic and un-American, but 
also because the CIA is a criminal organization and covert actions are 
criminal actions." See "Abolish the OA and Covert Action," CounterSpy 2 
(Winter 1976): 3. When the magazine resumed publication in 1978, the new 
editors would make similar declarations. 
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Although the "Year of Intelligence" is most commonly associated with 
the Rockefeller Commission, the Church Committee, and the Pike Committee, 
historians of the intelligence community need tore-conceptualize the existing 
interpretation of the crisis that the Agency faced in the mid-1970s. A key 
limitation of the traditional narrative is its failure to include the conservative 
attack on the CIA. While Senator Frank Church (Democrat-Idaho) and 
Congressman Otis Pike (Democrat-New York) criticized the Agency from the 
Left, and the editors of Counter-Spy launched a campaign against covert 
action from the far Left, conservatives skillfully manipulated the situation to 
achieve different objectives. 
Rather than viewing the CIA as too powerful, conservative critics, 
especially the members of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory 
Board (PFIAB, pronounced Piffy-Ab), believed that Agency analysts were 
actually too weak. They worried that the "culture of secrecy" at Langley was 
obscuring what they perceived to be critical flaws in the Agency's estimates 
on the Soviet Union. Several of these conservatives were also opponents of 
Henry Kissinger's negotiations with the Soviet Union on arms control, and 
they argued that CIA reports had repeatedly downplayed the Soviet threat to 
national security in order to foster support for SALT I.. They had been deeply 
concerned with Albert Wohlstetter's two-part series in Foreign Policy, which 
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appeared in the summer and fall of 197 4.1 Wohlstetter, a professor at the 
University of Chicago at the time, bludgeoned readers with detailed 
quantitative analysis of intelligence estimates on the Soviet military build-up 
that were contained in previous posture statements of the Secretary of 
Defense. Contrary to a popular mythology of American overestimation of the 
Soviet threat, Wohlstetter attempted to show that there was actually a 
"systematic underestimate."2 He included several graphs to demonstrate his 
conclusion that "[i]n 49 out of 51 cases the eventual Soviet deployment 
exceeded the mid-range of the Secretary's estimates. In 42 of the 51, it 
exceeded the Secretary's high."3 
Critics of Wohlstetter immediately accused him of "selective analysis," 
since he did not mention that there had been examples of intelligence 
estimates that exaggerated Soviet strength, most notably their ability to 
produce an anti-ballistic missile (ABM) defense.4 In his pioneering 
assessment of intelligence estimates during the Cold War, John Prados also 
shows that Wohlstetter's criticism had limitations. Prados cautions that "the 
estimators were engaged in an inherently complex task,." and as a result, they 
made the assumption that the Soviets would retire obsolete missiles once 
1 Albert Wohlstetter, "Is There A Strategic Arms Race?," Foreign Policy 15 
(Summer 1974): 3-20; and Wohlstetter, "Is There A Strategic Arms Race? (II): 
Rivals, But No 'Race,"' Foreign Policy 16 (Fall1974): 48-81; for background on 
these articles, see Anne Hessing Cahn, Killing Detente: The Right Attacks the 
CIA (University Park,. Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 
1998), 11-14; John Prados, The Soviet Estimate (New York: Dial Press, 1982), 
196-198; and Lawrence Freedman, US Intelligence and the Soviet Strategic Threat 
(Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1977), 3. 
2
·Wohlstetter, "Is There A Strategic Arms Race?," 17. 
3 Wohlstetter, "Is There A Strategic Arms Race? (II): Rivals, But No 'Race,"' 
49. 
4 Comment by Morton Halperin and Jeremy Stone, Foreign Policy 16 (Fall 
1974): 91. 
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better technology became available; "This single difference between 
assumption and reality accounts for over two hundred ICBMs in the 
'underestimates' after 1966," he says.5 But what was the nuclear strategist 
hoping to achieve? He fundamentally disagreed with the widespread belief 
that arms proliferation on one side of the Cold War would inevitably lead to a 
similar build-up on the other.6 In certain circumstances, he theorized, a 
massive proliferation might convince an opponent that they were doomed, 
and that their only viable option would be to abandon the arms race 
altogether. Wohlstetter believed that the intelligence community's 
underestimates could be attributed to the false predictions of a missile gap in 
the early 1960s. Since they had overestimated the deployment of Soviet 
missiles, the analysts developed a more cautious approach later in the decade 
that, from Wohlstetter's perspective, turned out to be unwarranted. 
Interestingly, Wohlstetter worried that his conclusions could potentially lead 
to unintended consequences: "It would be unfortunate if we should swing 
now from understatement to the opposite extreme. It would be nice, though 
far from easy, to get it nearly right."7 
PFIAB, which had been established during the Eisenhower 
administration, apparently did not take Wohlstetter's warning into 
consideration. Instead, they used his analysis to put pressure on the CIA's 
National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) dealing with the Soviet Union. Almost 
5 Prados, The Soviet Estimate, 198. 
6 He likened this theory to a Cold War version of Newton's Third Law: "For 
Every Action, There Is An Opposing Equal Or Greater-Than-Equal Reaction." 
See Wohlstetter, "Is There A Strategic Arms Race? (II): Rivals, But No 'Race,"' 
49. 
7 Wohlstetter, "Is There A Strategic Arms Race?," 20. 
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a year after the resignation of Richard Nixon, George Anderson, the chair of 
PFIAB, questioned the accuracy of NIB 11-3/8-74 in a letter to President 
Gerald Ford. Anderson called the 1974 estimate of Soviet forces "seriously 
misleading in the presentation of a number of key judgments and in 
projecting a sense of complacency unsupported by the facts; as a consequence 
it is deficient for the purpose it should serve."8 Anderson recommended that 
there should be an outside critique of the estimate process, an idea that was 
first proposed by two of his colleagues on PFIAB, John Foster and Edward 
Teller. "If Wohlstetter's articles were the opening salvo in the conservative 
assault on the CIA's Soviet estimates," says Anne Cahn, "Anderson's letter 
... began the secon~ round."9 CIA director William Colby refused to allow a 
group of outsiders to second guess CIA analysts. On November 21, 1975, 
Colby wrote to President Ford and explained why he could not allow the 
experiment in competitive analysis to take place: "It is hard for me to 
envisage how an ad hoc 'independent' group of government and non-
government analysts could prepare a more thorough, comprehensive 
assessment of Soviet strategic capabilities-even in two specific areas-than 
the Intelligence Community can prepare."10 
When Colby blocked PFIAB'srequest, it is important to realize that, 
technically speaking, he had been fired already. Colby's dismissal was just 
one dimension of President Ford's so-called "Halloween Massacre," a cabinet 
8 Cahn, Killing Detente, 115. 
9 1bid. 
10 Ibid., 119; John Prados, Lost Crusader: The Secret Wars of CIA Director William 
Colby (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 281. According to Prados, 
"Bill Colby did well to resist this exercise, something for which he has been 
given little credit." Ibid. 
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re-shuffling during the first week of November 1975 that would have a 
profound impact on American history. According to most historians, Donald 
Rumsfeld, Ford's chief of staff, was at the center of the dramatic shake-up. 
This skillful bureaucratic maneuver ousted both Colby and Secretary of 
Defense James Schlesinger, who had served briefly as CIA director 'in 1973. 
Rumsfeld replaced Schlesinger at the Pentagon, while George H. W. Bush 
was appointed to Colby's position. Henry Kissinger remained Secretary of 
State, but he was forced to relinquish the title of National Security Advisor to 
Brent Scow croft. Richard Cheney, one of Rumsfeld' s closest allies, became 
Ford's new chief of staff. He was only thirty-four years old at the time, but he 
had already established a reputation for getting things done. 11 
Colby remained in charge at the CIA until the Senate confirmed Bush 
late in January 1976. The following month the OA revised its estimate of 
Soviet military expenditures, which was a calculation that had been the 
source of controversy in the intelligence community. CIA analysts had 
typically determined the amount of Soviet defense spending by using a 
technique known as the "building-block" approach. In essence, if there were 
"X" number of Soviet tanks, they would determine how much it would cost 
American manufacturers to produce the same quantity, and they then 
converted the figure into rubles through a series of complicated and arcane 
calculations. The analysts applied this approach to every weapon {tanks, 
missiles, planes, ships, etc.) to determine the total defense budget for the 
11 James Mann, Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush's War Cabinet (New 
York: Viking, 2004), 65:-67; Mann observes that "[i]n these intra-
administration battles, Rumsfeld never lost, and Cheney was regularly at his 
~?ide." Ibid., 59; see Cahn, Killing Detente, 122-123. 
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Soviet Union. Since the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) did not agree 
with the "building-block" assessment, the CIA began looking for more 
concrete information to test their conclusion, and in 1975 it seems that the 
clan4estine service was able to acquire a handbook that contained budget 
information. The CIA modified its estimate in response to the new 
intelligence; although they had previously believed that Soviet defense 
spending was 6-8% of their GNP, they now raised the figure to 10-15%.12 
This 40% increase became public, and conservative critics gave the 
impression that the CIA's revision somehow meant that the Soviets had 40% 
more weapons than the United States once thought. 
As Prados demonstrates, however, "[t]he revised budget estimates did 
not mean that the Soviets were stronger than before-the number of 
'observables' counted by intelligence did not change at all, butonly the cost of 
these items to the Soviet economy and the burden of defense spending within 
that economy."13 In other words, American analysts had given too much 
credit to the Soviet military-industrial complex; in fact, even though there 
was considerable waste in America's defense industry throughout the Cold 
War, the Soviets were far more inefficient than the CIA had imagined. "We 
now know that the [Soviet] military burden was in play by the 1970s, 
probably alr~ady by the late 1960s, and that the Soviet economy was already 
contracting in the Brezhnev era," argues Prados.14 Contrary to what CIA 
critics claimed in the mid-1970s, the revised estimate of Soviet spending was a 
12 Cahn, Killing Detente, 132-135. 
13 Prados, The Soviet Estimate, 247. 
14 John Prados, "Team B: The Trillion-Dollar Experiment," The Bulletin of 
Atomic Scientists 49 (April1993): 30. 
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sign of weakne'ss rather than strength. The inefficiency of the Soviet economy 
was simply not conducive to lcmg-term stability.15 
. The CIA completed another report in February 1976 that angered 
conservatives. The study was titled "The Track Record in Strategic 
Estimating," and it examined NIEs between 1966 and 1975 in order to assess 
the accuracy of past CIA predictions. It openly acknowledged "the failure of 
the earlier estimates to foresee the degree to which Soviets would not only 
catch up to the U. S. in number of ICBMs but keep right on going,"16 but as 
George Carver observed in his description of the report, "in no case have the 
Soviets ever deployed a major weapons system which the Intelligence 
Community did not spot. and assess well before its operational 
deployment."17 PFIAB had requested the track record study, and a few 
months after the report was completed, the board renewed their request for 
outsiders to compete against CIA analysts. Carver, who believed "that the 
balance is very much on the plus side of the ledger [for analysts],"18 wrote a 
memo in which he warned that PFIAB's proposed experiment "would be 
extremely difficult to accommodate without prostituting the whole 
intelligence process."19 Bush, unlike Colby, accepted the recommendation at 
the end of May with a brief notation to Carver: "[L]et her fly. OK, GB."20 
15 Cahn says "the new data were interpreted [among CIA experts] to mean 
that the Soviet military sector of the economy was only half as efficient as had 
been thought." See Cahn, Killing Detente, 135. 
16 Ibid., 129. 
17 Ibid., 130. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid., 131. 
20 Ibid., 139. 
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Bush had set in motion a project that would have long-term 
consequences for CIA analysis. The group of outsiders was divided into 
three panels, and they later became known collectively as "Team B." Charles 
Lerch chaired the panel on the Soviet air defense system, Roland Herbst led 
the study of Soviet missile accuracy, and Richard Pipes, an expert on Russian 
history at Harvard University, became the chair of the panel on Soviet 
strategic objectives.21 The "Team B" study of Soviet strategic thinking is by 
far the most widely known of the three as well as the most controversial. This 
report, which remained classified until 1992, has developed a certain 
mythology among both its critics and supporters. Conservatives often argue 
that "Team B" forced the CIA to re-evaluate their allegedly dovish 
perspective on the Soviet Union. Paul Wolfowitz, who studied under 
Wohlstetter at the University of Chicago, had joined Pipes's panel as a 
technical advisor upon the recommendation of Richard Perle, an advisor to 
21 Anne Hessing Cahn, "Team B: The Trillion-Dollar Experiment," The Bulletin 
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leader." William Van Cleave, Lieutenant General Daniel Graham (U.S. Army, 
retired), Thomas Wolfe (Rand Corporation), and General John Vogt (U.S. Air 
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Kohler, Paul Nitze, Ambassador Seymour Weiss, Major General Jasper Welch 
(U.S. Air Force), and Paul Wolfowitz (Arms Control and Disarmament 
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Senator Henry "Scoop" Jackson (Democrat-Washington). According to 
Wolfowitz, the experiment "demonstrated that it was possible to construct a 
sharply different view of Soviet motivation from the consensus view of the 
analysts, and one that provided a much closer fit to the Soviets' observed 
behavior ... . "n Other alumni of Team B share Wolfowitz's assessment. Paul 
Nitze, veteran Washington insider and another advisor on the 1976 project, 
re-examined the report when it was de-classified and told the Washington 
Post: "I don't find anything wrong with it at all."23 Not surprisingly, the most 
vocal defender of Team B has been Pipes himself. In a 1986 article in 
Commentary, he claimed that liberals had unfairly maligned his panel. "So 
preoccupied were the politicians, journalists, and left-wing intellectuals with 
what they presumed to have been the motives of Team B and the potential 
political fallout from its findings that they never bothered to inquire whether 
its principal conclusion was correct," he observed.24 Pipes, an unrepentant 
cold warrior, suggests in his memoirs that the legacy of Team B directly 
contributed to Ronald Reagan's victory in the 1980 presidential election, 
contending that "while we [supporters of Reagan] argued on the basis of facts 
our opponents either spoke in terms of vague generalities or else resorted to 
ridicule and abuse."25 
The Team A/Team B experiment began at the end of August 1976 and 
ran through December. The Team B panel on missile precision believed that 
n Mann, 74. 
23 Don Oberdorfer, "Report Saw Soviet Buildup for War," Washington Post, 12 
October 1992, All. 
24 Richard Pipes, "Team B: The Reality Behind the Myth," Commentary 82 
(October 1986): 36. 
25 Richard Pipes, Vixi: Memoirs of a Non-Belonger (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 2003), 141. 
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CIA analysts had underestimated the accuracy of Soviet ICBMs, but the real 
controversy unfolded when Pipes's panel clashed with their CIA 
counterparts. Despite the claims of Team B members about their panel's 
objectivity, it is difficult to believe that prior convictions did not influence 
their approach to the experiment. In fact, it would be something of an 
understatement to describe the members as hard-liners. Pipes, a Jewish 
emigre from Poland, had been forever changed by his first-hand encounters 
with the Nazis in the 1930s. "When you see this violence, when you see these 
cruel barbarities, you tend to look at things more realistically," he later 
argued.26 Prior to his involvement with Team B, he had developed a 
reputation for criticizing the idea that American society and Soviet society 
would eventually experience a peaceful convergence. Pipes believed that 
there was an irreconcilable and fundamental difference between communism 
and democracy, which would inevitably lead to conflict.27 
Two other hard-liners on the panel were Professor William Van Oeave 
and Lieutenant General Daniel 0. Graham. Van Cleave taught at the 
University of Southern California, and he had participated in the SALT 
negotiations in 1971. Van Cleave expressed significant reservations about 
these talks, and when secret information on SALT appeared in the New York 
Times, the Nixon administration considered him a prime suspect for the leak. 
Although he passed a polygraph, he did not deny talking with William 
Beecher, the Times reporter, and acknowledged there existed "some 
26 Sam Tanenhaus, "The Hard-Liner," Boston Globe, 2 November 2003, G1. 
27 Pipes, Vixi, 129-131. 
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possibility that I might have said something that could be taken to be an 
indiscretion-but I didn't think so."28 
Like Van Cleave, Lieutenant General Graham was deeply suspicious of 
the SALT process. Graham specifically distrusted CIA analysts for not taking 
a tougher stance on the Soviet Union; "There are more liberals per square foot 
in the CIA than any other part of government," he would say later.29 This 
antipathy can be traced to an earlier confrontation that Graham had with the 
Agency during Vietnam while he was in charge of intelligence estimates for 
the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV). A headstrong CIA 
analyst named Sam Adams asserted that the military was significantly 
undercounting enemy forces, which led to a heated confrontation in Saigon. 
Military intelligence refused to accept any estimate that placed the enemy 
order-of-battle above 300,000. Adams's calculations indicated that the so-
called irregular forces-dismissed by the Army as women, children, and old 
men-needed to be included in the statistics, because a large percentage of 
American casualties were the result of booby traps. In other words, since 
Vietnam was not a conventional war, Adams argued that the order-of-battle 
had to be adjusted accordingly. He estimated that enemy forces totaled 
500,000-600,000, a number that horrified military intelligence.30 
28 Cahn, Killing Detente, 156. 
29 Graham quoted in Sanders, 198~ 
30 Sam Adams, War of Numbers: An Intelligence Memoir (South Royalton, 
Vermont: Steerforth Press, 1994), Chp. 5, esp. 111-118; C. Michael Hiam, Who 
The Hell Are We Fighting?: The Story of Sam Adams and the Vietnam Intelligence 
Wars (Hanover, New Hampshire: Steerforth Press, 2006), Chp. 7, esp. 114-115; 
Adams originally went public with the controversy in 1975. See Sam Adams, 
"Vietnam Cover-Up: Playing War With Numbers," Harper's, May 1975,41-44, 
62-73; for a critical view of Adams, see James J. Wirtz, "Intelligence to Please?: 
The Order of Battle Controversy During the Vietnam War," Political Science 
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Much to the dismay of Adams, however, the CIA essentially accepted 
the MACV estimates in.September 1967. Adams never forgave the CIA for 
refusing to challenge the military's numbers, and his story would eventually 
receive national attention in 1982 with CBS's "The Uncounted Enemy." In 
response to the accusations, General William Westmorland sued CBS. The 
resulting trial convinced Adams that "[i]t wasn't right to pin the whole thing 
on Westy .... As far as cutting the local forces, not many people knew. That 
was a Danny [Graham] operation approved by General Davidson .... "31 
Ironically, while Adams protested to his superiors at the CIA and fell into 
disfavor, Graham received promotions from the military, and he eventually 
became the director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). 
Graham, Van Cleave, and the other members of Team B, believed that 
the CIA was not recognizing the true dimensions of the Soviet threat. In their 
meetings with CIA analysts (Team A), there were heated confrontations 
described as "absolutely bloody."32 "Sometimes we left them speechless," an 
unidentified Team B participant told the New York Times. "We had men of 
great prestige, some of them with memories going back 25 years or more, and 
they made devastating critiques of the agency estimates."33 Team B reviewed 
old NIEs from 1962 to 1975, castigated their methodology, and outlined 
recommendations for changes. The CIA assigned junior analysts to Team A, 
Quarterly 106 (Summer 1991): 239-263. Even though Wirtz criticizes the CIA's 
methodology, he concedes that "the general thrust of its critique of American 
golicy [in Vietnam] has been vindicated by events." Ibid., 261. 
1 Bob Brewin and Sydney Shaw, Vietnam On Trial: Westmoreland vs. CBS 
(New York: Atheneum, 1987), 373. 
32 David Binder, "New C. I. A. Estimate Finds Soviet Seeks Superiority In 
Arms," New York Times, 26 December 1976, 14. 
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52 
and their counterparts in the experiment saw the mismatch as an opportunity 
to influence the CIA's assessment of the Soviet Union. "I don't want to tell 
you guys you're going to lose your jobs if you don't get on board, but that's 
the way it is," Graham allegedly declared in one of the meetings at CIA 
headquarters. 34 
The report that Team B submitted in December 1976 has been 
described as NSC-68 redux. NSC-68, of course, was a National Security 
Council document approved in 1950 that called for a massive military build-
up in response to the perceived hegemonic intentions of the Soviet Union. It 
is not surprising that Paul Nitze, one of the principal authors of NSC-68, also 
served on the strategic objectives panel. At the beginning of the Team B 
report, the authors "agreed that all the evidence points to an undeviating 
Soviet commitment to what is euphemistically called 'the worldwide triumph 
of socialism' but in fact connotes global Soviet hegemony."35 The third 
section of the study, which dealt specifically with the USSR's strategic 
objectives, presented an even darker view of the Cold War. Although the 
Soviets would prefer to destroy the capitalist system without fighting a war, 
Team B concluded that "the Soviet Union is nevertheless preparing for a Third 
World War as if it were unavoidable [italics original]."36 "The intensity and 
scope of the current Soviet military effort in peacetime is without parallel in 
' 34 Graham quoted in Sanders, 200. 
35 
"Intelligence Community Experiment In Competitive Analysis: Soviet 
Strategic Objectives: An Alternative View, Report of Team 'B,"' 5. 
36 1bid., 45-46. 
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twentieth century history," they added, "its only counterpart being Nazi 
remilitarization of the 1930' s."37 
The central thesis outlined in the report was that the Soviet leadership 
did not accept the doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD). 
Beginning in the early 1960s, American policymakers believed that the Soviet 
Union wanted to achieve nuclear parity with the United States. From their 
perspective, the quantity of nuclear weapons on both sides made it irrational 
for either country to launch a first-strike, since the subsequent retaliation 
would be suicidal. The advocates of MAD assumed that the Soviets would 
act rationally as nuclear weapons proliferated. But Team B vehemently 
disagreed with mirror-imaging, the tendency to make predictions based on 
American pre-conceptions: "[t]his conceptual flaw is perhaps the single 
gravest cause of the misunderstanding of Soviet strategic objectives found in 
past and current NIEs."38 The first part of the report, mostly written by Pipes, 
complained that CIA analysts were too focused on "the hard evidence."39 
This evidence was collected using satellites and listening posts, and while 
such technology could determine the strength of enemy forces (e. g. the 
number of tanks, planes, ships, missile silos, and army divisions), it could not 
tell policym~kers what the Soviets planned to do with their weapons. 
Moreover, it also could not explain why certain military projects were 
pursued and others abandoneQ.. "Facts of themselves are mute: they are like 
37 Ibid., 46. 
38 Ibid., 1. 
39 Ibid., 9. 
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the scattered letters of an alphabet that the reader must arrange in sequence 
according to some system," observed Team B.40 
In order to understand Soviet intentions, Team B argued that it was 
important for the intelligence community to comprehend the profound 
cultural differences between Americans and Russians. Military strategists in 
the Soviet Union had inherited a history of expansionism, and according to 
Pipes, they continued to embrace the teachings of A. V. Suvorov, a Russian 
field marshall in the 1700s. (The report refers to Suvorov's treatise as the 
"science of conquest," but interestingly, Raymond Garthoff has explained 
"that the correct translation ... is 'the science of winning' or the 'science of 
victory ."')41 The Soviets, unlike Americans, viewed nuclear warheads as just 
another weapon in their military arsenal. Most importantly, they were 
convinced that they could prevail over the United States in the event of 
nuclear war: "The evidence suggests that the Soviet leaders are first and 
foremost offensively rather than defensively minded. They think not in terms 
of nuclear stability, mutual assured destruction, or strategic sufficiency, but of 
an effective nuclear war-fighting capability."42 From the perspective of Team 
B, "both detente and SALT are seen by Soviet leaders not as cooperative 
efforts to ensure global peace, but as means more effectively to compete with 
the United States."43 The Soviets, in other words, were lulling American 
policymakers into a state of complacency. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Garthoff quoted in Cahn, Killing Detente, 164. 
42 
"Intelligence Community Experiment In Competitive Analysis: Soviet 
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In the second section, the authors outlined specific problems with 
predictions in the NIBs. Team B said that "Soviet strategic forces have yet to 
reflect any constraining effect of civil economy competition, and are unlikely to do so 
in the foreseeable future [italics originial]."44 They warned that the CIA did not 
fully understand the danger of the Backfire bomber, predicting the plane's 
deployment "in substantial numbers, with perhaps 500 aircraft off the line by 
early 1984."45 In other areas of their analysis, Team B members were puzzled 
by the lack of hard evidence to support their theories. For instance, they 
became convinced that the Soviets were developing non-acoustic technology 
to enhance their anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities. Rather than 
allowing the fa~ts to undermine this belief, however, they concluded that the 
absence of evidence might mean "that the Soviets have, in fact, deployed 
some operational non-acoustic systems and will deploy more in the next few 
years."46 Although Team B was referring to the defensive use of non-acoustic 
technology, readers of their report were left to wonder about the offensive 
potential of these systems. If the Soviets could prevent American submarines 
from retaliating with their SLBMs in a nuclear war, they might consider a 
preemptive strike to be a realistic option. Team B also worried that Soviet 
engineers were aggressively pursuing ABM technology through experimental 
laser and particle beam research, and while acknowledging it was difficult to 
evaluate development efforts, the report claimed "that the Soviets have mounted 
44 Ibid., 23. 
45 1bid., 29. 
46 Ibid., 32; Cahn, Killing Detente, 167. 
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ABM efforts in both areas of a magnitude that it is difficult to overestimate [italics 
original]. "47 
It is difficult to understand why the alumni of Team B have so 
vigorously defended the report, for history has demonstrated that many of 
their assessments were wildly inaccurate. They predicted that the Soviet 
economy would remain strong in the years ahead, but in reality it soon 
collapsed under the weight of high military expenditures.48 Instead of 500 
Backfire bombers in 1984, there were only 235, and Team B had significantly 
exaggerated their range.49 Not surprisingly, the Soviets did not possess a 
viable non-acoustic system or a research program for lasers and particle 
beams. In the aftermath of the Cold War, it turned out that the installation in 
Semipalatinsk, which Air Force General George Keegan believed to be a 
center of beam weapon research, "was used to test nuclear-powered rocket 
engines and was totally unrelated to so-called nuclear directed-energy 
weapons."50 In the final analysis, CIA analysts were more accurate and 
intellectually honest than Team B, but this does not mean the NIBs that they 
produced were without error. In fact, a group of economists published a 
study in 1993 that indicated that the CIA had overestimated the strength of 
the Soviet economy.51 If the CIA had exaggerated the Soviet threat during the 
47 
"Intelligence Community Experiment In Competitive Analysis: Soviet 
Strategic Objectives: An Alternative View, Report of Team 'B,"' 34. 
48 Cahn, Killing Detente, 168. 
49 Ibid., 165. 
50 Ibid., 167. 
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no. 2 (1993): 33-57. The CIA com.missioned the study at the request of the 
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. According to the authors 
of the study, "[o]ur most significant critical conclusion is that certain CIA 
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Cold War, it is fair to say that Richard Pipes and his colleagues had engaged 
in a process of irrational exaggeration in their 1976 study. 
The Team A/ Team B exercise was an internal experiment, and both 
groups had access to classified documents. The CIA assigned John Paisley, a 
r~tired officer who had previously served as Deputy Chief in the Office of 
Strategic Research, to be the liaison for Team B. When they wanted to 
examine a· document, me:inbers of Team B submitted their request to Paisley, 
and in most instances, he complied. 52 Since they had access to secret material 
with national security implications, it was abundantly clear that participants 
in the experiment could not reveal any information to outsiders. Yet at the 
end of October 1976, shortly before the presidential election, an article 
appeared in the Boston Globe that revealed the existence of Team B. Someone 
on Team B had clearly leaked information to Globe reporter William Beecher 
with the intention of publicizing the neoconservative complaints about 
American foreign policy. Although Pipes has been accused of the leak in the 
past, Cahn convincingly argues that "[Daniel Graham], directly or indirectly, 
communicated with Beecher."53 Subsequent stories on Team B appeared in 
both the New York Times and the Washington Post after Christmas. During the 
mid-1970s, conservatives often complained that liberals in Congress could not 
be trusted with the oversight of the CIA, because their political biases would 
products during the 1970s and 80s may indeed have tended to overstate the 
size of the Soviet economy relative to the U. S. and, particularly, its military 
threat." Ibid., 35. 
52 Cahn, Killing Detente, 139-140, 157; CIA officials had warned against putting 
Graham on the panel. Henry Knoche, the official in charge of CIA analysis, 
told Bush in August "that Danny has not been the most discreet ex-
intelligence official around town." Ibid., 177. 
53 Ibid., 176; Prados, The Soviet Estimate, 253-254. 
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inevitably lead to security leaks. Ironically, many of the same commentators 
wholeheartedly endorsed the Team B exercise even after at least one of its 
members talked with the media. This was a revealing double standard. 54 
Paisley, the coordinator of the exercise, was furious with the leak. 
When he died in 1978 under circumstances worthy of an espionage film, he 
was reportedly investigating to determine what had gone wrong with the 
project. Paisley departed on his sailboat in late September 1978 and never 
returned. His body was found on October 1 in the Chesapeake Bay near the 
Patuxent River, and local authorities complained that the CIA's Office of 
Security contaminated the crime scene. Paisley was quickly cremated, but 
before this happened, his hands were cut off. The FBI identified the 
decomposed r~mains using an old set of fingerprints, because the official 
prints in Paisley's file could not be found. Although the gunshot wound that 
killed him entered towards the back of his head and the body had been 
weighted down, officials at the CIA viewed the death as a suicide. Reports 
said that radio equipment and CIA documents were found on board Paisley's 
sailboat, which led to speculation about his friendship with Soviet defector 
Yuri Nosenko. Since the CIA report on the investigation of Paisley's death 
remains classified, there is no shortage of conspiracy theories. Tad Szulc 
concludes that "[i]n the end we do not know, and we may never know, what 
happened to John Arthur Paisley. However he met his fate, in some sense he 
54 John Prados describes an incident in which a neo-conservative critical of 
detente had no qualms about receiving classified CIA material from a 
disgruntled analyst. "DavidS. Sullivan, a CIA analyst with the OSR, was 
fired after disclosing a highly classified CIA report to Senator Henry Jackson 
and his staff assistant Richard Perle, which concluded that the Soviets had 
deliberately deceived the U. S. on the size of the fourth-generation missiles." 
See Prados, The Soviet Estimate, 243. 
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may have been the latest casualty of the great intelligence wars that are 
invisibly waged around us."55 
As stories about Team B began to circulate, there was a considerable 
backlash against the project. Ray Cline, a retired CIA official, famously called 
Team B "a kangaroo court of outside critics all from one point of view."56 
Henry Kissinger announced in January 1977 that the ordeal was an attempt to 
"sabotage SALT 11."57 Even Soviet premier Leonid Brezhnev entered the fray, 
declaring in the same month that it was "absurd and totally unfounded" for 
anyone to believe that his country was preparing for a nuclear strike. 58 More 
than two years after Team B disbanded, a subcommittee of the Senate Select 
Committee on Intelligence completed a review of the exercise. The final 
report was apparently a toned down version of earlier drafts that had harshly 
criticized Team B. Although "[t]he committee's report makes no attempt to 
judge which group's estimates concerning the U. S. S. R. are correct,"59 it 
nevertheless concluded "that the outcome of the exercise was predetermined 
and the experiment's contribution lessened."60 In essence, the report said that 
55 Tad Szulc, "The Missing C. I. A. Man," New York Times Magazine, 7 January 
1979, 61; for more on this bizarre episode, see David Binder, "The Tormented 
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Lost Crusader, 2-3. Prados notes that William Colby went missing in the 
Chesapeake Bay not far from where Paisley did. Colby's body was 
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Team B had been loaded with a group of devout conservatives, and 
recommended that in the future, "outside critiques of NIE's should continue 
to be conducted, but should, in each instance, be made by expert groups 
which are broadly representative in character, and whose procedures are 
thereafter more strictly monitored by the commissioning authorities than 
obtained in the [Team] A-B case."61 
The review of Team B proved divisive, and three Senators on the 
committee had separate views attached to the report. Senator Gary Hart 
(Democrat-Colorado) charged that the "use of selected outside experts was 
little more than a camouflage for a political effort to force the National 
Intelligence Estimate to take a more bleak view of the Soviet strategic 
threat."62 Warning of the inherent da~ger of politicized intelligence, he 
advised that the writing of estimates must be insulated from external 
pressures. "Any attempt to bend intelligence to serve political needs other 
than the truth is a danger as great as the Soviet threat itself," he remarked.63 
Senators Daniel P. Moynihan (Democrat-New York) and Malcolm Wallop 
(Republican-Wyoming) both defended Team Bin their separate _opinions. 
Wallop's statement, which was probably written by a staffer named Angelo 
Codevilla,64 complained that the committee's report made Team B look like "a 
61 Ibid., 3. 
62 Ibid., 7. 
63 Ibid., 8. 
64 Cahn says that Codevilla "alerted Daniel Graham and William Van Cleave 
about the draft Senate committee report. Codevilla told them the report 
vilified Team B and was an ad hominem attack on the motivations and 
qualifications of Team B members." See Cahn, Killing Detente, 181. 
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narrow band of zealots with preconceived notions."65 Contrary to this 
characterization~ he said that the members of Team B were justified in their 
attack on CIA analysts, since "it is quite accurate to characterize the NIE's 
thrust and tone as very doveish indeed!"66 
In response to the backlash in the media, Richard Pipes wrote an 
article for Commentary in July 1977 that summarized and attempted to explain 
the major findings of his panel. He focused on a perceived cultural divide 
separating the Soviet Union from the United States, emphasizing the idea that 
Marxism contributed to "an extreme Social-Darwinist outlook on life which 
today permeates the Russian elite as well as the Russian masses, and which 
only the democratic intelligentsia and the religious dissenters oppose to any 
significant extent."67 Not only did Soviet leaders believe that they could win a 
nuclear war, they viewed nuclear weapons as a "compellant" rather than a 
deterrent.68 Pipes made several observations about the Soviets: their 
population was less concentrated in urban areas than America's; they had 
aggressively pursued a civil defense program to protect important officials; 
and they were conditioned by the lessons of history to accept massive 
casualties in a war. According to Pipes, "the USSR could absorb the loss of 30 
million of its people and be no worse off, in terms of human casualties, than it 
had been at the conclusion of World War II. In other words, all of the USSR's 
multimillion cities could be destroyed without trace or survivors, and, 
65 The National Intelligence Estimates A-B Team Episode Concerning Soviet 
Strategic Capability and Objectives, 12. 
66 Ibid., 13; for an overview of the Senate investigation and report, see Cahn, 
Killing Detente, 180-184; see also Reich, 395-396. 
67 Richard Pipes, "Why the Soviet Union Thinks It Could Fight and Win a 
Nuclear War," Commentary 64 Q"uly 1977): 26. 
68 Ibid., 34. . 
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provided that its essential cadres had been saved, it would emerge less hurt 
in terms of casualties than it was in 1945."69 This interpretation led inexorably 
to the conclusion that the Soviets rejected MAD and were prepared to 
consider launching a pre-emptive strike under certain circumstances. 
Pipes was profoundly skeptical of Soviet intentions, and he argued 
that this skepticism should be applied to the analysis of Russian documents. 
"Buried in the flood of seemingly meaningless verbiage," he explained to 
readers, "nuggets of precious information on Soviet perceptions and 
intentions can more often than not be unearthed by a trained reader."70 He 
provided the following quotation from a military book on Soviet strategy as 
an example of such analysis: "[i]t is well known that the essential nature of 
war as a continuation of politics does not change with changing technology and 
armament."71 This sentence might seem innocuous enough to the untrained 
eye, but Pipes claimed that it was actually a "code phrase" for a sinister 
strategy, the Soviet belief that "thermonuclear war is not suicidal, it can be 
fought and won, and thus resort to war must not be ruled out."72 
When Pipes published his article in Commentary, he had already joined 
the Committee on the Present Danger (CPD), "an organization that saw eye-
to-eye with Team B" on the Soviet threat?3 Paul Nitze, an advisor to Team B, 
helped form the CPD in 1976. Nitze had participated in an organization of 
the same title in the early 1950s, and he explains in his memoirs that the 
69 Ibid. 
70 Ibid., 27. 
71 Ibid., 30. 
72 Ibid.; a brief outline "of the case against Pipes" can be found in Jeffreys-
Jones, 225. 
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second CPD "owed a spiritual kinship to the first, but otherwise they were 
unrelated."74 CPD members could be found in both political parties, but they 
shared a common concern with the Soviet Union. The organization, which 
was announced after Gerald Ford's defeat, "conducted press conferences, 
commissioned opinion polls, and released facts and figures on the strategic 
balance" with the hope of persuading Americans to adopt a starker view of 
the USSR.75 The CPD challenged SALT II, called for a military build-up, and 
served as a networking apparatus for critics of the Carter administration.76 
Ronald Reagan, a prominent member, embraced the CPD foreign 
policy views in his 1980 campaign. After his election, over fifty of the 
organization's members would serve in his administration, including several 
veterans of Team B (Richard Pipes, Paul Nitze, William Van Cleave, and 
Seymour Weiss).77 Graham did not join the administration, but he established 
the High Frontier organization to lobby for a futuristic missile defense system 
in outer-space. The High Frontier contributed to Reagan's Strategic Defense 
Initiative (SDI).78 As Jim Klurfield remarked in Newsday, "on November 4, 
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1980, Team B, in essence, became Team A."79 It is true that Nitze would later 
become a· driving force behind arms negotiations with the Soviet Union 
during Reagan's second term, but most of Team B never wavered in their 
distrust of Soviet intentions. For instance, Pipes wrote a New York Times 
editorial titled "The Russians Are Still Coming" in October 1989. He warned 
that "world stability and peace are nowhere as close as much of world 
opinion would like to believe/' noting that the Soviets continued to interfere 
in the affairs of Third World countries like Syria, Angola, Nicaragua, and 
Afghanistan. 5° Pipes even theorized that Mikhail Gorbachev might be using 
detente "to restore [the Soviet Union's] flagging economy and popular 
morale, before resuming a worldwide offensive."81 Exactly one month after 
this was printed, the Berlin Wall came tumbling down. The collapse of the 
Soviet Union soon followed. 
Pipes's failure to predict the end of the Cold War and his paranoid 
rants would be comical were it riot for the damaging impact that Team B had 
on CIA analysis. In his succinct assessment of the Team A/Team B 
experiment, Robert C. Reich has argued that the principal short-term result 
was the revision of the intelligence community's most important National 
Intelligence Estimate on Soviet forces (NIE 11-3/8-76).82 Although Bush 
acknowledged in a memo that the final draft of the NIE "presents a starker 
appreciation of Soviet strategic capabilities and objectives," he also observed 
that "it is but the latest in a series of estimates that have done so as evidence 
79 Klurfield quoted in Pipes, "Team B: The Reality Behind the Myth," 40. 
80 Richard Pipes, "The Russians Are Still Coming," New York Times, 9 October 
1989, A17. 
81 Ibid. 
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has accumulated on the continuing persistence and vigor of Soviet programs 
in the strategic offensive and defensive fields." 83 Bush vigorously denied that 
Team B had pressured CIA analysts into modifying the estimate; "There is no 
truth to such allegations," he said.84 
It is now abundantly clear that Pipes's report contributed to the 
increasing politicization of intelligence. Team B entered the scene at a 
moment when the CIA was at the crossroads. Agency officials had been 
dealing with Vice President Rockefeller's Commission, Congressional 
hearings, Counter-Spy exposes, and low morale among employees. There had 
been significant internal shake-ups as well. In 1973, then CIA director 
William Colby disbanded the Board of National Estimates (BNE) and 
replaced it with twelve National Intelligence Officers (NIOs).85 While the 
BNE was designed to be insulated from outside pressures, the NIOs, who 
were either in. charge of geographic regions or specific issues of concern, 
answered directly to Colby. Although there is no comprehensive history of 
the NIO system, it is fair to say that it was more vulnerable to politicization 
than the BNE, which had worked effectively for two decades.86 Colby 
acknowledged in his memoirs that NIOs "were to have no more staff than 
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York: Simon and Schuster, 1978), 351-353; Prados, Lost Crusader, 276-278. 
86 RayS. Cline calls Colby's decision to abolish the BNE in 1973 "a tragedy," 
arguing that "NIBs ought to be responsive to the evidence, not the 
policymaker." Cline, Secrets, Spies, and Scholars: Blueprint of the Essential CIA 
(Washington, DC: Acropolis Books, 1976), 140; for a similar perspective, see 
Prados, The Soviet Estimate, 293. 
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one assistant and a secretary so that they could identify totally with my 
position and not develop a role of their own."87 The system may have been an 
effective· tool for streamlining the bureaucracy at Langley, but unlike the 
BNE, it was not conducive to independent thinking. If the Team A/ Team B 
exercise had happened at a different time, it is probable that its impact would 
have been less noteworthy. Under the circumstances, however, Team B's 
findings put further pressure on CIA analysts and successfully accelerated 
the shift to a darker interpretation of Soviet objectives. 
Yet many conservatives were not satisfied with the changes in CIA 
estimates. They did not forget Team B' s attack on the Agency, and shortly 
after Reagan's election in 1980, his CIA transition team formulated draconian 
proposals for intelligence reform. Thi~ team, headed by Bill Middendorf, 
had several members with different backgrounds, but as John Ranelagh 
observes, "Angelo Codevilla led the ideological assault [against the 
Agency]."88 While serving as Senator Wallop's staffer on the Senate Select 
Committee on Intelligence (SSCI), Codevilla had vehemently disagreed with 
the Senate report in 1978 that lambasted Team B. It is therefore not surprising 
that the preliminary transition report in November criticized the CIA in a 
strident tone. Although many policymakers in Washington believed "that the 
CIA is a highly professional, non-political agency that produces 'objective' 
intelligence," the transition team warned that "[t]hose assertions are arrant 
87 Colby, 352-353. 
88 Ranelagh, 659. Laurence Silberman was initially in charge of the transition 
team. In addition to Codevilla, the members included Ed Hennelly, John A. 
Bross, Walter Pforzheimer, George Carver, Mark Schneider, Kenneth 
deGraffenreid, and Roy Godson. Ibid. 
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nonsense .... "89 The report described the Agency as "an elitist organization" 
that planned "to capture and co-opt the next Director."90 During their 
meetings, the team outlined a long list of perceived intelligence failures that 
rehashed portions of the Team B critique, blaming analysts at Langley for 
"the consistent gross misstatement of Soviet global objectives."91 The team 
concluded that "[t]hese failures are of such enormity that they cannot help 
but suggest to any objective observer that the agency itself is compromised to 
an unprecedented extent and that its paralysis is attributable to causes more 
sinister than incompetence."92 
Codevilla developed a proposal to dismantle the CIA that would give 
rise to three separate institutions: "a new counterintelligence agency 
composed of CIA and FBI staffs in this field; an analytical agency made up of 
people from the Estimates side of the agency; and an operations agency to 
perform the functions of the old CIA clandestine service."93 Unfortunately for 
Codevilla, there were former CIA _officials on the team who opposed his 
radical approach. George Carver, who had earlier outlined the dangers of the 
Team A/Team B experiment to Bush, joined forces with John Bross. Bross 
had served in the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) during World War II 
before embarking on a successful career at the CIA. When William Casey, 
Reagan's campaign manager, was selected to run the CIA, Carver and Bross 
89 Ibid., 661. 
90 Ibid. 
91 Ibid., 664. 
92 1bid., 665. 
93 1bid., 660. The joint CIA-FBI counterintelligence proposal was not included 
in the final report on December 22, 1980. Ibid., 669-670; Bob Woodward, 
VEIL: The Secret Wars of the CIA, 1981-1987 (New York: Simon and Schuster, 
1987), 60. 
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warned him about the inherent danger of Codevilla's plan. According to one 
account, "Bross argued that the crazies on the transition team were trying to 
sell Casey a bill of goods from some spy novel, some romantic notion of a 
golden espionage past."94 The anti-Codevilla forces prevailed in the end, and 
Casey disbanded the transition team. His biographer provides a thoughtful 
summary of this decision: "The report reminded Casey of what he had 
concluded long ago about his fellow conservatives: the greatest enemies of a 
cause are its blindest believers. He was not about to take over an empire in 
order to dismantle it."95 
One wonders what would have happened if a different person was 
appointed CIA director under Reagan. Would they have embraced or 
rejected Codevilla' s strategy? It is, of course, impossible to provide a 
satisfactory answer to this counterfactual question, but it is nevertheless clear 
that the CIA came far closer to being dismantled in 1980 than it did in the 
aftermath of the Congressional hearings five years earlier. This conclusion 
emphasizes the fundamental importance of Team B's legacy. So much 
attention has been given to Senator Frank Church and Representative Otis 
Pike that "The Year of Intelligence" is wrongly remembered as a liberal attack 
on the intelligence community, when, in reality, the conservative offensive 
that began in August 1976 had a far greater impact in the long term. 
The hearings directly contributed to the establishment of intelligence 
oversight committees in both the S~nate and House of Representatives, but 
94 Woodward, 75. 
95 Joseph E. Persico, Casey: From the OSS to the CIA (New York: Penguin 
Books, 1990), 204-205; for a detailed explanation of Casey's decision to end 
the transition team, see Ranelagh, 671. 
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they did not lead to permanent changes at the CIA. In fact, in the midst of the 
sensational investigations, the Agency was mounting a covert venture in 
Angola.% A few years later the CIA, which had allegedly been emasculated 
by Pike and Church, launched an operation in Afghanistan that would 
eventually become its largest since Vietnam. The Team B exercise, unlike the 
Congressional investigations, did undermine the CIA. The hard-line 
conclusions of Pipes and his committee helped push CIA analysts to be 
increasingly skeptical of Soviet intentions. To be sure, there had been 
political pressures on the CIA since its establishment in 1947, but the 
politicization of analysis that resulted from Team B was unprecedented. In a 
different era, the BNE might have resisted this outside pressure. Yet in 1976 
the BNE no longer existed, and Team B took full advantage of the vacuum. 
Richard Pipes, like the editors of Counter-Spy, believed that the CIA 
was keeping secrets from the American people. Rather than worrying about 
the morality of covert operations in the Third World, however, Pipes believed 
that the CIA was withholding information that indicated the Soviets were 
readying themselves for World War III. He represented a markedly different 
challenge to the CIA than critics on the Left, but he shared with them a 
concern about the secrets hidden away inside Langley vaults. In the end, 
Pipes and his fellow conservatives proved far more successful in their 
attempt to "reform" the CIA, especially when compared to the rapid demise 
of Counter-Spy magazine. Agency officials fended off the Left, but they were 
less successful in dealing with the reactionary right. The politicization of 
96
· For an insider's account of the Angolan operation, see John Stockwell, In 
Search of Enemies: A CIA Story (London: Andre Deutsch, 1978). 
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intelligence since the late 1970s, and its tragic consequences for American 
foreign relations, is the undeniable legacy of Team B. 
CHAPTER III 
THE CIA ON THE SILVER SCREEN, 1973-1975 
What is it with you people? You think not getting caught in a lie is 
the same thing as telling the truth.-Joe Turner, Three Days of the Condor 
Turner ... comes close to wreaking more havoc on the C. I. A. in 
three days than any number of House and Senate investigating committees 
have done in years.-Vincent Canby 
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Between 1973 and 1976, the public became increasingly distrustful of 
the CIA. In the summer of 1973, only 19% of Americans questioned in a 
Gallup poll had a negative view of the Agency. Two years later the number 
of negative responses would rise to 39%/ and by January 1976, a separate 
polling service found that almost 50% of those surveyed disapproved of the 
CIA's performance.2 When George H. W. Bush took over at Langley, he 
desperately wanted to escape from the skeletons that had been unleashed 
during the Congressional investigations. He delivered a speech to CIA 
employees on March 4, 1976 inside the Bubble, the Agency's domed 
auditorium, and although he acknowledged that recent polling data indicated 
the Agency had "a fundamental public relations problem," he did his best to 
put a positive spin on the situation.3 Bush told the audience that the Harris 
Poll was somewhat misleading, since it did not take into consideration the 
pervasiveness of the anti-establishment mentality in the aftermath of 
1 Cynthia M. Nolan, "Seymour Hersh's Impact on the CIA," The International 
Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 12, nQ. 1 (1999): 21. 
2 Kathryn S. Olmsted, Challenging the Secret Government: The Post-Watergate 
Investigations of the CIA and FBI (Chapel Hill: The University of Nqrth 
Carolina Press, 1996), 140, 224n122. 
3 DCI Speech to CIA: Today and Tomorrow, 4 March 1976,3. CIA Records 
Search Tool (CREST), National Archives II (College Park, Maryland). 
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Watergate. "We're going through a time in our country's history where the 
American people seem to take delight in tearing down our institutions," he 
observed, ". . . there were some mistakes made here . . . but I'll not be 
troubled by these numbers because I'm not sure that the CIA, in terms of 
basic support from the American people, is ~uffering more than other 
institutions."4 
The movies that appeared in the mid-1970s support Bush's argument 
that there was widespread disillusionment in the country. At the same time, 
however, the CIA came to symbolize American fears of government 
conspiracies and the threat they presented to the nation's democratic ideals. 
"[W]e can already look back to Hollywood in the 70s as the period when the 
dorpinant ideology almost disintegrated," argues film scholar Robin Wood.5 
Likewise, Peter Lev concludes in American Films of the 70s "that the films of 
the period constitute a dialogue or debate about the nature and the prospects 
of American socie:ty."6 Happy endings were temporarily abandoned, and 
social commentary became increasingly popular. Until now, scholars have 
claimed that the negative depictions of the Agency on the.silver screen during 
the 1970s represented Hollywood's response to the "Year of Intelligence." 
Through an examination of five espionage movies that premiered between 
1973 and 1975-Scorpio, The Spook Who Sat By The Door, Breakout, Three Days of 
4 1bid. 
5 Robin Wood, Hollywood From Vietnam To Reagan ... And Beyond, rev. ed., 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), 62; for an excellent history of 
Hollywood moviemaking during the 1970s, see Peter Biskind, Easy Riders, 
Raging Bulls: How the Sex-Drugs-and Rock 'n' Roll Generation Saved Hollywood 
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1998). 
6 Peter Lev, American Films of the 70s: Conflicting Visions (Austin: 
University of Texas Press, 2000), xi. 
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the Condor, and The Killer Elite-it becomes clear that screenwriters and 
directors actually anticipated the backlash against the intelligence 
community. These films outwardly criticized the intelligence community's 
obsession with secrecy, portraying the CIA as an elitist, cold-blooded 
organization that engaged in assassinations, cover-ups, and political intrigue. 
In the spring of 1973, MGM released Michael Winner's Scorpio, which 
marked the beginning of a new era in spy films. Scorpio offers what is 
perhaps the first unflinchingly negative portrayal of the CIA in film history; a 
poster for the movie depicted a dead body sprawled across the seal of the 
CIA, and the trailer boldly declared: "When the Agency wants to get rid of 
someone, they do it, even when it's their best man."7 When the film begins, 
CIA assassin Gerald Cross (Burt Lancaster) is overseas on assignment with 
his protege Scorpio (Alain Delon). Cross soon discovers that the CIA has 
turned against him, and after he goes on the run, a top Agency official 
convinces Scorpio to track down and kill Cross in exchange for money and 
Cross's job. 
Agency goons break into Cross's home in hopes of gathering 
information that will help them in the manhunt, but his wife returns home 
early from a party, confronts the intruders, and gets killed. Cross hunts 
down and kills his former boss in retaliation. Yet he is ultimately unable to 
evade Scorpio's wrath, and as Cross lays dying in a parking garage, he 
laments the futility of their chosen profession: "it's a bit like monopoly, only 
more people get hurt. There's no good and no bad. The object is not to win, 
7 
"Theatrical Trailer," Scorpio, DVD, directed by Michael Winner (1973; Culver 
City, California: MGM Home Entertainment, 2000). 
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l?ut not to lose, and the only rule is to stay in the game."8 The CIA apparently 
has no interest in rewarding Scorpio with Cross's job, for at the end they send 
an assassin to eliminate him .. 
Despite the movie's fast pace, critics complained about the· convoluted 
plot. From Roger Ebert's perspective, Scorpio contained "[t]oo many 
characters, too many situations, [and] finally too many twists."9 The reviewer 
for the New York Times was even more blunt: "There are people who take 
[Michael] Winner seriously ... but I doubt if anyone could take 'Scorpio' 
seriously, and that is the best I can say about it."10 Winner has argued that the 
movie would have received a better reception among critics if its release had 
been delayed to take advantage of the headlines about the Watergate cover-
up. "Watergate and the C.I.A. had not quite hit the big time. I think just nine 
months later and we would have done much better in America,'' he 
explains. 11 In an interview in 1994, Winner continued to characterize Scorpio 
as a prophetic .movie: "It showed the CIA doing things that nobody at the 
time believed they did. And that now everybody believes they do."12 
In fairness to Winner, the movie did predate both Watergate and the 
revelations about the Agency's assassination plots. In fact, during the filming 
of Scorpio in 1972, some of the cast and crew were staying at the Watergate 
complex, and shortly before the break-in at the office of the Democratic 
8 Bill Harding, The Films of Michael Winner (London: Frederick Muller 
Limited, 1978), 91; "Two For One" (31), Scorpio, DVD. 
9 Roger Ebert, Chicago Sun-Times, 1 May 1973, www.rogerebert.com (accessed 
February 9, 2005). 
~0 Roger Greenspun, "Winner's 'Scorpio,' Spy Melodrama, Bows," The New 
York Times, 19 April 1973, 52. 
11 Harding, 89. . 
12 Winner quoted in Gary Fishgall, Against Type: The Biography of Burt 
Lancaster (New York: Scribner, 1995), 285. 
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National Committee, Burt Lancaster and Alain Delon had a chance encounter 
with the burglars.13 Gerald Wilson, who wrote the final screenplay for 
Scorpio, clearly envisioned the movie as a blistering critique of modern 
espionage. As he explained in an interview, "I know people connected with 
. . 
the intelligence business and I find the whole thing repugnant; self-servicing, 
brutal, ugly and obsolete in the extreme. So I decided to write a story which 
combined that with the question of real loyalties, instead of boundary 
loyalties."14 Wilson's negative assessment of spying finds expression in 
Cross's interaction with KGB agent Sergei Zharkov (Paul Scofield) and his 
dying words; however, Robert Gregg exaggerates when he describes the 
movie as "one of the strongest indictments of the Cold War on film." 15 
Zharkov wins the respect of the audience not only by protecting Cross, but 
also through his forceful renunciation of Soviet atrocities during the Stalin 
era. In the final analysis, the film's political message remains in the distant 
background. "The plot is a peg to hang the action on," lamented Roger Ebert, 
"and there is a lot of action in Scorpio. Maybe too much."16 Even Burt 
Lancaster confessed to the inherent limitations of the movie, describing it as 
"nothing incisive, just a lot of action .... [it's] one of those things you do as 
part of your living, but you try to avoid doing them as much as you can."17 
Unlike Scorpio, Ivan Dixon's The Spook Who Sat By The Door (1973) 
never allows the action to undermine its commentary on the CIA. The movie, 
13 Ibid., 286; Fred Emery, Watergate: The Corrpution of American Politics and the 
Fall of Richard Nixon (New York: Random House, 1994), 130. 
14 Harding, 89. 
15 Robert W. Gregg, International Relations on Film (Boulder, Colorado: 
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), 100. 
16 Ebert, 1 May 1973. 
17 Lancaster quoted in Fishgall, 286. 
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which is based on a Sam Greenlee novel, begins in the office of a United 
States Senator who is trailing in the polls. Realizing that the black vote would 
secure his re-election, the senator decides to deliver a speech accusing the 
CIA of racial discrimination.18 The CIA responds to the criticism with a 
special recruitment program for African-Americans. The only recruit that 
successfully completes CIA training is Dan Freeman (Lawrence Cook). 
Freeman, a veteran of the Korean War, is a stereotypical "Uncle Tom" on the 
surface, and he does not protest his appointment as the Agency's "top secret 
reproduction center section chief."19 When Freeman is not busy making 
copies, he also volunteers to lead tours to show how the Agency is 
"integrating."20 
· Everything changes after Freeman resigns from the CIA. He moves to 
Chicago and finds employment as a social worker, but the audience quickly 
learns that this is simply a cover job. Freeman uses his CIA training to 
develop an underground guerilla movement, telling his recruits that black 
men are ideal secret agents for domestic operations. "A black man with a 
mop, tray, or broom in his hand can go damn near anywhere in this country," 
he explains, "and a smiling black man is invisible."21 Freeman teaches his 
followers the fundamentals of black nationalism; "what we got now is a 
18 
"Give It To Me Straight," The Spook Who Sat By The Door, DVD, directed by 
Ivan Dixon (1973; Monarch Home Video: Obsidian Home Entertainment, 
2004); former CIA officer Victor Marchetti revealed that an internal study in 
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20 Ibid. 
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colony, but what we want to create is a new nation," he declares.22 And since 
he believes "there is no way that the United States can police the world and 
keep us on our ass too unless we cooperate," Freeman advocates a militant 
challenge to the power structure.23 After the Chicago police shoot a black 
man in the back, there is a riot that prompts Freeman's organization to initiate 
a well-coordinated insurgency. 
The National Guard is ordered to the city, but they prove no match for 
the well trained "black freedom fighters of Chicago."24 Freeman's men 
capture the commander of the National Guard, paint his face black, force him 
to drop acid, and then kill him. OA officials cannot understand the success 
of the urban uprising, and they become convinced that the Soviets have 
organized the insurgency. Not realizing that Freeman developed the 
movement using cells, the CIA wrongly believes that they can stop the 
rebellion by eliminating the leader. The audience learns that the rebellion has 
spread to other cities, and the film ends with an ominous radio 
announcement: "The president has declared a state of national emergency."25 
Although it was shot on a low budget, The Spook Who Sat By The Door 
became a cult classic in African-American communities. It also inspired 
future black moviemakers like Robert Townsend. When it was released in 
the fall of 1973, most reviewers were clearly not prepared for the movie's 
aggressive tone. Vincent Canby of the New York Times concluded that "[t]he 
rage it projects is real, even though the means by which that rage is projected 
22 
"Nightmare," The Spook Who Sat By The Door, DVD. 
23 
"We Can Paralyze This Country," The Spook Who Sat By The Door, DVD. 
24 
"Gatta Go," The Spook Who Sat By The Door, DVD. 
25 
"The Revolution," The Spook Who Sat By The Door, DVD. 
78 
are stereotypes."26 The reviewer for the Christian Science Monitor explained 
that the film "culminates in a violent series of scenes that can only be 
described as an incitement to riot," calling it "a virulent form of propaganda 
.... [and] as much of a blueprint for violence as 'Battle of Algiers.11127 Film 
critics recognized the powerful emotions unleashed by The Spook Who Sat By 
The Door, but they obviously were troubled with its violent implications. In 
many ways, the criticism directed at Dixon's movie anticipated what some 
reviewers would later say about Spike Lee's Do The Right Thing (1989), which 
also ends with a black uprising in the inner city. 
The Spook Who Sat By The Door mysteriously disappeared from 
circulation until it was re-released on VHS in 1993, and there have been 
unproven allegations that the government may have acted to suppress the 
movie. It should have been clear to reviewers in 1973 that the film was more 
of a cautionary tale than a call to arms. Adrienne Manns, one of the few 
writers at the time who seemed to understand the movie, explained in the 
Washington Post that "its triumph is that it lends humanity to persons who are 
usually portrayed as vicious, savage, sub-humans-the street gangs, the 
young people who have in many cities terrorized the communities they live 
in. They are the real heroes, this time."28 As Manns understood, the film 
addresses conflict within the black community while arguing that race is a 
social construction. Freeman warns his followers that "this is not about hate 
26 Vincent Canby, "Screen: Using the C. I. A.," The Nw York Times, 22 
September 1973, 18. 
27 Louise Sweeny, "The Spook Who Sat Next To The Door," Christian Science 
Monitor, 22 September 1973, 14. 
28 Adrienne Manns, "A Constructive Black Movie," Washington Post, 30 
October 1973, E4. 
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white folks." 29 In fact, Freeman selects Willie (David Lemieux), who is either 
white or incredibly light-skinned, to serve as the organization's "minister of 
information."30 The movie also provides a stinging indictment of America's 
black bourgeoisie for their unwillingness to acknowledge what is happening 
in the ghetto. The black bourgeoisie is best symbolized in the character of 
Dawson (J. A. Preston), a Chicago police officer and Freeman's childhood 
friend. When Dawson discovers that Freeman is the leader of the insurgency, 
he attempts to stop him; in the confrontation that ensues, Freeman kills 
Dawson. Although The Spook Who Sat By The Door appeared in the midst of 
the blaxploitation phenomenon, it was definitely not a blaxploitation movie. 
Lawrence Cook's riveting performance as Dan Freeman helps to make the 
film one of the most unique ever made about the CIA. 
It is important to emphasize that both Scorpio and The Spook Who Sat By 
The Door were conceived before the Watergate break-in. As a consequence, it 
is wrong to characterize these movies as a response to the criminal activities 
of the Nixon administration. Peter Lev has observed that film scholars 
should not overlook the continued popularity of movies with conservative 
themes. "If the early 1970s were the period of youth culture on film," he says, 
"they were also the period of right-wing cop films starring Clint Eastwood 
and Charles Bronson."31 Lev's conclusion is undoubtedly true when taking a 
broad view of the decade's movies, but there are also films that complicate his 
assessment. He points to Charles Bronson's role in Michael Winner's Death 
Wish {1974) as a classic example of a conservative Hollywood movie. Yet 
29 
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30 Ibid. 
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Winner had previously directed Scorpio, and Bronson would soon appear in 
Breakout (1975). 
Like Death Wish, Breakout is intended primarily as entertainment; 
however, in Breakout it is the CIA that engages in criminal activity, not urban 
hoodlums. The CIA frames Jay Wagner (Robert Duvall) for a murder 
committed in Mexico, and after Wagner's extradition from Chile, the Mexican 
government convicts and imprisons him. His grandfather is Harris Wagner 
(John Huston), president of the Transpacific Fruit and Steamship 
Corporation. Early in the movie, Harris Wagner meets with a CIA officer 
(Paul Mantee) in New York City. The CIA officer informs him that they have 
successfully framed his grandson, and it appears that Jay Wagner has done 
something to embarrass the CIA. The CIA officer expresses disappointment 
that Jay's grandfather intervened to prevent his assassination, since he 
worries that Jay might try to escape from prison.32 
Predictably, Jay's wife Anne Gill Ireland) organizes a rescue attempt 
and hires a freelance pilot named Nick Colton (Charles Bronson). Colton, a 
man of few words, agrees to fly Anne into Mexico, but he is initially unaware 
of her intentions. The first rescue attempt fails, prompting Colton to develop 
a scheme ~n which he sends his friend Hawk (Randy Quaid) into the prison 
disguised as a prostitute. The Mexican authorities are not trick~d by such a 
cunning plan, and they eject Hawk from the prison after severely beating 
him. This makes Colton even more determined to exact vengeance on the 
32 
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<'pepperbellies" and rescue Wagner.33 For the third rescue attempt, Colton 
lands a helicopter in the prison yard at a· ·pre-arranged time.· Wagner is 
rescued this time, but unbeknownst to him, his life remains in danger. When 
flying back to the United States, customs officials at Brownsville, Texas order 
Colton to land for an inspection. The Agency has arranged this inspection in 
order to kill Wagner. In the movie's finale, Colton intervenes to protect 
Wagner from the CIA officer chasing him. But just as the CIA man is about to 
shoot Colton on the runway, he is sliced into pieces by the propeller of a 
departing plane. 
In his review of Breakout, Roger Ebert explained that he was somewhat 
surprised "to find Charles Bronson starring in a Ramparts magazine cover 
story .... "34 As Ebert notes, the .movie is indeed based on a true story. Joel 
David Kaplan was rescued from a Mexican prison with a helicopter in 
August 1971 where he had been serving a 28~year sentence for a murder 
committed a decade earlier. Kaplan, president of the American Sucrose 
Company, came from a wealthy family. Prior to the helicopter rescue in 1971, 
there had been several unsuccessful escape attempts. In addition to declaring 
his innocence, Kaplan claimed that he was connected with the CIA, which 
might help to explain why he entered Mexico with a fake passport. His uncle, 
J. M. Kaplan, operated a charitable foundation that the CIA had previously 
used to funnel over. one million dollars into Central America.35 Breakout is 
33 
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adapted from Eliot Asinof' s book about the escape.36 Like Scorpio, however, 
the movie emphasizes action, and it is "more concerned with the rescue 
mission than with any shadowy political implications."37 
The movie does not contain any precise explanation for why the CIA 
wants Wagner dead, but in comparison to other films with depictions of the 
CIA, it is somewhat unusual. Patrick McGilligan argues that of all the movies 
dealing with the Agency that appeared in 1975, Breakout "is the most 
interesting politically, even though it is the least interesting, cinematically."38 
"In this film," says McGilligan, "the entire CIA is understood as the 'enemy,' 
not simply a splinter cabal."39 In other words, Breakout flagrantly violates one 
of the most common themes of CIA movies: the idea that the sinister activities 
of the CIA are attributable to a limited number of rogue agents. It is possible 
that the CIA officer in Breakout is acting on his own, because the audience 
never sees any other official from the Agency on screen. Yet it seems unlikely 
that a rogue agent would be able to pressure the Mexican government into 
framing an innocent American civilian. 
The sensational "Year of Intelligence" undoubtedly contributed to the 
popularity of Hollywood's increasingly negative depictions of the CIA. 
Kathryn Olmsted correctly identifies Three Days of the Condor (1975) as "[t]he 
York Times, 21 August 1971, 3; Paul P. Kennedy, "Mexico Weighing Plea By 
American," The New York Times, 7 February 1965, 31. 
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movie that best exemplified this change in the CIA's popular image .... "40 At 
the same time, however, Olmsted incorrectly suggests that "the film included 
plot changes that demonstrated the influence of the investigations."41 
Perhaps the most fascinating aspect of the movie is that it was written prior to 
the publication of Seymour Hersh's story in December 1974. As Sydney 
Pollack, the movie's director, later explained in an interview, "[t]he film was 
three-quarters finished before any of these CIA revelations began to 
happen."42 Pollack insisted that no changes were made to the script in the 
final weeks of shooting, since "[w]e had shot the whole set-up, the whole 
plot, we were locked. We couldn't, all of a sudden, start changing scenes."43 
By the time the Congressional hearings began, Three Days of the Condor was 
already in post-production. 
Hollywood producers traditionally defend the lack of message movies 
by arguing that the American public is only interested in entertainment, but 
this argument only begs the question: isn't it possible to make films that are 
both entertaining and thought provoking? This is exactly what Pollack hoped 
to achieve with Three Days of the Condor; in his words, "[t]he attempt was, first 
of all, to make it faiflt!ul to the genre of a thriller. And within that, to explore 
certain ideas of suspicion, trust, morality, if you will ... it was not intended in 
any way as a documentary, I suppose, but as a warning-using the CIA 
almost as a metaphor, and drawing certain conclusions from post-Watergate 
40 Olmsted, 102. 
41 1bid. 
42 McGilligan, 11. 
43 Ibid., 12. 
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America."44 One of the most effective features of the movie is the character 
development; unlike the vast majority of thrillers, the villains in the film are 
not simply cardboard cutouts. Interviewed during the shooting of the movie, 
Robert Redford said that the he was attracted to the project because of the 
script's complexity: "I think the movie is about trust and paranoia, it's about 
bureaucracy run amok. That's something that really frightens me. A film 
that just says 'Hey, the CIA are bad guys!' wouldn't interest me. We all know 
that. But how frightening it is not to know how far you can trust the 
CIA-how big it is and what it's doing."45 
The movie opens with Joe Turner (Robert Redford) arriving late for 
work one December morning at the American Literary Historical Society, 
which is a CIA research office in New York City. It is later explained that 
Turner, whose codename is Condor, gets paid to read books dealing with a 
wide range of topics. He analyzes these books in an attempt to provide the 
CIA with new ideas as well as information about potential intelligence leaks. 
After Turner enters the office, his boss, Dr. Lappe (Don McHenry), reminds 
him that it is his turn to get everyone lunch. Dr. Lappe also asks Turner 
whether he is happy with his job as an analyst. Turner confesses that he has 
trouble not telling people what he actually does for a living, explaining that 
unlike many of his colleagues, "I actually trust a few people."46 
44 Ibid., 11. 
45 Redford quoted in Tom Donnelly, "Waiting For Redford," Washington Post, 
3 December 197 4, B6. . 
46 
"The American Literary Historical Society" (1), Three Days of the Condor, 
DVD, directed by Sydney Pollack (1975; Hollywood, California: Paramount 
Pictures, 1999). 
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Turner leaves the building through the basement, and when he returns 
with the lunch orders, he discovers that all six people in the office have been 
gunned down. He instinctively takes the secretary's handgun before calling 
the CIA's panic line from a nearby phone booth. The CIA arranges a meeting 
in an alley with Turner's section chief in Washington, S. W. Wicks (Michael 
Kane), in order to bring him out of the field. At this meeting, however, Wicks 
attempts to kill Turner, forcing him to return fire. Turner now realizes that he 
can no longer trust the CIA, and he randomly selects a woman to kidnap. 
Although Kathy (Faye Dunaway) is obviously scared of Turner, he ultimately 
gains her trust. In keeping with one of the most important rules of CIA 
movies, Kathy sleeps with him not long .after her abduction and then helps 
him track down Higgins (Cliff Robertson), Deputy Director of the CIA. 
Turner becomes convinced about the strong possibility that "there's another 
CIA, inside the CIA."47 
After saying goodbye to Kathy, Turner travels to the home of Leonard 
Atwood (Addison Powell) in Chevy Chase, Maryland. He believes that 
Atwood, the Agency's Deputy Director of Operations for the Middle East, 
will be able to unlock the mystery. But Joubert (Max von Sydow), the 
freelance assassin responsible for wiping out Turner's colleagues, kills 
Atwood before he can disclose information to Turner. Joubert allows Turner 
to live, and he tells Turner that he should leave the country. Although 
William R. Taylor describes Joubert "as the most villainous of all of Pollack's 
47 
"The Suspicion Business" (11), Three Days of the Condor, DVD. 
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characters,"48 he also manages to win the audience's sympathy for sparing 
Turner. Joubert tells Turner that being an assassin "is not a bad occupation .. 
. . [i]t's quite restful, it's almost peaceful. No need to believe in either side or 
any side ... there's only yourself. The belief is in your own precision."49 
Turner, however, refuses to take Joubert's advice about traveling to 
Europe; "I was born in the United States," he says, "I miss it when I'm away 
too long."50 Instead of fleeing America, he arranges a meeting with Higgins in 
New York City outside the New York Times building. Turner has concluded 
by this point that he stumbled upon Atwood's covert plan to invade the 
Middle East that the CIA was not willing to sanction. When he confronts 
Higgins about these suspicions, Higgins replies, "We have games. That's all. 
We play games. 'What if?', 'How many men?', 'What would it take?', 'Is 
there a cheaper way to destabilize a regime?' That's what we're paid to do."51 
Higgins emphasizes that Atwood had embarked on "a renegade operation," 
but he proudly observes that "there was nothing wrong with the plan. No, 
the plan was all right. The plan would have worked." 52 This response leads 
to a famous exchange that is worth quoting at length: 
Turner: Boy-What is it with you people? You think not getting caught 
in a lie is the same thing as telling the truth. 
Higgins: No, it's simple economics. Today it's oil, right? In ten or 
fifteen years, food, plutonium .. Maybe even sooner. Now what do you 
think the people are going to want us to do then? 
48 William R. Taylor, SydneyPollack (Boston: Twayne Publish~rs, 1981), 135; 
see also Janet L. Meyer, Sydney Pollack: A Critical Filmography Oefferson, North 
Carolina: McFarl~f1d & Cqmpany, 1998), 80-85 .. 
49 
"For That Day" (15), Three Days of the Condor, DVD. 
50 Ibid. 
51 
"Telling Stories" (16), Three Days of the Condor, DVD. 
52 Ibid. . . 
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Turner: Ask them! 
Higgins: Not now, then. Ask them when they're running out. Ask 
them when there's no heat in their homes and they're cold. Ask them 
when their engines stop. Ask them when people who've never known 
hunger start going hungry. You want to know something: they won't 
want us to ask' em. They'll just want us to get it for' em. 
Turner: Boy; have you found ~-hoiile.53 
Turner proceeds to inform Higgins that he has told his story to the New 
York Times.· Dumfounded by this development, Higgins declares to Turner 
that he has "done more damage than you know." Turner's reply is bold in its 
simplicity: "I hope so."54 Will the Times print the story, or will the CIA 
somehow arrange to block its publication? The answer remains unclear as 
Turner walks away from Higgins with Christmas carolers singing "God Rest 
Ye Merry Gentlemen" in the background. The movie ends with a dramatic 
freeze frame of Turner looking back at Higgins over his shoulder, which 
serves to reinforce the ambiguity of the ending. Turner's facial expression 
suggests defiance, but it also appears he understands that he is "about to be a 
very lonely man."55 
When Three Days of the Condor opened in September 1975, most critics 
enthusiastically embraced the movie. According to Vincent Canby, "Turner 
... comes close to wreaking more havoc on the C. I. A. in three days than any 
number of House and Senate investigating committees have done in years."56 
"At its best moments," said Canby, "[the movie] creates without effort or 
53 Ibid. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Vincent Canby, "Redford a C.I.A. Eccentric in 'Three Days of the Condor,"' 
The New York Times, 25 September 1975, 60. 
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editorializing that sense of isolation-that far remove from reality-within 
which super-government agencies can operate with such heedless 
immunity."57 The reviewer for the Christian Science Monitor also recognized 
the political issues raised by the movie, calling it "a thinking man's spy story" 
with an ending "that mingles liberal humanism with a smidgen of skepticism 
and a dash of doubt."58 Joy Gould Boyum took notice of how effectively the 
film explored the conflict between the various characters; "The villains here 
are not traitors working for an enemy government. They, and the heroes as 
well, are working for what they apparently believe to be in the best interests 
of our own nation."59 
However, there were others who complained about the movie's 
political message. In his assessment of the film's ending, William Buckley, Jr., 
conservative guru and former CIA officer, observed with a hint of sarcasm 
that "[t]he director failed only to emblazon under [the New York Times 
building], 'Daniel Ellsberg Slept Here."'60 Buckley also criticized promotional 
material for the movie, which said that the filmmakers wanted to describe 
"the climate of America." "They really mean," he complained, "[t]he climate 
of America as seen by I. F. Stone, Seymour Hersh, Susan Sontag and Shirley 
MacLaine."61 Three Days of the Condor also upset Ben Stein, and in an article in 
the Wall Street Journal titled "Let's Tar and Feather the CIA," Stein called the 
57 Ibid. 
58 David Sterritt, "Redford's Latest: This Time He's' A Sort of Superspy 
Librarian,'" Christian Science Monitor, 26 September 1975, 25. 
59 Joy Gould Boyum, "Robert Redford vs. the CIA," Wall Street Journal, 29 
September 1975, 11. 
60 William F. Buckley, Jr., "The Case of Redford vs. the C. I. A.," The New York 
Times, 28 September 1975, sec. 2, p. 1. 
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movie "complicated and simple-minded at the same time . " 62 Stein 
criticized the.filmmaker and other critics of the intelligence community for 
failing to consider "the possibility that the CIA might serve some valuable 
function for the nation and that the Soviets may not be the friends they seem 
to be. Fashion must be served."63 Both Buckley and Stein were not pleased 
with American popular culture in the aftermath of Watergate, and they 
equated the movie with the liberal politics C?f Sydney Pollack and Robert 
Redford. 
In fairness to the conservative critics, there is no question that the 
political beliefs of Pollack and Redford influenced the movie~ Pollack openly 
expressed disillusionment with American government: "I tried to deal, as 
much as I could [in the movie], with trust and suspicion [and] paranoia, 
which I think is happening in this country, when every institution I grew up 
believing was sacrosanct is now beginning to .crumble."64 The movie's 
screenplay, which was adapted from James Grady's Six Days of the Condor, is 
considerably different than the novel, and the modifications in the story are 
obviously intended to enhance the film's political commentary. In the book, 
the rogue CIA officers are smuggling drugs rather than developing plans to 
invade the Middle East. The villains in the novel ultimately shoot the Kathy 
character (Wendy Ross); believing that she has been killed, Turner's character 
(Ronald Malcolm) tracks down the assassin (Maronick) at National Airport 
62 Benjamin Stein, "Let's Tar and Feather the CIA," Wall Street Journal, 2 
October 1975, 24. 
63 Ibid. 
64 McGilligan, 12. 
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and murders him. He then returns to the CIA. 65 In short, the book contains 
more action and sex, but it does not address the ethical issues surrounding 
espionage as Pollack does in the movie. The book's ending provides closure, 
while the movie's finale leaves the audience feeling uncertain about Turner's 
fate. Yet despite the changes to Grady's novel, Pollack vehemently denied 
the charge that he was advocating the.abolition of the CIA, stating in an 
interview that "I don't think we should abolish the CIA. What we have to do 
is find some way of making a check and balance system work that, 
conceivably, hasn't been working before."66 
But Pollack's willingness to accept the necessity of the CIA troubled 
McGilligan, who referred to Three Days of the Condor as "a wide-screen 
whitewash tantamount to the Rockefeller Commission" that was nothing 
more than "a souped-up contemporary spy caper with lukewarm political 
impact."67 McGilligan faulted the movie for portraying the villains as "a 
small, dangerous yet ultimately controllable clique-that is presumably 
motivated by abstract power-mongering rather than economic imperatives."68 
From McGilligan's perspective, in other words, the real villain should have 
been the CIA itself. The film's ending creates problems for this analysis, 
however. It becomes clear during Turner's exchange with Higgins that 
65 There are also other differences between the novel and the screenplay. The 
setting of the novel is Washington, D. C., not New York City, and Grady's 
story unfolds in the spring during the course of a single week starting on a 
Wednesday. Moreover, after Wendy is shot, Malcolm spends a night with a 
teenage prostitute. He is also nursing a cold in the book. James Grady, Six 
Days of the Condor (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1974). After the 
movie's release in 1975, the book was re-published as Three Days of the Condor. 
66 McGilligan, 12. 
67 Ibid., 11. 
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economic factors (i.e. the desire for Middle Eastern oil) were a motivation 
behind Atwood's plan, and even though Higgins reminds Turner that 
Atwood was indeed the leader of renegade group not sanctioned by the CIA, 
Turner is unimpressed with the distinction: "who the hell is Atwood? He's 
you. He's all you guys. Seven people killed. And you play fucking garnes!"69 
Should the CIA be allowed to continue the "games" that Higgins and other 
CIA men play behind closed doors at Langley, or as Turner suggests in the 
finale, would it be better for officials to incorporate the American public into 
the policyrnaking process? This is a provocative question that moviegoers 
must resolve for themselves. Turner trusts that the American people will do 
~hat is right, while Higgins is far more cynical, claiming that most Americans 
are unconc.erned about foreign policy as long as it preserves economic 
prosperity at horne: "they won't want us to ask 'ern. They'll just want us to 
get it for 'ern."70 
Sam Peckinpah's The Killer Elite, an adaptation of a Robert Rostand 
novel, opened approximately three months after Three Days of the Condor, and 
in the final week of December, it was the highest grossing movie, earning 
$849,000.71 The commercial success of the movie proved short-lived, which is 
not surprising given its disjointedness. A transcript of an interview with 
Lawrence Weyburn (Gig Young) appears on the screen at the beginning of the 
movie: 
Q. What do you mean by special departments Mr. Weyburn? 
69 
"Telling Stories" (16), Three Days of the Condor, DVD. 
70 Ibid. 
71 David Weddle,"IfThey Move . .. Kill'Em!": The Life and Times of Sam 
Peckinpah (New York: Grove Press, 1994), 500. · 
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A. Some countries have 'special' departments for directly or 
indirectly eliminating defectors and others who carry away 
secrets which may jeopardize its national security. 
Q. Does our country have a similar department? 
A. Not to my knowledge. 
Q. Would you admit it if we had? 
A. No.72 
This transcript is followed with a somewhat ironic disclaimer, reminding the 
audience that "[t]his film is a work of fiction. There is no company called 
[COMTEG] and the thought the C. I. A. might employ such an organization 
for any purpose is, of course, preposterous."73 Mike Locken Games Caan) and 
George Hansen (Robert Duvall) are secret agents, but they do not work 
directly for the CIA. Instead, they are employed with a clandestine 
organization that essentially does contract work for the Agency and other 
groups willing to pay. They are experts on dirty work, but when they are 
assigned to guard a prominent defector, Hansen betrays his partner at the 
safe house. He kills the defector before cruelly shooting Mike in the knee and 
ann. 
Forced to go through months of painful rehabilitation in the hospital, 
Mike remains determined to return to his job. Mike's boss, Cap Collis 
(Arthur Hill), initially wants nothing to do with him after the shooting, but 
Collis later recruits him to protect a foreign leader from Asia who has been 
targeted by ninja assassins. Although Collis tells Mike that Hansen is. now 
working with the enemies of the Asian leader, in reality he still answers to 
Collis and COMTEG. Mike recruits two friends, Mac (Burt Young) and 
72 
"Logo/Title/The Bomb" (1), The Killer Elite, DVD, directed by Sam 
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Jerome Miller (Bo Hopkins), to participate in the mission. Later in the movie, 
in what Michael Bliss has labeled "the film's most analytical speech,"74 Mac 
warns Mike that "[y]ou're so busy doing their dirty work you can't tell who 
the bad guys really are."75 Mike proceeds to explain that he defines the bad 
guys as "anybody that tries to hurt me."76 Mac, however, is not satisfied with 
this response; "They need guys like you to do their bloodletting while they're 
busy making speeches about freedom and· progress. They're all full of 
bullshit."77 During the final sequence that unfolds in a graveyard of 
abandoned warships, Collis expresses a similar sentiment: "sides, sides, all 
full of shit. They all want the same thing: to be in charge."78 Mike shoots 
Collis, and the movie ends with Mac and Mike sailing off together, 
symbolizing their abandonment of. the world of assassinations and dirty 
tricks. (Miller is unable to join them, because he has been killed shortly after 
shooting Hansen on the pier.) 
According to Bliss, "The Killer Elite is interesting, but it exhibits a great 
deal of pessimism about the possibility of being delivered from corruption, 
this not only in spite of, but to a fair extent because of, its unrealistic 
ending."79 One reviewer at the time noted that the movie's "theme is the 
world as universal sell-out" and compared The Killer Elite to Three Days of the 
74 Michael Bliss, Justified Lives: Morality & Narrative in the Films of Sam 
Peckinpah (Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, 
1993), 268. 
75 
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76 Ibid; see also Bliss, 268. 
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Condor. 80 Yet this comparison is somewhat misleading, for in many ways, The 
Killer Elite is actually more similar to Scorpio than Pollack's film. Except for 
~ac' s critical assessment of covert operations, it is a traditional Hollywood 
action movie that is often difficult to follow. Bliss is correct when he 
maintains that the film's ending "fails to confront the moral problems 
inherent in the lives of secret agents."81 
By any standard of measurement, the movie is seriously flawed even 
though it had the potential to be an engrossing thriller. Peckinpah blamed 
the producers for the weaknesses of The Killer Elite; during pre-production, he 
had sent a memo to Mike Medavoy, the executive in charge of production at 
United Artists, complaining abo1.,1t how he had been prohibited from 
modifying the script. Medavoy responded with a memo that re-iterated that 
Peckinpah was expected to leave the screenplay alone. Angered by 
Medavoy's reply, Peckinpah had T-Shirts made "with his [memo] on the 
front and Medavoy' s response on the back" and provided the shirt to 
everyone on the set.82 Peckinpah' s feud with the producers continued 
throughout the production, and it has been suggested that he intentionally 
sabotaged the movie to retaliate. For instance, David Weddle claims that 
"[Peckinpah] had his actors ad-lib sophomoric asides that undercut the 
drama and encouraged the audience to jeer at the movie they'd paid good 
money to see."83 
80 Richard Eder, "'Killer Elite,' or Copping Out of the Universal Sell-Out," The 
N~ York Times, 18 December 1975,62. 
81 Bliss, 273. . 
82 Gamer Simmons, Peckinpah: A Portrait in Montage (Austin: University of 
Texas Press, 1976), 211. · 
83 Weddle, 499. 
95 
Rampant cocaine use on the set also helped to undermine the quality 
and coherence of the film. Peck.inpah "would forget conversations that he 
had with you," recalled stunt director Whitey Hughes, "[y]ou'd set up a 
stunt,.you'd discuss it with him and he'd approve it, then he'd come out of 
his trailer and we'd do a take and. he'd completely reverse himself . . . ."84 
One of the movie's producers would later attempt to reconcile with 
Peck.inpah. Not surprisingly, Peck.inpah was uninterested in mending fences; 
as he explained to the producer, "[m]y problem is, I do not suffer fools 
graciously and detest petty thievery and incompetence. Other than that, I 
found you charming, and on occasion, mildly entertaining."85 Although 
Peck.inpah certainly had legitimate grievances, he deserved more of the blame 
for the problems with The Killer Elite than he was willing to acknowledge. 
Moviegoers were left to wonder how the director of The Wild Bunch (1969) 
and Th.e Ballad of Cable Hogue (1970) could have faltered so badly with The 
Killer Elite. The first sentence of the review in the New York Times probably 
explained it best: "Sam Peck.inpah knows how to make movies but perhaps 
he has forgotten why."86 
The espionage movies of. the 1970s demonstrate the importance of 
studying the cultural history of the "Year of Intelligence." Films like Scorpio 
and Three Days of the Condor have been frequently imitated in the past three 
84 Ibid., 500. 
85 Simmons, 224. 
86 Eder, 62; for a completely different assessment of the movie, see Pauline 
Kael, "Notes on the Nihilist Poetry of Sam Peck.inpah," The New Yorker, 12 
January 1976; 70-75. Kael acknowledged that "[m]uch of what Peckinpah is 
trying to express in 'The Killer Elite' is probably inaccessible to audiences 
.... " Ibid., 74. Yet she confided to readers that his ability as a filmmaker 
"makes me feel closer to him than I do to any other director except Jean 
Renoir .... " Ibid., 72. 
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decad~s. Regardless of whether they romanticize or demonize the CIA, 
' ' 
filmmakers love to turn unsuspecting CIA analysts into heroic field 
operativ.es in the image of Joe Turner (The Amateur, The Hunt for Red October, 1 
The Sum of All Fears). There is also a tendency to examine what happens 
when the CIA hierarchy turns against their own officers (Spy Game, The 
Bourne Identity, The Bourne Supremacy). And, of course, much attention has 
been given to assassination (In The Line of Fire, Conspiracy Theory, The Bourne 
Identity, The Bourne Supremacy), mind control experiments (Conspiracy Theory), 
and allegations of the CIA's connection to the mafia (JFK, Agent On Ice). 
Popular culture is more than just a reflection of society, for it has 
almost certainly helped to shape the public's perception of the intelligence 
community. In the same speech where he attempted to downplay the PR 
problem facing the CIA, Bush's optimistic facade vanished when discussing 
Hollywood's portrayal of the Agency. He explained to CIA employees that 
he "made the mistake" during the holiday season of going to see Three Days of 
the Condor with his daughter, "who is madly and passionately in love with 
Robert Redford."87 He described the movie as "a fairly good shoot-em-up 
and, if I were totally untutored in this business, I might have got a yak out of 
it''; despite this complimentary remark, however, he warned that "it was a 
very vicious and sinister piece because what it did was to lay at the CIA's 
doorstep all kinds of outrageous things that the CIA by its severest critics has 
never been accused of."88 The new CIA director was especially appalled that 
the movie's finale implied that The New York Times might somehow be in 
87DCI Speech to CIA: Today and Tomorrow, 4. 
88 Ibid. 
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cahoots with Langley. From Bush's perspective, the accusation seemed 
irresponsible and downright foolish: "Well, if we control it, we're doing a 
hell of a job with the editorial content they're coming out with! This is tough 
propaganda."89 
89 Ibid. 
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CHAPTER IV 
'TELLING THE INTELLIGENCE STORY': WILLIAM COLBY, THE ARlO, 
AND THE SELLING OF THE CIA 
Although George H. W. Bush conceded in March 1976 that the CIA 
confronted "a fundamental public relations problem," his attempt to combat 
the negative publicity was simple: "I want to get the CIA off the front pages 
and at some point out of the papers altogether," he informed President Ford 
that summer.1 Bush's primary objectives were to revive Agency morale and 
regain the trust of Congress, and from the perspective of most observers, he 
succeeded admirably. Yet this "no publicity is good publicity" strategy 
differed from the approach of his predecessor, William Colby. Colby, who 
headed the CIA during this contentious era, decided that it was necessary to 
reveal some of the Agency's darkest secrets in order to ensure its survival. As 
John Prados has explained in Lost Crusader, Colby became "the man in the 
middle ..... "2 Not only was he caught between the Congressional 
investigators and the White House, he also found himself in the middle of 
two opposing factions within the CIA. The first believed that it was 
acceptable for him to share information with Congress and the public, while 
the second lobbied aggressively for him to stonewall.3 Even though Colby 
infuriated the old school Cold Warriors for cooperati~g with the 
investigations, it is now clear, as Prados concludes, that the embattled CIA 
1 Anne Hessing Cahn; "Team B: The Trillion-Dollar Experiment;'' The Bulletin 
of Atomic Scientists 49 (April 1993): 25; Herbert S. Parmet, George Bush: The Life 
of a Lone Star Yankee (New York: Scribner, .1997), 196. 
2 John Prados, Lost Crusader: The Secret Wars of CIA Director William Colby 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 330. 
3 David Atlee Phillips, The Night Watch (New York: Ballantine Books, 1977), 
372; for more on the internal divisions inside the CIA at the time, see Prados, 
310-311. 
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director was "far less open to inquiry than his critics claimed."4 In fact, 
Colby's PR efforts-in conjunction with the well-organized campaign of 
former CIA officials-helped make ifpossible for the CIA to emerge from the 
"Year of Intelligence" essentially unscathed. In the end, Colby managed to 
protect what he referred to as the (1 good secrets."5 
As the headlines announcing news of CIA scandals multiplied in the 
mid-1970s, Colby began to realize that publication relations could help to 
rehabilitate the CIA's image. He explained in his memoirs, Honorable Men, 
that "[t]he CIA must build, not assume, public support, and it can do this 
only by informing the public of the nature of its activities and accepting the 
public's control over them."6 Rather than weakening the CIA, Colby 
concluded, creating the perception of greater openness would re-invigorate it: 
"A public informed of the CIA's accomplishments and capabilities will 
support it. A public aware of its true .mission and the limits of its authority 
will accept it .... A public convinced of the CIA's value will help protect its 
true secrets."7 It is important to keep in mind that Colby did not invent CIA 
public relations; in fact, as a budding CIA officer in the 1950s, he witnessed 
how effectively Allen Dulles had used publicity to win support for the 
Agency.8 
Dulles, more than any other person, cultivated the mystique of the CIA 
that Colby and other Agency defenders would work so hard to protect in the 
4 Prados, 311. 
5 Colby quoted in Phillips, viii, 372. 
6 William Colby and Peter Forbath, Honorable Men: My Life in the CIA (New 
York: Simon and Schuster, 1978), 21. 
7 Ibid. 
8 When Colby was stationed in Stockholm, Sweden, he briefed Dulles while 
the CIA director was in the bathtub. Prados, 52. 
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mid-1970s. In reflecting on the contributions of "the Great White Case 
Officer," one of his proteges perceptively observed that " ... Dulles loved 
[the mystique], helped create it, and in many ways embodied it."9 When 
Dulles became CIA director in 1953, he led the Agency into what is 
commonly known as the "golden age of operations."10 Dulles controlled the 
covert dimension of American foreign policy under President Eisenhower, 
while his brother, John Foster Dulles, ran the State Department. 
Despite the cold war consensus that emerged in the 1950s, Dulles's 
clandestine power did not go unchallenged. In July 1953, just five months 
after Eisenhower selected Dulles to be the country's top spymaster, Senator 
Mike Mansfield (Democrat-Montana) made a proposal that stunned the 
intelligence establishment. Mansfield, a former history professor who had 
been elected to the Senate the previous fall, offered a resolution that would 
establish a Congressional oversight committee on intelligence with ten 
members drawn from both the House and Senate.11 Dulles's supporters on 
Capitol Hill easily quashed the resolution, but in March 1954, Mansfield 
would try again. This time he delivered a stirring speech on the floor of the 
Senate, declaring that "secrecy now beclouds everything about CIA-its cost, 
9 Ray S. Cline, Secrets, Spies, and Scholars: Blueprint of the Essential CIA 
(Washington, DC: Acropolis Books, 1976), 119; see also Jonathan Nashel, "The 
Rise of the CIA and American Popular Culture," in Architects of the American 
Century: Individuals and Institutions in Twentieth-Century U. S. Foreign 
Policymaking, ed. David F. Schmitz and T. Christopher Jespersen (Chicago: 
Imprint Publications, 1999), esp. 66-73. 
10 Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones, The CIA and American Democracy, 3rd ed. (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 2003), Chp. 5. . 
11 Ibid., 78; David M. Barrett, The CIA & Congress: The Untold Story From 
Truman To Kennedy (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2005), 171-172. 
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its efficiency, its successes, and its failures."12 Mansfield even included a 
prophetic warning in his address: "until we create some sort of 'watchdog 
committee' ... we will have nothing but continued anxiety about the Central 
Intelligence Agency and its widespread activities."13 
The evidence now available indicates that Dulles was reluctant to 
challenge Mansfield publicly.14 Dulles fought back against the senator 
indirectly using a masterful display of PR, and the crowning achievement of 
this campaign appeared in the form of a three-part series in The Saturday 
Evening Post. The articles, written by Richard and Gladys Harkness, would 
have been impossible without insider assistance at the Agency. Peter Grose, 
Dulles's biographer, claims that Dulles did not simply leak stories to the 
reporting team, but he does concede that the CIA director granted them full 
access and later proofread their articles over dinner, "making a few 
corrections or suggestions here and there."15 
Judging from the content of the series, however, Dulles most likely had 
far more control over the articles than Grose suggests. In fact, "The 
Mysterious Doings of the CIA" nicely illustrates what historian Jonathan 
Nashel has called "the incestuous and corrosive mix between the government 
12
. Mansfield quoted in Barrett, 173. 
13 Ibid., 17 4. . 
14 According to one observer's diary entry, "[Dulles] said that we did not like 
this proposal [from Mansfield] in its present form, but that we did not want 
to appear to fight it." Ibid., 172. 
15 Peter Grose, Gentleman Spy: The Life of Allen Dulles (Boston and New York: 
Houghton Mifflin, 1994), 416; Thomas Powers, The Man Who Kept The Secrets: 
Richard Helms and the CIA (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1979), 100, 375n20, 
376n24. 
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and the media that developed during the Cold War years."16 The first article, 
which appeared on October 30, 1954, revealed to readers that the CIA had 
been covertly involved in Guatemala. The reporters claimed that this 
intervention was justified since Dulles had "proof that the communist-
domi:ry.ated government of Guatemala was part and · parcel'" of a Red 
conspiracy, hatched in Moscow, to give Russia a military toehold in Latin 
America hard by the Panama Canal."17 President Jacobo Arbenz of 
Guatemala had been a "communist puppet," and his supporters were Soviet 
hardliners posing as reformers.18 Thankfully, from the perspective of the 
authors, Dulles and his CIA operatives "met the Reds early enough to hand 
Russia its defeat in Guatemala."19 As a consequence, the United States had 
averted the possibility of a large-scale military intervention "to save Latin 
America."20 It is evident, however, that Dulles and his subordinates withheld 
crucial information during interviews for the story. In the aftermath of 
Arbenz' s downfall, the CIA conducted PBHISTORY, an examination of 
thousands of captured documents. This secret study firmly indicated that 
Arbenz had not been Moscow's puppet. 21 
The second article in the series told readers that the CIA had achieved 
a similar success in 1953 when "the strategic little nation of Iran was rescued 
16 Jonathan Nashel, Edward Lansdale's Cold War (Amherst and Boston: 
University of Massachusetts Press, 2005), 98. 
17 Richard and Gladys Harkness, "The Mysterious Doings of CIA," Saturday 
Evening Post, 30 October 1954, 20. 
18 Ibid., 20-21. 
19 Ibid., 21. 
20 Ibid., 162. 
~~ Nick Cullather, Secret History: The CIA's Classified Account Of Its Operations 
In Guatemala, 1952-1954 (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 
1999),106-107. . . 
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from the closing clutch of Moscow."22 Like Arbenz, Muhammad Mossadegh 
was in cahoots with the Communists, according to the authors, and. they 
obviously took pleasure in boasting that the Iranian prime· minister "was 
captured as he lay weeping in his bed, clad in striped silk pajamas."23 If the 
coverage of Iran was propaganda masquerading as journalism, the final 
article on November 13 was even worse. The Harkness duo described Dulles 
as "a tough-minded, hardheaded, steel spring of a man with an aptitude and 
zest for matching wits with an unseen foe."24 On the final page, they 
editorialized about the necessity and cost effectiveness of the Agency: "A 
helping hand in the rescue of one country such as Guatemala or Iran from 
communism is worth CIA's annual budget many times over."25 In the event 
that readers had somehow missed the implicit rebuke of oversight proposals, 
they were reminded that "qualified observers in Washington believe that CIA 
deserves the trust and confidence of Congress and the people."26 
The PR campaign ended in success for the CIA when the most recent 
Mansfield proposal was defeated 59-27 in April 1956.27 Dulles remained 
committed to CIA public reiations in the ensuing years. As Jonathan Nashel 
reveals, the CIA director became so interested in the Hollywood adaptation 
of Graham Greene's The Quiet American that he was willing to help the 
22 Richard and Gladys Harkness, "The Mysterious Doings of CIA," Saturday 
Evening Post, 6 November 1954, 68. 
23 1bid. 
24 Richard and Gladys Harkness, "The Mysterious Doings of CIA," Saturday 
Evening Post, 13 November 1954,30. 
25 Ibid., 134. 
261bid. 
27 Grose, 416; Barrett, 223-233; Jeffreys-Jones, 79-80. 
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production team shoot the movie on location. 28 Unlike Greene's original 
story, the movie version celebrated American involvement in Vietnam. 
Edward Lansdale, the CIA's point man in Southeast Asia, helped director 
Joseph Mankiewicz modify the script to transform "Pyle [the American 
charcter] into a hero and Fowler [the British character] into a communist 
stooge."29 Dulles also did not disapprove of the fact that E. Howard Hunt, the 
CIA officer who later became infamous for his role in Watergate, was 
moonlighting as a spy novelist, and after he was forced to resign following 
the Bay of Pigs· debacle, he enlisted Hunt and Agency veteran Howard 
Roman to ghost write The Craft of Intelligence.30 
Future CIA directors did occasionally try to promote the Agency 
mystique as Dulles had done. Not, long after the Soviets executed Oleg 
Penkovsky in 1963, the CIA funded the publication of The Penkovsky Papers in 
order to publicly flaunt the contributions of their high-ranking asset inside 
Soviet military intelligence.31 In the early 1970s, moreover, Richard Helms 
28 Nashel, Edward Lansdale's Cold War, 166. 
29 Seth Jacobs, America's Miracle Man in Vietnam (Durham: Duke University 
Press, 2004), 110; Nashel, Edward Lansdale's Cold War, 163-171, esp. 164-166. 
30 Grose, 539; James Srodes, Allen Dulles: Master of Spies (Washington, DC: 
Regnery Publishing, 1999), 552; according to Tad Szulc, "Hunt himself quietly 
collaborated with Dulles in drafting the former CIA Director's book, although 
the Agency nowadays denies this with vigor." See Szulc, Compulsive Spy: The 
Strange Career of E. Howard Hunt (New York: The Viking Press, 1974), 21. 
Szulc also says that future OA director "[Richard] Helms kept copies of 
Hunt's.spy novels around his office and often gave or lent them to friends 
and visitors." Ibid., 105. 
31 John Ran~lagh, The Agency: The Rise and Decline of the CIA (New York: 
Simon and Schuster, 1986), 331, 397, 400-402; Jeffreys-Jones, 151. Jeffreys-
Janes says that "[Penkovsky] supplied.the Western powers with thousands of 
pages of secret strategic documents, some of which contained information 
that could. be usefully collated with satellite evidence. The combin,ed picture 
destroyed the 'missile gap' theory." Ibid., 114; VictorS. Navasky, "Why Sue 
The C. I. A.?," 26 October 1982, A29. 
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allowed the director of Scorpio to film the exterior of Langley. But 
unfortunately for Helms, he was apparently unaware that the screenplay 
called for the protagonist in the movie to gun down a high-ranking CIA 
official.32 A few years later Helms accepted an invitation to visit the movie 
set for Three.Days of the Condor. He was then serving as Ambassador to Iran, 
and according to the film's director, Sydney Pollack, Helms appeared to be 
"having a great time" and was ·even "giggling." Oiff Robertson recalls that at 
the moment Turner (Robert Redford) confronted his character (Higgins) 
about CIA involvement in assassinations, he glanced over and noticed that 
the former DCI was grinning. "As his grin wrapped around his mouth, the 
hairs on the back of my neck stood upright at attention," says Robertson.33 
By the time Three Days of the Condor was released in 1975, however, 
CIA officials were not laughing. On October 30, 1975, an ad hoc task group 
chaired by Lieutenant General Samuel V. Wilson sent Colby a memo entitled 
"Telling the Intelligence Story." Not surprisingly, Wilson and his colleagues 
noted that "[p ]ublicity on the CIA in the last year has not resulted in a 
rounded story. Much attention has been focused on specific sensational bits 
and pieces of information."34 The authors of the memo proposed a strategy 
for overcoming the negative publicity. "Altering this situation will require 
patience and a gradual approach. It will also require a more open and 
forthcoming attitude in the Agency's dealings with the media, which provide 
32 Gary Fishgall, Against Type: The Biography of Burt Lancaster (New York: 
Scribner, 1995), 286; Phillips, 312. 
33 The Directors: Sydney Pollack, DVD, directed by Robert J. Emery (1997; New 
York: Fox Lorber CenterStage, 1999). 
34 Task Group Memo to DCI, "Telling the Intelligence Story," 30 October 1975, 
1, CIA Records Search Tool (CREST), National Archives II (College Park, 
Maryland). 
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our only significant access to the American public," they advised.35 The 
group outlined four recommendations for improving the CIA's relationship 
with the media. They began with the suggestion that the Agency "collaborate 
with the media when asked to do so in developing features articles, articles 
for publication on selected topics, or television features," and in an 
attachment, they listed several topics that might interest journalists.36 Second, 
the committee thought that "[t]he present program for providing substantive 
background briefings [for columnists] should be expanded as opportunities 
arise."37 They also believed that high-ranking CIA officials should consider 
making more "public appearances and speeches," while their final 
recommendation sought to highlight "CIA contributions to the advancement 
of technology and keeping the peace."38 
In addition to their proposals for dealing with the press, the ad hoc 
group hoped that other people might be encouraged "to help tell the true 
story of intelligence."39 The CIA should ask "senior statesmen" to get 
involved, and perhaps more importantly, they pushed for a stronger 
relationship with ex-officers: "We can provide judicious assistance to selected 
former Agency employees and retirees who want to defend the CIA in books, 
articles, or public appearances. 'Judicious' and 'selected' are the operative 
words."40 Although the memo did not explain how. "judicious" and 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid. Six topics were mentioned in the attachment: "the operations center," 
"personality interviews," ''current intelligence," "academic skills," "counter-
intelligence," and "backgrounders." Ibid., TAB A. 
37 Ib'd 1 . 1 ., . 
38 Ibid., 2. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid. 
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"selected" would be defined in practice, it is obvious that the authors were 
only interested in dealing with individuals willing to support their former 
employer. 
Since Colby had already embraced similar ideas before receiving 
"Telling the Intelligence Story," the memo should be viewed as a synopsis of 
pre-existing polices that offered a blueprint for modifications in the future. 
President Ford fired Colby only a few days after the document was prepared, 
and although he stayed on for a few more months, he did not have much time 
to implement changes. Yet there is no question that Colby desperately 
wanted to change public perceptions of the Agency. As he explained in his 
memoirs., the CIA adopted a "gradual strategy" for public relations during 
hjs tenure at Langley/1 an approach intended "to get our story out to the 
American people."42 In order to maintain ties witl,. ex-officers, for instance, he 
established an event called "alumni day." This reunion was viewed as more 
than an opportunity for intelligence veterans to reminisce about old 
adventures, since Colby intended "to ann them with the answers they needed 
to defend the institution to which they had given their loyalty."43 There was 
undoubtedly a recruitment dimension to Colby's efforts. Groups of high 
school students on trips to Washington visited CIA headquarters every 
Tuesday night during the spring, and the Agency also opened its doors to 
several college delegations.44 
41 Colby, 379. 
42 Ibid., 378. 
431bid. 
44 1bid; Phillips says that "[w]e had hundreds of visitors to our building: 
college classes, high school students, and businessmen. The last college 
group I saw in the halls was from th~ Malcolm X College.'~ See Phillips, 312. 
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Colby's efforts were not always successful. Seeking to improve 
relations with the media, he initiated a briefing program for reporters that 
proved disastrous. The first session with journalists, which Colby thought 
would focus on world events, led to a confrontation over the CIA's 
relationship with American businessmen. Finding himself cornered, he 
accidentally blurted out the approximate number of Agency contacts in the 
business community. Colby learned from the embarrassing incident; in the 
future, such briefings would be done on a smaller scale that would enable the 
CIA to retain more control over the topics discussed.45 
Unlike many of his colleagues in the clandestine service, David Atlee 
Phillips, a twenty-five year veteran, supported Colby's strategy. At the same 
time, however, he worried that the backlash against previous wrongdoing 
might lead to the CIA's destruction. The media, which Dulles had 
manipulated with such ease in the 1950s, had turned on Phillip's beloved 
Agency. He described the "Year of Intelligence" as "[t]he storm which 
changed my life," a crisis that he believed could be solved using public 
relations.46 
Phillips drew inspiration from the plight of Ray S. Cline and Harry 
Rositzke. Cline had been Deputy Director for Intelligence (DDI) at the CIA 
before leaving in 1969 to run the State Department's intelligence division 
(INR), and Rositzke was previously a high-ranking officer in the Directorate 
45 Colby, 378. 
46 Phillips, vii; Kathryn S. Olmsted, Challenging the Secret Government: The Post-
Watergate Investigations of the CIA and FBI (Chapel Hill: The University of 
North Carolina Press, 1996), 146-147. 
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of Plans (called the Directorate of Operations since 1973).47 In October 1974, 
Rositzke reviewed the history of the relationship between the CIA and the 
executive branch in a New York Times editorial, noting that the Agency did not 
operate independently of th~ president. "Political-action operations-secret 
support of foreign leaders, political parties and labor unions, and the 
preparation of coups and countercoups-have been carried out under the 
aegis of every postwar President," he observed.48 While Rositzke advised 
that paramilitary operations like the Bay of Pigs should be moved to the 
Pentagon, he believed that "more post-mortems" were unnecessary.49 Cline 
argued in the Times the following month that covert action was vital to 
national security: "we should not be obsessed with piety but instead should 
think earnestly of every way possible -short of total war to insure that our 
society and political structures and alliances with like-minded peoples will 
continue to flourish .... "50 As the "Year of Intelligence" unfolded, Cline and 
Rositzke also appeared on television to defend the intelligence community.51 
47 It became known as the Directorate of Operations in 1973. 
48 Harry Rositzke, "Controlling Secret Operations," New York Times, 7 October 
1974,35. 
49 Ibid. 
50 RayS. Cline, "The Value of the C. I. A.," New York Times, 1 November 1974, 
39. Cline argued that America intervened in foreign politics to protect 
democracy, a proud tradition that he said could be traced back to the 
Agency's role in Italian elections during the early years of the Cold War. He 
proclaimed that "[t]he principal supporters of President Salvadore Allende 
Gossens' administration intended to establish a dictatorship of the 
revolutionary left, abolish Congress and neutralize or destroy the entire 
managerial and middle class." Ibid., 39. Not surprisingly, Cline failed to 
mention that Allende had been democratically elected in September 1970, and 
he presented no concrete evidence to explain how events in Chile were 
connected to the national security of the United States. In September 1974, 
Seymour Hersh had revealed details about CIA involvement in Chile. Ibid. 
51 Phillips, 346. 
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Phillips admired their efforts, but it was obvious to him that they were badly 
outnumbered. 
If he had learned one thing during his years of service in the CIA, 
~owever, he realized that low manpower was not an insurmountable 
handicap. His understanding of propaganda convinced him that even 
though Colby should be forthcoming at the Congressional hearings, the 
Agency had to simultaneously push back against critics. Phillips approached 
Colby with his concerns, hoping to convince his boss to launch a more 
aggressive public relations campaign aimed at restoring the public's 
confidence in the CIA. Though he agreed with Phillips in principle, Colby 
considered the approach too risky. He reminded Phillips about The Selling of 
the Pentagon, a documentary that CBS had first broadcast in February 1971.52 
Narrated by Roger Mudd, the expose outlined the Pentagon's massive efforts 
to win the support of the American public, from displays in shopping malls 
to promotional films that showed how the military was winning in Vietnam. 
It revealed that the annual PR budget at the Defense Department had risen 
from $2.8 million in 1959 to $30 million in 1971. (According to the Twentieth 
Century Fund, the budget was actually closer to $190 million.)53 Colby 
52 Ibid., 345. 
53 
"The Selling of the Pentagon," VHS, produced and written by Peter Davis 
(1971, New York: Carousel Film & Video); Garth S. Jowett, "The Selling of the 
Pentagon," The Museum of Broadcast Communications 
http: II www .museum. tv/ archives I etv IS I htmlS I sellin~ofth I sellingofth.htm 
(accessed February 21, 2006); the origins of the documentary can be traced to 
Senator J. W. Fulbright (Democrat-Arkansas). Fulbright, The Pentagon 
Propaganda Machine (New York: Liveright, 1970); Jack Gould, "TV: C.B.S. 
Explores Pentagon Propaganda Costs," New York Times, 24 February 1971, 83; 
Jack Gould, "The Unselling of the Pentagon," New York Times, 7 March 1971, 
D17; see also William C. Berman, William Fulbright and the Vietnam War: The 
Dissent of a Political Realist (Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1988), 142. 
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understood that the CIA could not allow a similar controversy to happen to 
them. After Hersh's story, critics might characterize any PR venture as 
nothing more than sinister propaganda. "We're just going to have to take the 
heat," Colby declared.54 
Phillips accepted Colby's decision, but he could no longer tolerate 
watching events from the sidelines. He left the CIA in the spring of 1975 to 
form the Association of Retired Intelligence Officers (ARlO). When Phillips 
began planning the ARlO, he hoped that Cline might be interested in serving 
as the president. Cline, an executive director at Georgetown University's 
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) at the time, declined the 
offer. "You know that I have been trying to build up a reputation as a 
scholarly commentator on intelligence as distinct from a 'committed' 
defender of CIA," Oine explained in a letter to Phillips. "While I am not sure 
my tactics have been entirely successful, I do want to stay in the public view 
as an independent rather than a partisan 'CIAnik' ."55 Although it is unclear 
whether he sought out anyone else about the position, Phillips ultimately 
became the first president of ARlO. 
Taking addresses from the mailing list that his family used for 
Christmas cards, he had sent out a letter to fellow intelligence officers in 
March announcing his objective "to explain why our country needs an 
intelligence service and to help clear up some of the erroneous impressions 
and sensationalism surrounding us by explaining what CIA is and, more 
54 Colby quoted in Phillips, 345. 
55 Ray Cline to David Phillips, 27 March 1975, The Papers of Ray Cline, Part 1: 
Container 7, Folder 3, Library of Congress Manuscript Division. 
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important probably, what it is not."56 Membership was open to anyone who 
had previously worked within the American intelligence community, and 
annual dues of ten dollars included a subscription to Periscope, ARlO's 
newsletter. More than anything else, the organization provided a network for 
ex-intelligence officers. Starting in 1975, for instance, the ARlO held 
conventions every year.57 Over 1,000 people had joined by the fall of 1976. 
Phillips hoped to address what he referred to as "a tough credibility 
problem" for American intelligence.58 The ARlO established a speaker's 
bureau for anyone in the organization who wanted to publicly defend the 
intelligence establishment against its detractors. Phillips, arguably the most 
prolific speaker in ARlO, made numerous appearances across the country 
after leaving the CIA. He spoke about his adventures with the Agency, and 
he assured audiences that the policies of reform were working effectively. 
Not everyone accepted what Phillips had to say.· In fact, when he appeared in 
Madison, Wisconsin to deliver a speech in 1976, approximately four hundred 
people protested·against him.59 But for the most part, demonstrations of this 
magnitude were uncommon. 
In addition to their speeches in front of local groups, Phillips and select 
colleagues from the ARlO spoke to journalists and went on television shows 
56 David Phillips, ARlO Form Letter, 15 March 1975, The Papers of Ray Cline, 
Part I: Container 7, Folder 3, Library of Congress Manuscript Division; 
"C. I. A. Aide Quitting to Defend Agency," New York Times, 22 March 1975, 
39; Phillips, 348-349. 
57 Jean M. White, "Intelligence Gathering: Insiders Meet on the Outside," 
Washington Post, 18 September 1976, B1; Phillips, 366. 
58 Joseph Novitski, "CIA Aide Quits, Will Head Drive," Washington Post, 10 
May 1975, A4. 
~9 Maggie Kennedy, "With Speeches Spy Comes Out of Cold," Dallas Times 
Herald, 4 November 1976, newspaper clipping, Papers of David A. Phillips, 
Container 5, Folder 3, Library o£ Congress Manuscript Division. 
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to provide a counterpoint to opponents of the CIA. Kathryn Olmsted 
correctly observes that "he guaranteed reporters that pithy, pro-CIA quotes 
were just a phone call away."60 On an ABC morning show, Phillips squared 
off against John Marks and Philip Agee, the former CIA officer who revealed 
the names of Agency operatives in Inside The Company, and on another show 
he sparred with Victor Marchetti.61 Unlike Agee, who Phillips called "the first 
CIA defector,"62 Marchetti had not outed any CIA employees. Marchetti 
contends that Phillips put pressure on him to renounce any connection to 
Counter-Spy, the radical magazine in Washington, DC that was exposing the 
identities of Agency officers. "Marchetti respected the CIA's power and took 
the warning to heart," says Angus Mackenzie, "[h]e withdrew from the 
magazine and talked others into leaving with him."63 Phillips briefly 
mentioned in his memoirs that Marchetti left Counter-Spy, but he omitted any 
r~ference to his conversation with the noted CIA critic.64 
.The omission was not especially surprising, since ARlO members 
typically wrote their memoirs with the intention of shaping public opinion. 
Having ~een .how effectively former officers such as Marchetti, Agee, Frank 
Snepp, and Patrick McGarvey had used their books to criticize the Agency, 
they believed that the genre offered, a terrific opportunity .to counterattack. 
Less.than three weeks after leaving the CIA, Phillips complained in the New 
York Times that the media was treating the Agency unfairly. Phillips placed 
60 Olmsted, 147. 
61 Phillips, 364, 376. 
62 Ibid., 364. 
63 Angus Mackenzie, Secrets: The CIA's War at Home (Berkeley and Los 
Angeles: University of California Press, 1997), 65. 
64 Phillips, 376. 
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stories about the CIA into three categories: "factual," "sensationalist," and 
"fact-and-fallacy."65 The first type "we can endure stoically," he explained, 
while the second 11We can also endure because the ridiculous is· patently 
short-lived."66 What most frustrated Phillips and his colleagues was 11the 
hybrid (fact-and-fallacy) story" because it "refuses to die or be straightened 
out, and sinks into the public subconscious as durable myth."67 
Ironically, despite Phillips's concerns about so-called "hybrid" news 
stories, he and fellow CIA defenders did not respond with "factual" accounts 
of the Agency; on the contrary, they used their memoirs to create their own 
"durable myths." Phillips published The Night Watch in 1977, a skillfully 
written account of the various positions he held at the CIA between 1950 and 
1975. After his initial recruitment in Chile, he gained extensive experience 
with the Agency throughout Latin America-in Guatemala, Cuba, Mexico, 
the Dominican Republic, Brazil, and Venezuela-before finishing his career 
as the head the Western Hemisphere Division in the Directorate of 
Operations. In reflecting on his quarter century of service, Phillips admitted 
the CIA had made mistakes. He condemned the MKULTRA experiments that 
the Agency secretly conducted in the 1950s and 1960s. "Without question," 
Phillips acknowledged, "conducting the drug research on unwitting persons 
or in a manner that could lead to suicide, as in the instance of one man [Dr. 
Frank Olson], was unjustifiable."68 He also criticized the CIA's actions 
leading up to the Bay of Pigs invasion of April 1961. Phillips, who had 
65 David Atlee Phillips, "This Is About (shh)," New York Times, 25 May 1975, 
181. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Ibid. 
68 Phillips, The Night Watch, 351. 
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participated in these events, concluded that "[a]t some time we [CIA] should 
have cried 'enough.' When told the plan was to be changed from a classic 
guerilla landing at Trinidad to a military operation we should have protested 
individually to the point of refusing to go along."69 
Phillips's primary objective, however, was not to apologize. 
Throughout The Night Watch, he attempted to refute negative allegations that 
had been leveled against the Agency. For instance, in order to counter the 
accusation that the CIA lacked diversity, he casually mentioned that "[o]ne of 
my friends became the first black Chief of Station,"70 and later described how 
he "appointed the first female Chief of Station in CIA's history."71 
Interestingly, when Janine Brookner successfully sued the CIA in 1994 for 
gender discrimination, evidence came to light that contradicted Phillips's 
~ssertion that he had named the first woman station chief. Brookner, who 
joined the Agency in the late 1960s, had served as Acting Deputy Chief of 
Station in Venezuela, and she later became Jamaica Chief of Station in 1989. 
Brookner' s lawyer described her as the first female director of a CIA station in 
Latin America.72 If this information is indeed accurate, Phillips appears to 
have misstated the facts in his book. 
There are also significant flaws with the information he provided on 
covert actions. In 1954, four years after the CIA first recruited him in Chile, 
69 1bid., 140. 
70 Ibid., 290. 
71 1bid., 311. 
72 Victoria Toensing, "CIA's 'Cone of Silence' Guards Glass Ceiling," The 
Seattle Times, 4 May 1995, B7; Peter Carlson, "Looking to Sue the CIA?: First 
Find Janine Brookner," Washington Post, 10 March 2004, Cl. Brookner's 
trouble began when "she reported her male deputy [in Jamaica] for his 
repeated and admitted wife beating, at least once to the point of the wife's 
collapse." See Toensing, B7. 
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he helped overthrow President Arbenz in Operation PBSUCCESS. Phillips's 
version of PBSUCCESS evoked memories of "The Mysterious Doings of the 
CIA." He referred to Arbenz as "a Soviet sycophant'' who "would have 
undoubtedly succumbed to the political flattery and pressures of his 
[Communist] advisers."73 Phillips proudly told readers how the radio 
broadcasts he initiated on May 1, 1954: were designed to convince Arbenz that 
the opposition forces of Castillo Armas were too powerful for his government 
to stop. "Arbenz would not have resigned had he not been manipulated into 
what he conceived as an impossible situation by the rebel radio," Phillips 
observed, "especially in creating a climate in which he would not allow his 
pilots to fly or permit the colonel from St. Cyr to commit his troops."74 He 
relaxed in Guatemala City after Armas prevailed by playing golf at a local 
course, and in a somewhat bizarre twist, he learned afterwards that the spikes 
he wore during the outing actually belonged to Arbenz?5 Not only did 
Phillips perpetuate the well-worn myth that Arbenz was a Soviet pawn, he 
also appears to have exaggerated the effectiveness of his propaganda 
campaign (Operation SHERWOOD)?6 
Since Phillips portrayed covert action as a method of spreading 
democracy and containing communism, he went to great lengths to explain 
away CIA intervention in Chile. Afte:r Salvador Allende was democratically 
elected in.Septembf2!r 1970, President Nixon ordered the CIA to prevent the 
• 
73 Phillips, 68. · 
74 Ibid., 67; see also Piero Gleijeses, Shattered Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution 
and the United States, 1944-1954 (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University 
Press, 1991), 294-296. 
75 Phillips, 66. 
76 Cullather, xi, 76-77. 
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Chilean leader from taking office. The Agency established a secret Chile Task 
Force to execute this mission and appointed Phillips to direct it. Phillips said 
1n his memoirs that he was aware he would be working to undermine 
democracy, which made him reluctant to take the job: "Track II [Nixon's 
covert policy in Chile] was the only episode in my CIA career which 
disturbed me to the point that I even considered resigning in protest."77 
Instead of resigning, however, Phillips accepted the position to run the Task 
Force. Shirting in the middle of September, he spent over forty days plotting 
against Allende, and by his own estimation, he typically "worked twenty 
hours a day" during the operation?8 De-classified CIA records indicate that 
Phillips and his Task Force sought to establish "a coup climate [in Chile] by 
propaganda, disinformation and terrorist activities."79 Phillips and the head 
of the Western Hemisphere Division sent a cable to the CIA station in 
Santiago on September 28 that bluntly outlined their objectives: "We conclude 
that it is our task to create such a climate climaxing with a solid pretext that 
will force the military and the president to take some action in the desired 
direction."80 
Phillips attempted to disassociate the CIA from the assassination of 
General Rene Schneider, the official determined to protect Chilean 
democracy, but he neglected to mention that the Agency provided $35,000 to 
the conspirators after the murder.81 He also kept secret the praise that he had 
77 Phillips, 352. 
78Phillips, 286; for Phillips's account of the Task Force, see ibid., 282-287. 
79 Peter Kornbluh, The Pinochet File: A Declassified Dossier On Atrocity And 
A_ccountability (New York: New Press, 2003), 14. 
80 Ibid., 17. 
81 Ibid., 34-35. 
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lavished upon CIA officials in Santiago after hearing about the attack on 
Schneider. "The Station has done [an] excellent job of guiding Chileans to 
point today where a military solution is at least an option for them," he said 
in an October 23 cable.82 Even though he later claimed that he had been 
reluctant at first to participate in Track II, the sentiment expressed in this 
cable reveals that Phillips took great pride in his work once he committed 
himself to the covert project. 
Phillips blamed Track II on President Nixon and Henry Kissinger, 
calling the covert policy of the White House "inexcusable."83 The 
condemnation of a plan that he implemented with such determination seems 
rather self-serving to say the least. Some might be inclined to sympathize 
with Phillips's situation in the fall of 1970: after all, he received orders from 
his superiors, and he loyally followed them despite significant reservations. 
Yet the evidence demonstrates that Phillips was a willing participant in 
events rather than a hapless victim. After General Schneider was gunned 
down on October 22, Phillips claimed in his memoirs that the CIA aborted 
Track Il.84 He argued that the CIA was not responsible for the military coup 
that toppled Allende on September 11, 1973. Rather than de-stabilizing the 
Chilean government, Phillips maintained, the objective of the CIA "was just 
the opposite-to stabilize [Chile] by keeping alive demo~ratic institutions 
until the election ... scheduled for 1976."85 Cord Meyer, a retired CIA officer 
who published his memoirs three years after Phillips, essentially made the 
' 82 Ibid., 29. 
83 Phillips, 352. 
84 Ibid., 286-287. 
85 Ibid., 352. 
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same argument about Allende. Track II was an "unhappy incident" and 
"secret Nixonian aberration" in Meyer's assessment, but "the Agency was 
specifically enjoined from any action that might be construed as supporting 
coup plotting" once the program ended in October 1970.86 Like Phillips, 
Meyer said that the purpose of CIA involvement in Chile after Track II "was 
to ensure the survival of a democratic coalition that would have a reasonable 
chance of winning back the Chilean presidency in the election scheduled for 
1976."87 
Denying CIA complicity in Allende's downfall was central to the 
defense of covert action, since Agency supporters recognized that the 
Am.erican public would not tolerate an institution that undermined 
democracy and promoted dictatorships ... Recently de-classified CIA files 
show that the assertions of Phillips and Meyer were significant distortions of 
the historical record. Meyer served as the Deputy Director for Plans between 
1967 and 1973, and in June 1973, Phillips took over as chief of the Western 
Hemisphere Division. Given their high-ranking positions within the 
clandestine service, both men would have known that the covert operations 
against Allende continued in the three years preceding the September 1973 
coup. Thomas Karamessines, who ran the Directorate of Operations during 
this era, later admitted that "Track II.never really ended."88 Although the 
CIA avoided any involvement in the logistical aspects of the coup, an Agency 
report concluded in 2000 that Langley "provided assistance to militant right-
86 Cord Meyer, Facing Reality: From World Federalism to the CIA (New York: 
flarper and Row, 1.980), 187. 
87 Ibid., 189. 
88 Kornbluh, 114. 
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wing groups to undermine the president [Allende] and create a tense 
environment."89 
Phillips and Meyer perpetrated a clever disinformation campaign to 
hide what the CIA had done in Chil.e. Phillips believed that the truck strikes 
in the. months prior to the military takeover directly contributed to the 
success of Pinochet, but he denied that the CIA had financed the truckers. 90 
This denial was literally true; at the same time, however, it was completely 
misleading. Instead of directly funding the labor unrest, the Agency offered 
money to other groups ("cutouts") who, in turn, "supported ... key sectors 
fomenting economic and social upheaval, notably the truck owners and 
strikers that paralyzed Chile in 1973."91 The CIA also supported El Mercurio; 
rather than stabilizing Chilean democracy, the newspaper sought to destroy 
it, using propaganda to force the resignation of Carlos Prats in August 1973. 
Peter Kornbluh has eloquently summarized the tragic implications of his 
resignation: "Like his predecessor, General Schneider, Prats had upheld the 
constitutional role of the Chilean military, blocking younger officers who 
wanted to intervene in Chile's political process."92 
Phillips, a true believer in the power of propaga:nda who once owned a 
newspaper in Santiago, took over the Western Hemisphere Division at the 
same time events began to escalate inside Chile. Was this simply a 
coincidence? Perhaps. But it is certain that Phillips knew about ongoing 
89 Ibid., 90. 
90 Phillips, 327. 
91 Kornbluh, 90. 
92 Ibid., lli; Kornbluh demonstrates that the CIA concocted a propaganda 
scheme "designed to convince the Chilean generals that Allende was secretly 
plotting with Castro to undermine the army high command .... " The 
objective, of course, was to set the stage for a coup. Ibid., 94. 
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efforts to undermine Allende, participated in them, and then worked 
assiduously to cover up the CIA's ties to the Chilean right-wing. "The 
argument that these [CIA] operations were intended to preserve Chile's 
democratic institutions was a public relations ploy, contradicted by the 
weight of the historical record," Kombluh notes in The Pinochet File.93 Phillips 
and his ARlO friends were key architects of this "public relations ploy," and 
they unleashed their propaganda techniques on Americans to mislead them 
about what really happened in Chile during the early 1970s. 
Phillips and Meyer downplayed the domestic operations of the 
Agency using similar tactics of obfuscation. In his famous expose of the CIA 
in December 197 4, journalist Seymour Hersh revealed that the Agency had 
"conducted a massive, illegal domestic intelligence operation during the 
Nixon Administration against the antiwar movement and other dissident 
groups in the United States .... "94 Defenders of the CIA took issue with 
Hersh's decision to use the words "massive" and "illegal" in the opening 
sentence of the article, which appeared on the front page of the New York 
Times. "Based on the extensive evidence that is now available," argued 
Meyer, "my own view is that the domestic surveillance activity involving 
antiwar activists conducted by the Agency was neither massive in scope nor 
clearly illegal at the time that it was undertaken."95 Operation MHCHAOS 
led to the infiltration of anti-war groups, :IJut he rationalized the activity by 
claiming that the informants were simply attempting to establish whether the 
93 Ibid., 114. 
94 Seymour Hersh, "Huge C. I. A. Operation Reported In U. S. Against 
Antiwar Forces, Other Dissidents in Nixon Years," The New York Times, 22 
December 197 4, 1. 
95 Meyer, 209. 
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protestors were the puppets of Moscow. While he acknowledged that the 
CIA team implementing CHAOS had "clearly exceeded its instructions" on 
three occasions,96 Meyer concluded that "[Richard] Helms was correct in his 
judgment that the foreign dimension of domestic dissent was clearly within 
the Agency's jurisdiction and that there was no choice but to trace down 
every lead."97 
Not surprisingly, Meyer blatantly distorted Helms's assessment of 
CHAOS. In February 1969, Helms had sent a letter to National Security 
Advisor Henry Kissinger, informing Kissinger that "[t]his is an area not 
within the charter of this Agency, so I need not emphasize how extremely 
sensitive this makes the paper [on the anti-war movement]. Should anyone 
learn of its existence, it would prove most embarrassing for all concerned."98 
Both Meyer and Phillips cited the report of the Rockefeller Commission to 
support their claims. Phillips first developed this strategy in 1977: "these 
violations were not 'massive'; the undisputed findings of the Rockefeller 
Commission established less than a dozen cases which could be described as 
clearly illegal."99 Phillips embraced a puzzling definition of the word 
"massive." In reality, the Rockefeller Commission actually disclosed that the 
CIA had created files on approximately 7,200 Americans while 
96 Ibid., 216. 
97 1bid., 215; Angus Mackenzie discovered in his investigation that Meyer 
received a thorough briefing on CHAOS in 1972. Richard Ober, the project 
manager, outlined "the tremendous scope of MHCHAOS." Mackenzie, 55. 
98 U. S. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with 
Respect to Intelligence Activities [Church Committee], Final Reports, 94th 
Cong., 2d sess., 1976, Supplementary Detailed Staff Reports on Intelligence 
1\ctivities and the Rights of Americans (Book III), "CIA Intelligence Collection 
About Americans: Chaos and the Office of Security," 697. 
· 
99 Phillips, 350. . . 
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simultaneously maintaining a secret computer database in the basement of 
Langley with "the names of more than 300,000 persons and organizations."100 
In outlining their defense of the CIA, these Agency veterans also chose to 
sidestep one minor detail: the National Security Act of 1947, which 
established the CIA, specifically prohibits it from engaging in domestic 
operations. 
Skeptical observers in the 1970s charged that there was an active 
relationship between Langley and the ARlO. The organization's decision to 
move into an office building that was a short drive from CIA headquarters 
did nothing to diminish this perception. While Colby approved of the project 
and became a member after his retirement, he told Phillips "that he [Phillips] 
could have no special help from or relationship with CIA or we would be 
pilloried for attempting to run a covert operation on the American public."101 
Phillips vehemently denied any connection. "I wish to make it absolutely 
clear that the C. I. A. management has not had, and will not have, a hand 
officially, unofficially or otherwise in this organization and its efforts," he 
said to the media in 1975.102 
At. first glance it appears that the ARlO, which was renamed the 
Association of Former Intelligence Officers (AFIO) in 1977, had a fairly 
innocuous relationship with CIA headquarters. Evidence suggests that they 
made referrals to each other if they considered it appropriate. For instance, 
100 Commission on CIA Activities within the United States, Report to the 
President by the Commission on CIA Activities within the United States 
[Rockefeller Commission] (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 
1975), 130. 
101 Colby, 412. 
102 
"C. I. A. Aide Quitting to Defend Agency," 39. 
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when a staffer on the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence contacted the 
Agency's Office of Legislative Counsel in January 1976 to see if Phillips could 
make a speech in Texas, the Counsel's office extended a cautious response. "I 
told [the staffer] we are at arms length with Mr. Phillips but provided him the 
phone number where Mr. Phillips can be reached," wrote the official.103 
Referrals also worked in the other direction, since members like Cline kept 
contact numbers for the CIA's public affairs office on hand. One member, an 
assistant professor at Canisius College in Buffalo, New York, sent the CIA a 
letter to arrange for students visiting Washington to meet with Agency 
officials. The professor described the proposed meeting as "an opportunity 
for the Agency to contact a group of highly motivated, intelligent, and 
patriotic young men and women."104 
The editor of Counter-Spy magazine leveled one of the most sensational 
charges against Agency veterans connected to ARlO, alleging in 1979 that 
Cline and thirteen other Georgetown employees were still working for the 
CIA .. Cline lashed out at the accusation in the campus newspaper while 
claiming that the magazine was "set up by Cuban intelligence, run by the 
KGB (Soviet secret police) ... Where do you think they get their funds 
from ?"105 He further defended himself in a memo on the episode, saying he 
had "received no compensation of any kind from CIA since [resigning in 
103 Journal-Office of Legislative Counsel, 14 January 1976, 2, CIA Records 
Search Tool (CREST), National Archives II (College Park, Maryland). 
104 Stafford T. Thomas to Herbert Hetu, 29 August 1979, 1, CIA Records 
Search Tool (CREST), National Archives II (College Park, Maryland). 
105 Jay Vogel, "Faculty Accused of Affiliation: 14 Linked with CIA Alleges 
Kelly," Georgetown University Hoya, 2 February 1979, 1, 11, newspaper . 
clipping, The Papers of Ray Cline, Part I: Container 26, Folder 18, Library of 
Congress Manuscript Division. 
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1969] except for three or four lectures given to training classes at CIA. My 
total income from fees for such lectures is only a few hundred dollars spread 
over several years."106 In truth, Cline had remained in contact with the CIA 
.. 
even though he was not on the payroll. Shortly after Admiral Stansfield 
Turner succeeded George H. W. Bush as CIA director, Cline offered to assist 
him. "If there is anything at all that I Can say or do to help you," Cline wrote 
in March 1977, "please let me know."107 He sent a more detailed letter about 
four months later: "I wish I had an opportunity to counsel with you and your 
staff with a view to supporting from outside of government the legitimate 
goals of coordinated central intelligence. I have consulted your staff several 
times in the past month to see if you ever have any time for sympathetic old 
hands, so far with no response .... if you can think of any way in which I can 
be helpful to the intelligence community, please let me know."108 
It appears that Turner never followed up on Cline's overtures.109 Yet 
there is also no question that other ARI,O members received assistance from 
inside Langley. While working for the CIA's history staff in the early 1990s, 
Nick Cull ather was amazed to discover that Phillips's chapter on the 
Guatemal.a coup in The Night Watch had been "copied almost verbatim from a 
106 Ray Cline toM. Jon Vondracek, 31 January 1979, Papers of Ray Oine, Part 
I: Container 26, Folder 18, Library of Congress Manuscript Division. 
107 Ray Cline to Admiral Stansfield Turner, 14 March 1977, Papers of Ray 
Cline, Part I: Container 26, Folder 14, Library of Congress Manuscript 
Division. 
108 Ray Oine to Admiral Stansfield Turner, 18 July 1977, Papers of Ray Cline, 
Part I: Container 26, Folder 14, Library of Congress Manuscript Division. 
109prustrated in part by this rebuff, Cline eventually turned against the Carter 
administration and joined Ronald Reagan's campaign in 1980. In a letter to 
Daniel Schorr in September 1979, Cline referred to Turner as "poor old Stan." 
Cline to Schorr, 24 September 1979,2, Papers of Ray Cline, Part I: Container 
26, Folder 18, Library of Congress Manuscript Division. 
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debriefing report that is still classified."110 Assuming that Phillips did not 
possess a photographic memory or steal documents from headquarters before 
he retired, Cullather' s remarkable finding suggests that the president of ARlO 
was actually collaborating with former friends still working at Langley in the 
mid-1970s. This directly contradicts the official proclamations of both Colby 
and Phillips in which they denied a relationship between Langley and the 
ARlO. CIA officials apparently had no problem leaking classified 
information as long as Phillips could spin it to make them look good. 
Ironically, when two authors filed a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) 
request for documents on the Guatemala operation, the Agency turned them 
down and ultimately prevailed in the legal battle that ensued.111 CIA lawyers 
failed to disclose that at least one of the documents requested had been 
published already in The Night Watch. If the information had not been 
withheld from the court, it would have been far more difficult for the Agency 
to win the case. 
What most united the former intelligence officers was their belief that 
the intelligence community needed to operate in secrecy.112 Much has been 
11° Cullather, 122. 
111 Ibid. 
112 As with any organization, it is important to emphasize that differences of 
opinion sometimes surfaced within the ARlO. There was an early dispute 
over Phillips's decision to. grant membership to Sam Adams, the former CIA 
analyst who had tangled with the Pentagon during Vietnam. At least one 
person resigned from ARlO in protest. See David Phillips to Board Members, 
30 July 1976, 2, The Papers of Ray Cline, Part I: Container 7, Folder 4, Library 
of Congress Manuscript Division; in addition, when the organization created 
the George Bush Award to honor contributions to the intelligence 
community, several members complained that the prize should have been 
named after someone with a more distinguished record than Bush such as 
William Donovan. For the press release announcing the George Bush Award 
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written already about how the White House used Richard Welch's murder in 
December 1975 to turn public opinion against the investigations of Senator 
Frank Church (Democrat-Idaho) and Representative Otis Pike (Democrat-
New York). FrederickA. 0. Schwarz, Jr., the Chief Counsel of the Church 
Committee, has described it as a Machiavellian PR campaign: "They danced 
on the grave of Welch. They egregiously and unfairly took advantage of the 
situation. In a short-term, tactical way, they rejoiced in his death."113 It is 
important to remember that the Ford administration received assistance in 
this effort from the ARlO and William Colby, who did everything in their 
power to portray Welch as a fallen hero. 
To commemorate the arrival of Welch's remains at Andrews Air Force 
Base on the morning of December 3Q, 1975, Phillips, Colby, and about twenty-
eight others formed a receiving line and watched as an Air Force honor guard 
escorted the casket from the C-141 transport plane to a nearby hearse. 
Television crews filmed the brief ceremony, and thousands of Americans saw 
the footage on the news. Perhaps the most iconic image of the event was of 
Colby standing next to Welch's ex-wife and crying daughter, all three with 
hand over heart.114 The CIA organized a memorial ceremony for Welch 
inside the Bubble at Langley, and although the press was not allowed to 
and the resulting controversy, see The Papers of Ray Cline, Part 1: Container 
7, Folder 3, Library of Congress Manuscript Division. 
113 Schwarz quoted in Frank J. Smist, Jr., Congress Oversees the United States 
Intelligence Community, 1947-1994, 2nd ed. (Knoxville: The University of 
Tennessee Press, 1994), 64; for the most thorough overview of the PR 
surrounding Welch's assassination, see Olmsted, 151-155; see also Scott M. 
Cutlip, "Public Relations in the Government," Public Relations Review, 2 
(Summer 1976): 14-15. 
114 
"Slain C. I. A. Man Honored," New York Times, 31 De.cember 1975, 47; 
Eugene L. Meyer, "Slain CIA Agent Receives Unusual Honor," Washington 
Post, 31 December 1975, A1; Olmsted, 152. 
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attend, the Agency released detailed information about the service. It began 
with the National Anthem and closed with "America The Beautiful." In 
between the singing, Colby delivered a eulogy for Welch.115 President Ford 
granted a special waiver to authonze Welch's burial at Arlington Ceremony 
on January 6. The funeral, with an estimated five hundred people in 
attendance, garnered national media attention.116 "Although the Welch 
family requested that reporters be barred from the chapel where the funeral 
service was performed," observed Laurence Stem of the Washington Post, 
"provision was made for news coverage of what the Ford administration 
clearly conceived of as an important event."117 As Senator Church 
recognized, the White House carefully "stage-managed" the entire event.118 
Phillips nicely complemented the Ford administration's PR efforts. He 
spoke out against the editors of Counter-Spy for disclosing the names of 
American operatives, and just three days after Welch's killing, the Washington 
Post ran a front page story drawn almost exclusively from information he 
provided. Dan Morgan, the Post reporter, focused on Phillip's claim that 
Welch had foreseen the possibility of terrorists murdering CIA officers. He 
quoted Phillips several times in the article, which allowed the ARlO president 
to shape the story's content. The reporter's sources portrayed Welch as a CIA 
martyr, "an 'erudite' man with a mastery of classical and modem Greek, 
Spanish and French," and a person who "reportedly would enliven 
115 
"Colleagues Pay Tribute To Welch," Washington Post, 1 January 1976, A6. 
116 Laurence Stem, "CIA Agent Welch Buried," Washington Post, 7 January 
1976, A1; James M. Naughton, "Ford At Funeral For C. I. A. Officer," New 
York Times, 7 January 1976, 8; Olmsted, 152-153. 
117 Stem, A1. · 
118 Church quoted in Smist, 64. 
129 
government meetings on current topics by citing anecdotes and precedents 
from ancient Greek and Roman history.;1119 Phillips described Welch, who 
worked for him in the Western Hemisphere Division, as someone "who had 
the potential for aiming at any position in the agency, given time and 
experience."120 Phillips later dedicated The Night Watch to Welch, and he even 
based the title on a comment that Welch. made to a CIA recruit at Camp 
Peary's bar: "[that intoxicated instructor is] trying to tell you that the night 
watch can be lonely, but that it must be stood."121 Phillips and his 
organization would keep alive the memory of Welch, lobbying forcefully in 
the years ahead for a federal law to guard against the disclosure of 
intelligence officers. This effort directly contributed to the passage of the 
Intelligence Identities Protection Act in 1982. 
In order to tum Welch into a martyr, however, important evidence was 
withheld from the American public. Kathryn Olmsted points out that the 
CIA had unsuccessfully encouraged Welch to use a home in Athens that was 
less conspicuous,122 and John Prados found in his research that Welch's house 
"was regularly pointed out on sightseeing tours of the Greek capital."123 Yet 
in the immediate aftermath of Welch's death, Agency officials kept secret the 
warnings that they had sent. Supporters of the CIA placed blame for the 
assassination on Counter-Spy, and a Washington Post article even claimed that 
~thens News contacted the .magazine's editors before deciding to print 
119 Dan Morgan, "Slain Agent Feared For CIA Lives," Washington Post, 26 
December 1975, A20. 
120 Ibid. 
121 Phillips, 271. 
122 Olmsted, 151; Morton. H. Halperin, "CIA News Management," Washington 
Post, 23 January 1977, 30. 
123 Prados, 329. 
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Welch's name on November 25. Although a CIA investigation concluded the 
Post story was "untrue," the Agency only released this information after a 
Freedom of Information Act request forced its disclosure.124 
On January 8, 1976, two days after the Welch funeral, Times columnist 
Anthony Lewis perceptively observed that the events "[were] being 
manipulated in order to arouse a public backlash against legitimate criticism 
[of the intelligence community]."125 He expressed concern about the "careless 
legitimizing of secrecy," predicting that President Ford and Langley would 
exploit the situation "to prevent any thoroughgoing reform of the C. I. A."126 
Lewis was arguably the first person to recognize that the forces of secrecy 
were turning the tide against the Congressional investigations. These 
inquiries, which initially threatened the future of the CIA, ended within four 
months of Lewis's editorial. It is true that both the House and the Senate 
established intelligence oversight committees, but at the same time politicians 
refused to take more radical action. 
In describing how Americans viewed the Agency prior to the 
Congressional investigations, Jonathan Nashel offers an interesting 
observation: "[t]he fact that the American public simultaneously respected, 
feared, and approved of the CIA's actions until the 1970s was the result of one 
of the most successful promotions undertaken by the U. S. officialdom."127 
Allen Dulles, of course, was the mastermind behind the "promotions." But if 
124 Mackenzie, 89. Mackenzie notes that two other publications had identified 
Welch: Julius Mader's Who's Who in the CIA in 1968 and a Peruvian journal in 
1974. Ibid., 89; see also Philip Agee, On The Run (Secaucus, New Jersey: Lyle 
Stuart, 1987), 133. 
125 Anthony Lewis, "Death and Secrecy," New York Times, 8 January 1976,31. 
1261bid. 
127 Nashel, Edward Lansdale's Cold War, 98. 
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Dulles built up the Agency with PR wizardry in the 1950s, it is equally fair to 
say that William Colby and David Atlee Phillips helped save the institution 
two decades later using the same techniques. These men correctly perceived 
that the American public had not completely lost their fascination with the 
Agency despite all the ugly revelations that emerged in the mid-1970s. It 
was not accidental that Phillips intentionally evoked the legendary CIA 
mystique by emphasizing the anonymous heroism of intelligence officers on 
the final page of The Night Watch. "They have been in dark alleys working 
hard-with some mistakes and some success-to protect those [American] 
values," he observed, and then hopefully predicted: "American intelligence 
will survive."128 
In retrospect, PR deserves at least part of the credit for making this 
prediction come true. 
128 Phillips, 378; Phillips subsequently wrote a guide on how to. start a care~r 
in the intelligence field. "If we decide that covert action is wrong because it 
constitutes meddling in other peoples' affairs," he said in the chapter on the 
CIA, "we should re-examine not only our intelligence activities but our entire 
foreign policy, our foreign aid program, and our tariff policies (to mention 
only a few examples) because each of these can have a profound effect on the 
internal affairs of any number of countries and very often is designed to have 
just such an effect." See Phillips, Careers in Secret Operations: How to Be a 
Federal Intelligence Officer (Frederick, Maryland: University Publications of 
America, 1984), 38. 
CHAPTERV 
ADMIRAL STANSFIELD TURNER, HERBERT HETU, & THE 
LEGEND OF CIA OPENNESS, 1977-1981 
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In March 1992, William Colby provided a succinct and convincing 
description of his objectives during the Congressional i.nvestigations: "I was 
fighting for (a) survival of the agency, [and] (b) survival of the covert action 
mission. We won both."1 Public relations helped Colby achieve this victory, 
and it would also assist his successors in their efforts to repair the CIA's 
tarnished image. When Admiral Stansfield Turner became CIA director in 
1977, he immediately revamped how the Agency interacted with the public. 
Two years earlier Colby had shied away from using the Department of 
Defense as the model for his PR campaign; citing the fallout from "The Selling 
of the Pentagon" documentary on CBS, he worried the Agency might be 
accused of violating the National Security Act's prohibition on domestic 
activity. Given Turner's naval background, he was much more willing than 
Colby to institutionalize public relations at the CIA. He recruited an outside 
PR expert to establish a modern Office of Public Affairs, and between 1977 
and 1981, this office developed media strategies for the Agency that are still 
in use. Turner and his advisors sought to create the impression that the CIA 
had learned its lessons from the intelligence scandals; that Agency officials 
accepted and welcomed the newly established oversight committees; and that 
the reforms were working effectively. By projecting an image of openness to 
both Congress and the American public, they hoped to avoid further 
1 Kathryn S. Olmsted, Challenging the Secret Government: The Post-Watergate 
Investigations of the CIA and FBI (Chapel Hill: The University of North 
Carolina Press, 1996), 169. 
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investigation of the intelligence community. The PR hype served 
simultaneously to obscure what was happening at the CIA in the late 1970s 
and early 1980s. Ironically, at the same time that Agency executives talked 
publicly about their acceptance of greater openness, they worked forcefully to 
undermine the Freedom of Information Act and the ability of former 
intelligence officers to criticize the OA. 
Agency employees distrusted Admiral Turner and the outsiders he 
brought to Langley, but it immediately became clear to them that the new 
policies on public relations were not open for debate. In April 1977, E. Henry 
Knoche, Turner's deputy, sent his boss a packet of material titled 
"Suggestions for CIA Outreach to the Public"-two pages of 'which remain 
classified-that contained proposals for addressing public relations. For each 
recommendation, the report's authors provided a short description, estimated 
.the related costs, and assessed the idea's advantages and disadvantages. Not 
only did Turner read the packet thoroughly, he also made notations at the 
bottom of several pages. He approved most of the recommendations, even 
offering detailed suggestions for improvement in certain cases. One of the 
proposals was to provide tours of the Agency for groups from Congressional 
offices that would offer politicians "the chance to look good in front of the 
constituents."2 In response to the idea that these visitors could watch "old 
Agency P. R. films," Turner enthusiastically wrote: "Let's get a new one."3 
2 E. H Knoche to Admiral Turner, "Suggestions for CIA Outreach to the 
Public," 19 April1977, "Tour of Agency Headquarters-Congressional 
Sponsors," CIA Records Search Tool (CREST), National Archives II (College 
Park, Maryland). Most sections of the document were declassified in 2002. 
3 Ibid. 
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He also advised that there should be an exhibit in the passageway between 
the main building and the Bubble.4 
The packet contained a proposal to bring regional experts from 
universities to CIA headquarters for a visit, a recommendation that had 
obvious benefits for recruitment. Turner was warned that "[m]any of the 
target academics have been hostile or critical of the Agency in the past, and at 
least a few might well choose to make an issue of such an effort."5 Yet despite 
the potential challenges, such visits represented a tremendous opportunity: 
"[t]he target academics are among the most prestigious and influential 
regional experts in the United States, and in each instance where we succeed 
in improving their understanding and appreciation of the intelligence process 
there would be an extensive multiplier effect among both faculty and 
students."6 Similar proposals were made for think tank directors; meetings 
with these officials could "identify areas in which the research of private 
centers complements our own with an eye toward possible contractual 
relationships in areas where they are especially well qualified."7 In addition 
to embracing the above suggestions, Turner approved a plan to participate 
more extensively in career fairs at high schools and colleges.8 
4 1bid. 
5 E. H. Knoche to Admiral Turner, "Suggestions for CIA Outreach to the 
Public," 19 April1977, "Meetings with Directors of University Area Study 
Centers." 
6 1bid. 
7 E. H. Knoche to Admiral Turner, "Suggestions for CIA Outreach to the 
Public," 19 April1977, "A Series of Agency Forums with Directors of Private 
Think Tanks." 
8 E. H. Knoche to Admiral Turner, "Suggestions for CIA Outreach to the 
Public," 19 April1977, "Public Affairs Suggestion" [High School and College 
Career Programs]. 
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The packet on public outreach included ideas that would have 
delighted David Phillips. The Office of Public Affairs wanted to recruit a 
"group of well qualified public speakers to represent the Agency at local level 
speaking engagements ... throughout the country. Retired employees could 
be.used for this purpose along with public personalities."9 The proposal did 
not make reference to the speaker's bureau ·that the ARlO had already 
established, but it is clear that the intention was to institute a similar program 
under Agency auspices. The CIA apparently no longer worried that the 
project might be characterized as a domestic operation. Turner wanted to 
pursue an ambitious public relations campaign, and few ideas were off limits. 
His staff even proposed holding an "Open House" at Langley "advertised in 
advance to which the public at large would be invited."10 Turner, however, 
ultimately decided against the plan, most likely because of concerns about "a 
staged incident" and the possibility that the event could be condemned "as a 
'Disneyland' approach to selling th~ Agency's image, i.e., 'huckstering."'11 
Agency officials wanted to sell their image, but they planned on closely 
guarding their tactics. 
The person responsible for "selling the Agency's image" was Herbert 
E. Hetu, a jovial PR man with over two decades of experience in the Navy, 
who Turner would later praise for implementing "a far-reaching but carefully 
9 E. H. Knoche to Admiral Turner, "Suggestions for CIA Outreach to the 
Public," 19 April1977, "Public Affairs Suggestion" [Expanded Public 
Speaking Program]. 
~0 E. H. Knoche to Admiral Turner, "Suggestions for CIA Outreach to the 
Public," 19 April1977, "Public Visitation Day," 1. 
11 Ibid., 2. 
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controlled plan."12 Since public affairs at the Agency had been conducted 
internally in the past, Hetu's arrival proved somewhat controversial at first, 
especially since he reported directly to Turner and received the title 
"Assistant to the Director." Hetu recalled in a 1984 interview that he joked 
privately about looking underneath his car for explosive devices before 
driving to Langley in the morning: "going in there perceived as the guy who 
was going to let the press in, open the windows ... oh boy, [there was] a lot 
of hostility." 13 
During a series of interviews in 1996, Hetu explained that his 
introduction to public relations began while serving as a deck officer on the 
USS Salem. The Ionian Islands in the Mediterranean sustained extensive 
damage in August 1953 after several earthquakes hit, and the Salem provided 
emergency assistance to the disaster victims. Hetu, the assistant public affairs 
officer on the cruiser, submitted reports on the situation that were used in 
newspaper accounts of the tragedy. Time even printed a quote from one of 
Hetu's dispatches.14 After completing his tour on the Salem, the Navy 
selected him to run the magazine and book division of the Office of 
Information where he soon became a protege of Pickett Lumpkin. Hetu 
12 Stansfield Turner, Secrecy and Democracy: The CIA in Transition (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin, 1985), 104. 
13 Jeanne Edmunds, "They Didn't Laugh When I Invited CBS to Film the 
CIA," Washington Post, 15 July 1984, B3; for background on Hetu, see Ronald 
Kessler, Inside The CIA: Revealing the Secrets of the .World's Most Powerful Spy 
Agency (New York: Pocket Books, 1992), 215-220; for an overview of his career 
in the Navy, see The Reminiscences of Captain Herbert E. Hetu U.S. Navy 
(Retired), Interviewed by Paul Stillwell (Annapolis, Maryland: U.S. Naval 
Institute, 2003). 
14 The Reminiscences of Captain Herbert E. Hetu U. S. Navy (Retired), 42-44; 
according to Hetu, "I wrote all the first communiques, and for the first 12-18 
hours, everything in the press worldwide was coming out of the Salem, and I 
was writing it." Ibid., 43. 
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described Lumpkin as a member of the "40 Thieves," the moniker given to 
the founding fathers of the Navy's PR apparatus in the early Cold War 
years.15 Hetu fondly remembered the advice that Lumpkin bestowed on 
junior officers before sending them to meet with a reporter: "Write the music 
and play him like a violin."16 Lumpkin made it perfectly clear that the 
objective of PR officers in the Navy was to emphasize the positive and 
downplay the negative. This might sound like government propaganda, but 
Hetu perceived it differently: "We were always trying to think about telling 
the good side of the Navy. I suppose that's, in the classic of the definition, 
propaganda in a way, but [it was] not propaganda in that we didn't 
manipulate the message to be untrue or to say something that wasn't 
honorable or truthful."17 
Yet the evidence indicates that that the Navy did "manipulate the 
message" on several occasions. In fact, Hetu was directly connected to the 
two most important books published about Vietnam during the 1950s. While 
running the magazine and book division, he arranged for Admiral Arleigh A. 
Burke, then Chief of Naval Operations, to write the foreword for Tom 
15 As Hetu explained the term, "those were the first people after World War II 
who, when the Navy decided to make public information a specialty, a 
separate designator, 1650, 1655, these were the first 40 people. People now 
are not sure there were exactly 40, but I'm working on that in my other hat as 
the public affairs alumni association." Ibid., 50. "Pickett Lumpkin was one of 
the greatest guys we've ever had in this business. He was a sweet, smart, nice 
man and taught me an enormous amount about public affairs," said Hetu. 
Ibid., 67. 
16 Ibid., 72. 
17 Ibid.,153; interestingly, Hetu described the Watergate scandal as "a terrible 
PR blunder" and even suggested that President Nixon might have survived 
the crisis. "You know, if Nixon would have hung a couple of those_guys on 
the White House lawn, they would be making gold statues of him. He would 
have been a hero." Ibid., 154. 
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Dooley's Deliver Us from Evil. He also helped organize a national tour to 
promote the book. Seth Jacobs, author of America's Miracle Man In Vietnam; 
observes that "Deliver Us from Evil was a brilliant work of cold war 
propaganda in which the communist enemy was irredeemably evil and the 
Americans and their South Vietnamese allies were virtue incarnate."18 
Dooley, a Navy doctor in Vietnam, ultimately became a PR liability when, in 
Hetu's words, "[t]hey found out that he and his sailors were running more 
than a dispensary ... /' 19 After discovering Dooley's homosexuality, Hetu 
admitted, the Navy forced him to resign. 
Hetu left the magazine and book branch in 1956 and spent the next 
three years with the Pacific Fleet in Hawaii. He briefly shared an office there 
with William Lederer, who was in the process of co-authoring The Ugly 
American with Eugene Burdick. The novel, which was published in 1958, 
inspired countless Americans to more aggressively confront communism in 
the Third World, most notably in Southeast Asia. "Few books have had 
greater influence on American popular and elite opinion," argues Jacobs.2° 
Since Lederer asked Hetu for feedback on drafts, the young public affairs 
18 Seth Jacobs, America's Miracle Man in Vietnam (Durham: Duke University 
Press, 2004), 154; see also Jonathan Nashel, Edward Lansdale's Cold War 
(Amherst and Boston: University of Massachusetts Press, 2005), 62-63. James 
T. Fisher says that the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) compiled a dossier 
on Dooley that was seven hundred pages. This dossier included graphic 
descriptions of Dooley's sexual encounters with informants. See Fisher, Dr. 
America: The Lives of Thomas A. Dooley, 1927-1961 (Amherst: University of 
Massachusetts Press, 1997), 84-89. · 
19 The Reminiscences of Captain Herbert E. Hetu U. S. Navy (Retired), 60; Fisher, 
86. 
20 Jacobs, 111. Jacobs points out that "The Ugly American became one of the 
most popular books in U. S. history, remaining on the best-seller list for 
seventy-eight weeks and ultimately selling over five million copies." Ibid. 
See also Nashel, 173-178. 
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officer had the opportunity to "read the book as it came out of the 
typewriter."21 During his tour of duty in Hawaii, Hetu received another 
interesting job when asked to be the location scout and technical adviser for 
the movie South Pacific (1958).22 He subsequently served a year in Hollywood 
using his PR skills to convince producers to portray "the Navy in a good 
light."23 Hetu and his PR colleagues actually collaborated with writers to 
achieve this objective, even developing the entire plotline for an episode of 
"The Real McCoys." He believed that their efforts improved perceptions of 
the Navy: "Some people would think it was a waste of time, but the McCoys 
then had a . . . big audience . . . they were one of the top shows. We said 
something about the Navy to those people and that's what we were trying to 
do."24 
With the guidance of Pickett Lumpkin, Hetu learned how to persuade 
reporters and producers to focus on the Navy's best attributes. During the 
~ 960s, however, he also became a pioneer in the field of crisis public relations. 
In April1963, the USS Thresher sank off the coast off Massachusetts, and CBS 
soon informed the Navy that they had plans for an hour-long program on the 
loss of the nuclear submarine. Navy officials initially wanted nothing to do 
with the documentary, but the PR experts convinced their superiors that it 
was possible to "at least get a positive spin on the story .... " if they provided 
21 The Reminiscences of Captain Herbert E. Hetu U. S. Navy (Retired), 69. 
22 Ibid., 75-79. Hetu explained that the Navy would "bring the ships around 
and put them off the beach for a day or two, so they could shoot these scenes 
with the ships in the background." Ibid., 77. 
23 Ibid., 97. 
24 Ibid., 98; Hetu was later a consultant on Otto Preminger's In Harm's Way 
(1965). Ibid., 132-137. 
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assistance to CBS producers.25 By getting involved with the project, Hetu 
discovered, "[w]e were able to turn the thing around."26 
Hetu pursued his interest in crisis PR at Boston University by writing a 
master's thesis on peacetime naval disasters. He stressed the importance of 
disaster plans in the thesis: "The single most important conclusion of this 
study is that the success or failure of public relations in a naval disaster is the 
result of detailed preparation and planning, or the lack of it."27 Hetu outlined 
strategies for dealing with the media in the aftermath of a tragedy, including 
a comprehensive "do" and "don't" list. "Be alert to positive stories which 
may develop such as the heroic work of relief workers, [and the] number of 
d,octors and nurses working to treat survivors," he advised.28 In June 1969, 
after the USS Frank E. Evans was sliced into two pieces by an Australian 
aircraft carrier during a naval exercise, Hetu applied his theories to handle 
the crisis. He coached the survivors on the most effective way to deal with 
the media: "If you do w~nt to tell stories, from what I've heard just talking to 
som,e of you guys, there's some real_ heroics that went on, people helping 
pe()ple out [in] the dark, out in the middle of the night. . People helping other 
pe()ple off the ship and in the water ... And those stories, you can't tell 
25 1bid., 236. ' 
26 1bid., 237. 
27 Herbert E. Hetu, "Public Relations During Peacetime Naval Disaster" 
(master's thesis, Boston University, School of Public Communication, 
Division of Public Relations, August 1965), 108; he also observed: "it becomes 
obvious that the actions taken before disaster occurs are often the most 
important. When disaster strike_s, the organizations which have planned to 
meet the informational requirements are the ones which most effectively 
survive public scrutiny. Perhaps the two mc;>st important words to remember 
in a disaster situation are-Planning and Candor." Ibid., 50. 
28 Ibid., 80. . . 
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enough of those."29 He obviously hoped that these insbuctions would shift 
news coverage away from the mistakes that caused the tragedy and towards 
the heroisrn of Navy survivors. 
Given Hetu's expertise on crisis public relations, he was a perfect 
match for the CIA in 1977. He had warned in his thesis about the dangers of 
cutting ties to the media when confronted with a tragedy. Hetu understood 
that this was an understandable psychological response to a traumatic 
situation, but nevertheless, he concluded that isolation only made matters 
worse.30 He argued that the media was an indispensable ally in repairing the 
image of an institution under attack. Colby had previously attempted to re-
gain the bust of reporters, but his understanding ofPR was limited. Hetu, on 
the other hand, knew how to handle tough questions without giving the 
appearance of stonewalling. "I had a standing order in my office," he 
explained, "[w]e never said, 'No Comment.' I thought it was important, even 
if we couldn't comment, to tell the reporter why .... "31 While Hetu was in 
charge of CIA public affairs, journalists frequently contacted him to discuss 
stories that they were preparing. He listened to their information, provided 
assistance if possible, and made sure that the names of covert operatives did 
29 The Reminiscences of Captain Herbert E. Hetu U. S. Navy (Retired), 229; in April 
1969, when North Korea attacked an EC-121 spy plane, Hetu had managed 
the.PR response for the Navy. Ibid., 209-214. 
30 
"If the P.l. 0. [Public Information Officer] can establish himself as an ally of 
the. stricken society rather than a potential enemy, he will most probably 
serve that community, his organization, and the media in a positive and 
constructive manner," he observed. Hetu, "Public Relations During 
Peacetime Naval Disaster," 18. 
31 Hetu quoted in Edmunds, B3; see also Turner, 105; "We are trying a new 
openness policy," said Hetu, "[w]e want advice on how better to serve the 
media." Robert Green, "New CIA Image," Manila Bulletin, 27 October 1977, 
CIA Records Search Tool (CREST), National Archives II (College Park, 
Maryland). 
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not get revealed accidentally.32 If the media needed a favor, Hetu was more 
than willing to help. For example, when Time magazine asked the CIA to 
participate .in an event that they were hosting for European businessmen, he 
helped set up a meeting for them with Turner in October 1977.33 
Hetu also moved quickly to combat unexpected PR problems. In 
November 1977, CIA officer Paul Chretien spoke at a high school, and in 
addressing concerns about the MKULTRA experiments, he criticized the 
program but defended its underlying objective, observing that "[i]f you could 
control the mind of (Soviet Premier Leonid) Brehznev it could be useful."34 
Displeased with the incident, Hetu sent a memo to the Deputy Director for 
Administration in which he complained that Chretien was "meeting with the 
public on a regular basis with little or no guidance from, or contact with this 
office .... I am really concerned that Paul may get himself or the Agency 
inadvertently into some serious difficulties by trying to field questions such 
as the ones described in this article."35 He emphasized the necessity of 
coordinating all public appearances through his office to prevent PR gaffes. 
Rather than obsessing about minor mishaps, however, Hetu focused 
on larger objectives. He developed plans for CBS to film a "Who's Who" 
32 Edmunds, B3. 
33 Hugh Sidey and John L. Steele to Admiral Turner, 9 August 1977, CIA 
Records Search Tool (CREST), National Archives II (College Park, Maryland); 
Herbert E. Hetu to Acting Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, "Briefing 
of TIME-Sponsored Tour of Western European Industrialists," 25 August 
l977, CIA Records Search Tool (CREST), National Archives II (College Park, 
Maryland). 
34 Leonard Levitt, "CIA Visits Glen Coye," Newsday, CIA Records Search Tool 
(CREST), National Archives II (College Park, Maryland). 
35 Herbert E. Hetu to Acting Deputy Director for Administration, "Public 
Briefings," 29 November 1977, CIA Records Search Tool (CREST), National 
Archives II (College Park, Maryland). 
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segment inside Langley shortly after joining the CIA, and not surprisingly, he 
had to overcome the skepticism of some Agency employees. One official 
worried that Dan Rather might "air his own personal views a~out CIA and 
the Intelligence Community" during the show,36 while Robert Gambino, the 
CIA's Director of Security, expressed concern that permitting "CBS to film 
thjs program would be setting a precedent which has unknown future 
complications."37 Gambino requested that CBS producers allow the Agency 
. . ' . 
to view the footage to ensure that employees in classified positions did not 
appear on screen. 
Even though he acknowledged the risks involved, Hetu advised 
Turner that CIA officials could "positively impress [Dan] Rather and realize 
an overall good show."38 The CBS visit represented an excellent opportunity 
for the Agency to receive positive media publicity, and it would be, in effect, 
a preemptive strike against those who continued to criticize the culture of 
secrecyat Langley. "If we don't open our doors under our own terms, we 
could be forced to do so by external pressures (Congress, White House, 
media, public opinion, etc.)," wrote Hetu. "I think it better to move in the 
direction of openness voluntarily and in an orderly fashion. We may as well 
get credit for opening our own doors and enjoy the credibility that goes with 
36 Paul V. Walsh to Hetu, "CBS - 'Who's Who, 111 14 April1977, CIA Records 
Search Tool (CREST), National Archives II (College Park, Maryland). 
37 Robert W. Gambino to Deputy Director for Administration, "CBS - 'Who's 
Who,"'13 April1977, CIA Records Search Tool (CREST), National Archives II 
(College Park, Maryland). 
38 Herbert E. Hetu to Admiral Turner; "CBS - 'Who's Who,"' 18 April1977, 2, 
CIA Records Search Tool (CREST), National Archives II (College Park, 
Maryland). 
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such a decision."39 Breaking with .long-standing Agency fears about 
outsiders, Turner signed off on the project. 
Hetu' s "openness" initiative was an image-making operation and 
nothing more; when he spoke about "opening our own doors," he was not 
signaling the end of Langley's obsession with secrecy. He. wanted to protect 
the Agency's mystiqu~, but he also hoped to draw the public's attention away 
fr.om the scandals that had occupied the headlines just a few years earlier. In 
the summer of 1977, Hetu began collaborating with ABC's "Good Morning 
America" on a program devoted to the thirtieth anniversary of the CIA.' The 
two-hour show, which aired on September 19, 1977, contained short segments 
on the Agency that had been formulated in consultation with Hetu and his 
PR staff. In addition to "a live interview with the DCI at the ABC studio in 
Washington," there were proposals to feature the following aspects of the 
CIA: 
the automated cartography program; the Headquarters 
Library facilities; the recruitment process employed in 
hiring employees for several diverse positions; preparation 
of analytical material on such issues as Soviet economy, 
PRC [People's Republic of China] oil, weather and ecology; 
the Operations Center; the support activities of the 
[Oir~ctorate of Administrationj; and various aspects of 
security-bum baskets, safes, and vaults.40 
"[W]e will have no control over the narrative or story content," Hetu 
acknowh~dged to Turner, "[b]ut I am confident that, as in the case of [the CBS 
show], the product will sell itsel£."41 
391bid., 1. 
40 Herbert E. Hetu, Memorandumfor the Record, "Second Meeting with ABC 
GOOD MORNING AMERICA Representatives," 4 August 1977, Document 
No. CK3100202459, Declassified Documents Reference System [hereafter cited 
as DDRS] (Declassified, 11 April1985). 
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Part of Hetu' s confidence stemmed from the fact that his cooperation 
':Vith ABC made it unlikely that "Good Morning America" would deviate 
from the script at the last minute. In fact, the only uncertainty would be the 
questions directed at Turner during the broadcast. After receiving the 
authorization to move forward with the project, Hetu made arrangements for 
ABC to shoot four segments at Langley on a Saturday. He knew in advance 
which topics the producers had selected from the list created in early August, 
informing the Acting Deputy Director that the camera crew would be filming 
"a walking tour of the building" as well as features on security procedures, 
cartography, and employee recruitment.42 Then, on the morning of 
September 19, "Good Morning America" conducted a live interview with 
Turner at 2430 E Street, the landmark building that had housed the Office of 
Strategic Services (OSS) during World War II and the CIA between 1947 and 
the early 1960s. Although it is unclear who made the decision to use 2430 E 
Street instead of the studio at ABC, the new location was a vivid reminder of 
the mystique that developed around the CIA in the early years of the Cold 
War. William Donovan, the legendary OSS chief, and several CIA directors 
had used the office where the interview took place.43 
41 Herbert E. Hetu to Turner, "ABC- 'Good Morning America,"' 10 August 
1977DocumentNo. CK3100202460/CK3100202461, DDRS (Declassified, 11 
April1985), 1. 
42 Herbert E. Hetu to Acting Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, "ABC 
GOOD MORNING AMERICA," 24 August 1977, Document No. 
CK3100202462, DDRS (Declassified, 11 April1985). 
43 Herbert E. Hetu to Turner, "GOOD MORNING AMERICA Program," 16 
September 1977, Document No. CK3100202463/ CK3100202464, DDRS; Hetu 
provided Turner with a briefing book to help prepare for the show, and they 
<;onducted a walk through of 2430 E Street the day before the interview. He 
also offered advice on how to dress: "I suggest you wear a light-weight, dark 
colored summer suit and a loose-fitting, comfortable shirt. You might 
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Since the CIA continues to withhold records on Hetu's tenure at the 
CIA, it is difficult to evaluate the effectiveness of his overall strategy. 
However, the statistics for 1979 are revealing. That year public affairs 
scheduled about thirty speaking engagements for Agency officials; provided 
tours of Langley for over forty groups; and conducted 139 press briefings.44 
In October 1980, Acting CIA Director Frank Carlucci nominated Hetu and his 
office for a Congressional public service award,. praising them for developing 
programs that "resulted in an overwhelmingly favorable reaction from a 
greatly enlightened and supportive segment of the American public."45 
Carlucci explained that the Office of Public Affairs had helped implement "a 
new policy dedicated to the belief that a well-infprmed and supportive public 
is essential to the fulfillment of the Agency's mission, and that the public has 
a right to know as much as possible about the role of intelligence and the 
responsibilities of CIA."46 He emphasized, however, that the public's right to 
know did not extend to CIA secrets. From his perspective, "[t]he new policy 
[of openness] had a vital counterpoint: secrets essential to an effective 
consider bringing an additional shirt of the same color on a hanger to change 
during one of the lengthy film segments." Ibid., 2; for related documents on 
the "Good Morning America" program, see Sonya Selby-Wright to Hetu, 28 
June 1977, Document No. CK3100202458, DDRS (Declassified, 11 April1985); 
Sonya Selby-Wrightto Hetu, 29 September 19771 Document N<;>. 
CK3100202552, DDRS (DeClassified, 11 April 1985); and David Hartman to 
Hetu, 3 October 1977, Document No. CK31002025S3, DDRS (Declassified, 11 
April1985). 
44 Nomination for Congressional Award for Exemplary Service to the Public, 
14 October 1980, 2-3, CIA Records Search Tool (CREST), National Archives II 
(College Park, Maryland). · · 
45 Frank Carlucci to Incentive Awards Branch, Office of Personnel 
Management, 14 October 1980, CIA Records Search Tool (CREST), National 
Archives II (College Par~ Maryland). 
46 Nomination for Congressional Award for Exemplary Service to the Public, 
14 October 1980, 1-2, CIA Records Search Tool (CREST), National Archives II 
(College Park, Maryland). 
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intell~gence organization must be protec~ed at all costs."47 Informing 
American_s of the need for secrecy was "a major objective" of Hetu's office.48 
In other words, CIA officials believed that PR could be exploited to tutor the 
public about the positive aspects ofsecrecy. In the briefing book that Hetu 
assembled to prepare Turner for the "Good Morning America" interview in 
1977, for instance, he advised his boss to argue that there was "[m]ore 
openness with greater secrecy."49 
Despite Hetu's concerted effort to spin the American public, of course, 
there was a fundamental incompatibility between openness and secrecy. The 
rhetoric of openness diverted attention from the real strategy of the CIA 
during the late 1970s. Rather than working to reform the culture of secrecy at 
Langley, Agency officials were actually attempting to re-invigorate it. The 
former CIA officers who published memoirs critical of the intelligence 
establishment were directly threatening this entrenched culture. Patrick 
McGarvey, Victor Marchetti, and Philip Agee differed significantly in their 
motives and methods, but they all accused the CIA of using secrecy to hide 
evidence of incompetence and malfeasance. In responding to these 
unprecedented exposes, CIA officials viewed the Publications Review Board 
(PRB) as a convenient tool to re-assert control over disgruntled intelligence 
officers. George H. W. Bush had created the PRB in June 1976 "to review 
nonofficial writings of current employees," but as Stansfield Turner took over 
~7 Ibid., 2. 
48 Ibid. 
49 
"ABC GOOD MORNING A:tv1ERICA 19 SEPTEMBER 1977," Briefing book 
prepared by Public Affairs Office for Admiral Turner, Document No. 
CK3100202484-CK3100202532, DDRS (Declassified, 11 April1985), Tab E, 2. 
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at the CIA in early 1977, the board received a much broader mandate.50 In 
addition to examining the writings of individuals still on the Agency payroll, 
the PRB now had the power to inspect anything written by former personnel. 
Given the board's responsibility for protecting classified information, one 
might expect that the person chosen to supervise it would have been an 
Agency veteran, someone with the years of operational experience necessary 
to determine what information could conceivably threaten intelligence 
sources and methods. But the man selected as the chairperson of the PRB was 
none other than Herbert Hetu, the head of public affairs at Langley. 
During the years that Hetu chaired the PRB, the board received a wide 
range of submissions, from articles and books to speeches and editorials. The 
annual number of PRB reviews increased from 42 in 1977 to 148 three years 
later.51 Hetu informed a Congressional subcommittee in 1980 that the 
members of the PRB "consider ourselves negotiators. We often sit down with 
authors and work out the differences. In other words, it is not an arbitrary, 
cold-blooded process."52 Hetu said that the board objectively evaluated each 
item submitted without taking into consideration the author's opinions of the 
Agency, asserting that defenders of the CIA and its critics received equal 
treatment. Observers of the PRB, however, have accused the board of more 
50 Charles A. Briggs to Deputy Director for Administration, "Inspection 
Report of the Office of Public Affairs" [July 1981], Chapter V, "The 
Publications Review Board," 2. CIA Records Search Tool (CREST), National 
Archives II (College Park. Maryland). 
51 Ibid., 5. Between 1977 and June 4, 1981, there were 420 submissions to the 
PRB. 360 were described as "non-fiction," while the remaining 60 were 
categorized as "fiction." Ibid. 
5~ U.S. House of Representatives, Subco:rp.mittee on Oversight, Permanent 
Select Committee on Intelligence, Prepublication Review and Secrecy Agreements, 
96th Cong., 2nd sess. (April16, 24 and May 1, 1980), 4. 
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readily approving the submissions of A&ency loyalists. "While it gave the 
appearance of an orderly, even-handed approach," charges Angus 
Mackenzie, "its purpose was to increase the CIA's ability to censor the 
writings and speeches of CIA officers."53 Congressman Les Aspin (Democrat-
Wisconsin) offered a similar analysis of the PRB in 1980, callin~ it "a very 
arbitrary and capricious system."54 
In an internal assessment of the Office of Public Affairs written in 1981, 
the CIA's Inspector General found only two recorded complaints against the 
board. One person had appealed a PRB ruling to the deputy director, while 
another had filed a lawsuit.55 The report did not disclose the percentage of 
submissions modified by the PRB during the review process; however, it did 
reveal that members of the board attempted "not only to delete specific 
classified items but to recast entire passages and segments of manuscripts 
that the DO [Directorate of Operations] considers damaging."56 Although the 
Inspector General never explained how the Agency defined "damaging," one 
suspects that there was an overarching concern about potentially 
embarrassing information. 
In November 1977, less than a year after Hetu became the PRB's 
chairperson, the CIA discovered a critical flaw in the review system when 
53 Angus Mackenzie, Secrets: The CIA's War at Home (Berkeley and Los 
Angeles: University of California Press, 1997), 71. 
54
-.Aspin quoted in George Lar9.ne;r, Jr., "CIA Defends lts Selective Censorship 
of Ex-Agents' Writings," Washington Post, 6 April1980, A10. 
55 
"Inspection_ Report of the Office of Public Affairs" [July 1981], Chapter V, 4; 
of the 198 submissions to the board during the first three years of its 
existence, Hetu testified in March 1980 that they completely rejected three 
while four were withdrawn from consideration. George Lardner, Jr., "CIA 
Defends Its Selective Censorship of Ex-Agents' Writings," A10. 
56 
"Inspection Report of the Office of Public Affairs" Uuly 1981], Chapter V, 5-
6. 
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Frank Snepp published Decent Interval. Snepp, a· CIA officer who had 
witnessed the fall of Saigon in 1975, decided to violate the Agency secrecy 
a~eement by not submitting his book to the board. While Philip Agee had 
,hoped to stop ~overt operations, Snepp had entirely different objectives. He 
accused the CIA of betraying agent~ in South Vietnai?, leaving hundreds of 
them behind and failing to destroy classified documents that revealed the 
identities of several informants. Snepp vehemently condemned the Saigon 
withdrawal: "It is not too much to say that in terms of squandered lives, 
blown secrets and the betrayal of agents, friends and collaborators, our 
handling of the evacuation was an institutional disgrace. Not since the 
abortive Bay of Pigs invasion of 1961 had the agency put so much on the line, 
and lost it through stupidity and mismanagement."57 
The following· February the CIA initiated a landmark lawsuit against 
Snepp.58 Rather than claiming that the former CIA officer had disclosed 
classified material, Agency lawyers 'focused instead on Snepp' s violation of 
his secrecy agreement. Judge "Roarin" Oren Lewis ruled against Snepp in a 
bench trial that was far from impartial. Fred Barbash of the Washington Post 
observed that the outcome was hardly a surprise, since "[t]hroughout the 1 
1 I 2-day-long non-jury trial, [Judge] Lewis had made little effort to conceal his 
57 Snepp quoted in Seymour M. Hersh, "Ex-C. I. A. Man Assails Saigon 
Evacuation," New York Times, 18 November 1977, A22; see also Seymour M. 
Hersh, "C. I. A. Says Agent Violated Oath By Publishing Book About Saigon," 
New York Times, 19 November 1977, A1; and Seymour M. Hersh, "Ex-Analyst 
Says G. I. A. in Saigon Gave False Reports to Newsmen," New York Times, 21 
November 1977; 26. 
58 
"U.S. Sues Ex-CIA Agent for Book Profits," Washington Post, 16 February 
1978, G1; for a description of the complex legal battle, see Frank Snepp, 
Irreparable Harm: A Firsthand Account of How One Agent Took On the CIA in an 
Epic Battle Over Secrecy and Free Speech (New York: Random House, 1999), esp. 
Parts III and IV; see al~o Mackenzie, 73-77. 
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personal view of what Snepp, whom he generally referred to as 'Shepp,' had 
done, lecturing him angrily when he took the stand and saying at one point 
that 'it won't make any difference' what the evidence is."59 Lewis ordered 
Snepp to tum over all profits from Decent Interval to the federal government. 
Although an appeals court concluded in March 1979 that Snepp had indeed 
~qlated the secrecy contract, they overturned most of Lewis's decision.60 But 
in February 1980, the Supreme Court upheld the original verdict without 
bothering to hear oral arguments. 61 Some attributed the 6-3 decision, one of 
the most reckless ever issued, to an expose of the Court that Bob Woodward 
and Scott Armstrong had recently published. Not only did the Court rule in 
favor of the Agency, they described the CIA as "essential to the security of the 
United States and-in a sense--the Free World."62 
As a result of the Supreme Court's judgment, Snepp would ultimately 
forfeit over $140,000 dollars. The decision was an undeniable victory for the 
culture of secrecy and a massive defeat for the advocates of openness. After 
the PR~ received the high court's sanction, Turner wasted little time in 
pursuing John Stockwell, who had refused to submit his scathing account of 
the Agency's covert operation in Angola to the board. This operation had 
59 Fred Barbash, "Snepp Breached Contract, Judge Says," Washington Post, 22 
June 1978, A10. 
60 Fred Barbash, "Appeals Court Says CIA Agent Was Punished Improperly 
for Violating Secrecy Agreement," Washington Post, 21 March 1979, A16. 
61 Fred Barbash, "High Court Backs Secrecy Restraint On U.S. Workers," 
Washington Post, 20 February 1980, Al. According to the three dissenters 
Gohn Paul Stevens, William Brennan, and Thurgood Marshall), "The court 
seems unaware of the fact that its drastic new remedy has been fashioned to 
enforce a species of prior restraint on a citizen's right to criticize his 
5ovemment." Ibid., A15. 
Jim Mann, "Snepp and the CIA: A Few Troubling Questions Remain," Los 
Angeles Times, 2 March 1980, E3 .. 
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occurred at the height of the Congressional investigations.63 Turner, however, 
did not target all former CIA officials in violation of the secrecy agreement. 
Even though. the Agency discovered that the French edition of William 
Colby's Honorable ly1en was not submitted to the PRB before its publication, 
the former CIA director received no punishment and was allowed to the keep 
the money he earned from his memoirs. Colby, unlike Snepp, had even 
revealed classified information.64 Nothing happened either to Cord Meyer, 
who had started a second career as a syndicated columnist. Hetu attempted 
to convince Meyer to allow the PRB the opportunity to review his columns, 
but according to the findings of the Inspector General, Meyer refused, 
"insisting that as a journalist he writes only his opinions of current 
devel9pments in foreign affairs without discussing operations or other 
activities which he kno}VS about as a former Agency officer."65 The Inspector 
General discovered "that some believe that Meyer has maintained close ties 
with still active former colleagues and periodically visits Agency 
Headquarters .... "66 Despite the evidence that Meyer was possibly receiving 
insider information, the CIA did not take him to court. "We have less 
concern that Mr. Meyer would deliberately reveal a secret or would 
63 
"Third Ex-C.I.A. Agent Sued by U.S. for Profits," New York Times, 4 M~ch 
1980, A13. 
64 Laurence Stern, "Ex-CIA Chief Bares More In French," Washington Post, 19 
Nove:rpber 1978, A13. Colby revealed details about the. Glomar Explorer and 
identified a station chief by name. Ibid., A13; John Prados, Lost Crusader: The 
Secret Wars of CIA Director William Colby (New York: Oxford Univer.sity Press, 
2003), 338; Snepp, 114-115, 156-158, 308-309. 
65 
"Inspection Report of the Office of Public Affairs" Uuly 1981], Chapter V, 
11. 
~ Ibid.; 11-12. 
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deliberately do harm," Agency lawyer Ernest Mayerfeld explained in 
congressional testimony. 67 
Mayerfeld came close to admitting that there were two sets of 
guidelines. Agency supporters_ like Colby and Meyer would be forgiven for 
clear violations of the secrecy agreement, while Snepp, Stockwell, and other 
. . . 
CIA critics received no such mercy .. In the aftermath· of the Snepp ruling, the 
. . 
PRB wielded its authority even more subjectively than before .. Wilbur 
Eveland, a former National Security Council employee who had assisted CIA 
covert operations in the Middle East during the 1950s, had recently finished a 
manuscript about these activities when he learned of the Snepp verdict. 
Eveland had been secretly assigned to Allen Dulles in 1955 and participated 
in a covert CIA mission to undermine the government of Syria. After 
contacting the CIA to determine if he had signed a secrecy agreement, a CIA 
lawyer informed him in March 1980 that since the contract was "contained in 
a document which is currently properly classified, I am not at liberty at this 
time to forward it to you."68 Eveland knew that he had not signed any 
contract prior to September 1957, so he balked at the CIA's demand to.review 
the entire manuscript. "I'm sure as hell not going to let you get into anything 
before I signed the agreement [in 1957]," he declared.69 
67 George Lardner, Jr., "CIA Defends Its Selective Censorship of Ex-Agents' 
Writings," A10. 
68 George Lardner, Jr., "CIA Delays Printing of Ex-Aide's Book," Washington 
Post, 3 April 1980, A13. 
69 Ibid., A13; Wilbur Crane Eveland, Ropes of Sand: America's Failure in the 
Middle East (New York: W. W. Norton, 1980), 13-14; Mackenzie, 129-133. The 
CIA later released the secrecy contract. As Mackenzie explains, however, 
Eveland had not signed the document. "Even more important," says 
Mackenzie, "the employment contract contained no explicit assertion of a 
prepublication review agreement.". After the CIA threatened litigation, 
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The CIA's pettiness was on display again a few months later when the 
PRB analyzed a novel that Snepp had written. Snepp had included the 
identities of actual CIA operatives in the book, and the board instructed him 
to-remove one of these names in early July. The PRB, however, apparently 
forgot that they had permitted David Phillips to identify the same person in 
The Night Watch. "That gives you an idea of how good the clearance process 
is," Snepp wryly observed, "[t]hey'd allowed one of their 'good old boys' to 
release a name and now they were trying to get me to help squeeze the 
toothpaste back in the tube."70 He would ultimately remove the name from 
the book, but not before chastising the PRB for the inconsistencies of its 
reviews: "I have gone to great leng~s to avoid exposing a secret, a name or 
an intelligence source whose confidentiality is crucial to the effective 
functioning of our intelligence services. Although your own review staff has 
shown itself to be somewhat less diligent, I will not violate my own moral 
responsibility ."71 
The PRB reacted with even greater hostility to a manuscript Ralph 
McGehee submitted one week after the Supreme Court ruled against Snepp, 
demanding that he delete 397 items. When he protested these deletions, 
Agency officials were less than gracious. "It's too bad you didn't work for the 
Israeli intelligence service," he was told. "They know how to deal with 
Eveland reluctantly agreed to sign a secrecy pledge in December 1982. Ibid., 
131. 
70 Snepp quoted in George Lardner, Jr., "CIA to Snepp: Delete Name of 
(Known) Agent in Novel," Washington Post, 14 July 1980, All. 
71 Ib'd 
.. 1 •. . 
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people like you. They'd take you out and shoot you."72 The CIA reviewers 
took issue with his discussion of Langley's liaison arrangements with 
Thailand even though McGehee could demonstrate the "relationship was so 
well known that books had been written about it, academic studies discussed 
it, pictures of CIA station chiefs appeared in the Thai press, and high-level 
Thai officials openly bragged in the media about CIA support for their 
organizations."73 
Another PRB deletion pertained to McGehee's criticism "of the 
Agency's long-term operations against mainland China."74 McGehee quickly 
pointed out that they previously cleared Peer de Silva's Sub Rosa. De Silva, an 
Agency supporter who had once headed the CIA station in Hong Kong, had 
criticized the operations as well.75 The board initially reversed their decision, 
but then the China Division of the Directorate of Operations developed an 
entirely different justification for blocking the undesired commentary on their 
past failures, alleging that the manusc~pt divulged a technique associated 
with CIA methods. "That technique,,recruiting persons from the other side, 
was just slightly newer and less well known than prostitution," argued 
McGehee.76 The PRB backed down when McGehee demonstrated that 
Agency defenders such as Phillips revealed extensive information about 
72 "Bob~' quoted in Ralph W. McGehee, Deadly Deceits: My 25 Years in the CIA 
(New York: Sheridan Square Press, 1983; reprint, Melbourne, Australia: 
Ocean Pres~, 1999), 197. 
73 lbid. 
74 Ibid;, 198., 
75 lbid. 
76 lbid., 199. 
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recruitment techniques in their writings.77 Based on his experiences with 
Hetu' s board, McGehee believed that the double standard was self-evident: 
The PRB, taking its responsibilities seriously, labels just 
about everything secret until an author who is critical of 
the Agency can prove this not to be the case. But the 
situation for ex-employees who are advocates of the OA 
is the opposite. They are given almost carte blanche to 
discuss operations and techniques, and in some instances 
they are assisted in the research and writing of their works?8 
Moreover, he contended that the board wanted to protect the CIA's image 
even in cases where there was no legitimate reason for withholding material. 
"Agency officials show no hesitation in trying to censor embarrassing, critical, 
or merely annoying information," he wamed.79 
While the PRB made it increasingly difficult for current and former 
employees to criticize the Agency, there was a simultaneous effort to combat 
the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). The CIA and other members of the 
intelligence community had been largely exempt from the FOIA, which 
President Lyndon Johnson had gru9gingly signed in 1966, until Congress 
passed an amendment to the law that took effect in early 1975.80 This 
amendment, inspired in part by the Watergate scandal, made it possible for 
requestors to gain access to Agency records, but the OA could still withhold 
docun:tents for a long list of reasons. When speaking pub~icly, CIA officials 
went so far as to cite the FOIA amendment as evidence of the new era of 
openness and accountability at Langley. In 1977 Acting CIA Director John F. 
77 1bid. 
78 Ibid., 202. 
79 Ibid., 203. 
80 Bill Moyers, "In The Kingdom Of The Half-Blind," 9 December 2005, 
http://www.gwu.edu/,...,nsarchiv/anniversary/moyers.htm (accessed July 
28, 2006). 
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Blake, who also chaired the CIA committee in charge of complying with the 
new law, told a subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee that the 
legal changes "constituted a somewhat traumatic experience" for the 
Agency.81 At the same time, however, Blake proudly· reported: "[m]y 
colleagues have worked very hard during these past 30 months to make the 
~ct work according to the letter and spirit. We have been able to make the 
necessary adjustments. I am pleased to report that, in fact, I think the Agency 
is better off for it [the 1974 FOIA amendment]."82 
Sadly, Blake's optimistic testimony did not accurately reflect what was 
happening behind closed doors at Langley. In reality, as an ACLU lawyer 
explained in 1984, the Agency hierarc~y "developed a siege mentality toward 
the public and the FOIA" in the 1970s.83 About fifteen months after he gave 
the impression that the CIA had benefited from the increasing number of 
FOIA requests, Blake, then Deputy Director for Administration, forwarded a 
report on the FOIA and Privacy Act to Deputy Director Carlucci. The study 
indicated that there was a backlog of 2,700 FOIA requests, that around 
seventy full-time CIA employees were needed to respond to those inquiries, 
81 U. S. House of Representatives, Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency Information Act, 98th Cong., 2d sess., 1 
May 1984, H. Rep .. 98-726: Part I, 6. . 
82 U. S. House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Government Information 
and Individual Rights of the Committee on Government Operations, The 
Freedom of Information Act: Central Intelligence Agency Exemptions. Hearings on 
H. R. 5129, H. R.. 7055, and H. R. 7056 To Enhance the Foreign Intelligence and 
Law Enforcement Activities of the United States By Improving the Protection of 
Information Necessary to Their Effective Operation, 96th Cong., 2d sess., 20 
February and 29 May 1980, 71. 
83 U.S. House of Representatives,.Subcommittee on Legislation of the 
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, "Statement of Mark H. Lynch 
On Behalf Of The American Civil Liberties Union," Legislation To Modify The 
Ap;elication Of The Freedom of Information Act To The Central Intelligence Agency, 
98 Cong., 2d sess., 8 February 1984, 40. . 
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and that the Agency spent nearly $2.4 million dollars in 1977 on FOIA 
processirig.84 Rather than outlining the benefits of the FOIA to researchers, it 
referred to "the burden imposed on the CIA .... "85 Thus, the author of the 
report informed his superiors that "a good case could be made for total 
exemption from the Act, or, if that is impossible, partial relief."86 While he 
warned that there would be opposition to such an exemption, the official 
argued "that all of our old 'dirty linen' has by now been thoroughly exposed 
to public scrutiny. The public's interest in preventing future abuses or 
illegalities by U. S. intelligence organizations will be adequately served by the 
elaborate oversight mechanisms that have been established in the Agency, the 
Intelligence Community, the White House, and the Congress."87 In referring 
to the increased oversight of the intelligence establishment, the report came 
clo~e to describing the FOIA as a wasteful redundancy. "There is no 
84 John F. Blake to DDCI, "IPS Report on Impact of the FOIA and Privacy 
Act/' 6 December 1978, 7, 10, 11, CIA Records Search Tool (CREST), National 
Archives II (College Park, Maryland); CIA officials blamed the extensive 
backlog of FOIA cases on the Agency's records management system. David 
Wise has vividly shown the limitations of these firewalls in his study of 
Aldrich Ames, the CIA turncoat arrested in 1994. "On June 13, 1985, in his 
fourth-floor office, Ames wrapped up between five and seven pounds of 
Cqble traffic and other secret docu.ments in plastic bags, took the elevator 
down, and pushed his laminated ID card into the turnstiles that block the 
exits from headquarters .... No guard asked to look inside the plasti~ bags." 
Wise, Nightmover: How Aldrich Ames Sold the CIA to the KGB for $4.6 Million 
(New York: HarperCollins, 1995), 118. 
85 John F. Blake to DDCI, "IPS Report on Impact of the FOIA and Privacy 
Act," 6 December 1978, 15. "While we take no issue with the concept that the 
American public has a right to know what its Government is doing," the 
report clai;med, "we do submit that in the case of foreign intelligence records 
the public benefits deriving from the Act have not been commensurate with 
the costs." Ibid. 
86 Ibid. 
87 Ibid., 15-16 .. 
... ,'·).·' 
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compelling need . . . for the Freedom of Information Act to be a means of 
monitoring Agency activities," it concluded.88 
Although there is no question that CIA officials wanted to press for 
exemptions to the FOIA, they recognized that lingering memories· of the 
"Year of Intelligence" would make politicians reluctant to assist them. In fact, 
the author of the 1978 FOIA study acknowledged "that the prospects for 
obtaining relief th[r]ough amendments to the Freedom of Information Act are 
not bright."89 Instead of abiding by the law and opening their files in response 
to FOIA requests, the CIA adopted unethical tactics to thwart these inquiries. 
John Stockwell, the CIA officer who served in Angola, disclosed in his 
memoirs the existence of "blind" memos. These documents were not even 
allowed into the filing system, and as a result, "the inner-most records of the 
war [in Angola] would forever be immune to any Freedom of Information 
Act disclosures, or congressional investigation. Technically they did not 
exist: legally they could be destroyed at any time."90 Stockwell asserted that 
the tactics used by the Africa Division were directly connected to concerns 
about the FOIA: "Since the Freedom of Information Act, the agency 
increasingly uses a system of 'soft,' 'unofficial,' or 'convenience' files for 
sensitive subjects, especially any involving surveillance of. Americans. Such 
files are not registered in. the agency's official records system, and hence can 
88 1bid., 16. 
89 fuid., 17. 
90 John Stockwell, In Search of Enemies: A CIA Story (London: Andre Deutsch, 
1978), 169; Athan G. Theoharis, "Researching the Intelligence Agencies: The 
Problem of Covert Activities," The Public Historian 6 (Spring 1984): 69. 
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never be disclosed under the FOIA."91 (Interestingly, Blake revealed that the 
CIA did indeed use "soft files" in his 1977 testimony.92) 
At the same time Admiral Turner publicly talked about the CIA's 
greater openness, his deputy was quietly attempting to undercut the new 
FOIA l)tatute. Carlucci began to lobby Congress for broad relief from the 
FOIA in April1979. In order to downplay concerns about civil liberties, the 
CIA said that it did not want to eliminate the ability of individuals to file first-
person requests to determine if they had been subjected to Agency 
surveillance or experimentation. The Agency would also allow people to 
submit FOIA requests for completed intelligence reports prepared by the 
Directorate of Intelligence. In essence~ Carlucci argued that all of the so-
called operational files should be placed off limits to the FOIA. After Carlucci 
shared his concerns with Congress, Representative Robert McOory 
(Republican--Illinois) drafted H~R. ?129, a bill that used "language which 
[was] all but identical to [the CIA's]."93 
Carlucci, unsuccessful in 1979, appeared in front of a subcommittee of 
the House Committee on Government Operations the following February to 
continue his support for the proposed exemptions, offering a variety of 
reasons why Congress should allow the CIA to more easily reject FOIA 
requests. He told the members of the subcommittee about the backlog of 
2,700 cases, and he claimed that requests for operational material inevitably 
91 Stockwell, 228n. 
92 Theoharis, 68. 
93 The Freedom of Information Act: Central Intelligence Agency Exemptions, 23. 
There were other bills in both the House and Senate at the time that would 
have provided the CIA with exemptions to the FOIA. See, for instance, H.R. 
6316, H.R. 7055, H.R. 7056, S. 2216, and S. 2284; Mackenzie, 79-80. 
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forced Agency personnel to search through mountains of documents that 
they ultimately could not release.94 Such processing wasted time and money, 
argued Carlucci, and the backlog could be substantially reduced if the CIA 
was allowed to simply deny any request for operational files at the outset. 
Even though the CIA's own study of the FOIA had acknowledged that the 
risk of accidentally releasing classified information in response to a request 
was minimal, Carlucci warned about the dangers of human error. If the 
FOIA processors made a minor mistake, an enemy of the United States might 
be given the final clue needed to damage national security-a concern known 
as the mosaic theory.95 The deputy director even suggested: "there still exists 
the very real possibility that an orchestrated effort by persons hostile to the 
Agency could literally swamp the Agency with FOIA requests."96 By covertly 
inundating the Agency with FOIA letters, in other words, the communists 
could potentially cripple the intelligence establishment. This argument was 
~hockingly duplicitous. The CIA report forwarded to Carlucci for his review 
had concluded that there was no evidence that the Soviet Union or China had 
filed any FOIA requests. 97 
Carlucci focused extensively <;>n the alleged difficulty of convincing 
potential intellige~ce assets and foreign governments that they could share 
secrets with the Agency._ He claimed there had been situations "where agents 
have cited the FOIA as the reason for unwillingness to either cooperate 
94 The Freedom of Information Act: Central Intelligence Agency Exemptions, 29-31. 
95 Ibid., 28, 67. . 
96 Ibid., 31. 
":"IPS Report on Impact of the FOIA and Privacy Act," 6 December 1978, 7. 
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initially, [to] continue to cooperate, or [to] cooperate as fully as in the past."98 
Carlucci admitted that the Agency ha:d the complete power to protect secrets 
under the existing laws, but he believed that foreigners "have· ·an entirely 
different perception:"99 Although he recognized that there were reasons other 
than the FOIA that might explain why agents were reluctant to turn over 
information to the CIA, he described the Act as an important "symbol" of the 
problem.100 He was essentially asking Congress to grant the CIA an 
exemption to correct a problem that did not exist. Perhaps even more 
troubling, Carlucci denied that the FOIA should contribute to the oversight of 
the Agency. The internal safeguards within the intelligence community and 
the designated committees in Congress were responsible for holding the CIA 
accountable, "not ... 73,000 foreign and American FOIA requesters .... "101 
. Several representatives on the subcommittee responded skep~cally to 
Carlucci's testimony. Congressman John Erlenborn (Republican-Illinois) 
wondered. why the Agency "wanted relief from a misperception."102 When 
Congressman Peter Kostmayer (Democrat-Pennsylvania) further pressed 
Carlucci on this point, he offered an Alice and Wonderland reply: "I think 
98 The Freedom of Information Act: Central Intelligence Agency Exemptions, 26; 
historian Lloyd Gardner questioned Carlucci's accusation that foreign 
governments had expressed concern about the FOIA, noting that the State 
Department had encouraged countries to complain during the controversy 
over the Pentagon Papers. The objective, of course, was to manufacture 
protest that would help justify the government's position in its case against 
Daniel Ellsberg. He implied that the CIA might have used similar tactics to 
build support for restricting the FOIA. Interestingly, the revelations about the 
State Department resulted from a FOIA request filed by a student of Walter 
LaFeber. Ibid., 181. 
99 Ibid., 25. 
100 Ibid., 25, 28. 
101 Ibid.; 24. 
102 Ibid., 53. 
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that we.have to base this decision on the reality in which we live, and the 
world of perceptions in the intelligence business is the world of reality."103 
Later in the hearing, Koshnayer expressed concern that changing the current 
law might make it easier for the CIA to withhold information on illegal 
operations, observing that "the record of the Central Intelligence Agency 
leaves a great deal to be desired in terms of upholding the law."104 This 
comment led to a testy exchange: 
CARLUCCI: Mr. Koshnayer, you are posing hypothetical 
upon hypothetical based on an assumption that nobody 
in the CIA is an honorable person, and I frankly cannot 
accept that. 
KOSTMA YER: I am not suggesting that, and you are basing 
part of your testimony on assertions which you acknowledge 
are not valid, so I do not think you are in a position to 
criticize my hypothesis.105 
Carlucci also faced tough questioning from other members of the 
subcommittee. Father Robert Drinan, a Democratic Congressman from 
Massachusetts, drew attention to the fact that the Agency had a perfect record 
in FOIA litigation, and Congressman Ted Weiss (Democrat-New York) was 
apprehensive about the lack of judicial review.106 Weiss recognized that if the 
CIA received an operational files exemption, a judge would be obligated to 
reject all appeals from FOIA requesters any time the CIA claimed that the 
relevant documents were considered operational in nature. Like 
Congressman Koshnayer, Weiss forcefully reminded Carlucci that Congress 
had every reason to be suspicious of the promises made by CIA officials. 
103 1bid., 58. 
104 Ibid., 70. 
105 Ibid. 
106 1bid., 51, 62. 
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"[T]he gentlemen who preceded you .... were thought to be every bit as high 
minded, and noble, and patriotic American citizens as you are, and yet all 
kinds of terrible things happened during their directorships," he declared, 
"and I think the reason for our concerns-the reason for FOIA-is that .... 
terrible things can happen, and that is why we need the protections of the 
law."107 
.When the hearings on the proposed exemptions resumed three months 
later, the ACLU, historians, and other groups stepped forward to block the 
legislation. The Center for National Security Studies (CNSS), a division of the 
ACLU, submitted a detailed report that provided a point-by-point refutation 
of Carlucci's testimony. The study re-iterated that "as of March 1980, not one 
sentence has been released to the pub~ic under a court o:rder in circumstances 
where the CIA has argued that release would injure the national security."108 
Moreover, CNSS highlighted the dangers associated with reducing the 
intelligence community's accountability to the public: "The CIA says it is 
willing to give all information to the Congress for purposes of oversight and 
that this is further reason for granting the exemption. Yet disclosures under 
the FOIA have shown that the CIA did not tum over all information about 
past operations to the Congress .... "109 
Lloyd Gardner, ;:t ~story professor repre~enting the Orga;nization· of 
American Historians, joined the ACLU in denouncing the CIA's campaign t~ 
restrict the FOIA. "This will be a trag~dy if it is allowed to go unchallenged," 
107 1bid., 66. 
lOB Jbid., 94. 
109 1bid., 9S. 
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he argued.110 Gardner told Congress that the exemptions would seriously 
undermine historical scholarship on American foreign relations. He 
htmented that "the post-Vietnam backlash against declassification and against 
FOIA can only remind the historian of days when kings banished prophets 
who displeased them and sent messengers bearing bad news to oblivion. 
Surely, we are not prepared to go that route."111 William Corson, the author of 
The Armies of Ignorance (1977), elaborated on Gardner's protest, bluntly 
advising "that the Congress should be encouraged by the CIA's attempt to 
gain further exemptions from the FOIA. That, to me, is the best evidence that 
the FOIA is working, albeit not completely as some might prefer, but 
nevertheless still working."112 He called the proposed legislation "a 
bureaucratic Trojan horse/' since it would enable the Agency to withhold any 
qocu~ent from FOIA requesters by simply labeling it an operational file.113 
The forces aligned against the CIA in 1980 confirmed what Agency 
officials had anticipated two years earlier: the political climate, still shaped by 
the legacy of the Church and Pike committees, was not conducive to rolling 
back the FOIA. Since Congress refused to grant the CIA's request for 
exemptions to the FOIA, many requestors were able to obtain fascinating 
information from the Agency between 1975 and the early 1980s. John Marks, 
for instance, gained access to 16,000 pages of records on MKUL TRA, which 
enabled him to write The Search For The "Manchurian Candidate": The CIA and 
Mind Control. "Without these documents/' he admitted, "the best 
110 Ibid., 171. 
111 Ibid. 
112 Ibid., 186. 
113 Ibid., 184 
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investigative reporting in the world could not have produced a book, and the 
secrets of CIA mind-control work would have remained buried forever, as the 
men who knew them had always intended."114 The legal battle with the 
' . 
Agency had taken three years, but Marks remained optimistic about the 
FOIA, observing in October 1978 that "the system has worked extremely 
well."115 Journalists also used the Freedom of Information Act successfully at 
this time. Students at the College of William and Mary learned in April1980 
that the CIA had conducted surveillance of "radicals" on their campus during 
the Vietnam War.116 The Office of Security at Langley ran the operation as 
part of Project Resistance, a program of domestic espionage that targeted 
faculty andstudents at several colleges. The college newspaper at William 
and Mary, The Flat Hat, had acquired the sensational information through a 
FOIA request, which had been filed two years earlier.117 
The victories of FOIA requestors in the 1970s gave credence to the 
image of openness that Hetu worked so hard to create. The tragedy of CIA 
history·during these years is that Agency officials wanted nothing to do with 
openness. They complied with FOIA requests with considerable reluctance, 
and when they saw embarrassing information released to critics like John 
Marks, it only reinforced their commibnent to secrecy. The Agency's crusade 
against openness began with the formation of the PRB, which seriously 
re.stricted what former employees could say about the intelligence 
114 John D. Marks, The Search for the "Manchurian Candidate": The CIA and 
Mind Control (New York: Times Books, 1979; reprint, New York: W. W. 
Norton, 1991), xix. 
115 Ibid. 
116 Jennifer McBride, "The CIA On Campus: 1969-1971," The Flat Hat, 18 April 
1980, 1. 
117 Ibid. 
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community. The secondary target in Turner's secrecy campai.gn, of course, 
was the FOIA amendment of 1974. His deputy fought aggressively to win 
exemptions for the Agency, and although the ACLU and the Organization of 
American Historians prevailed in that battle, the CIA would mount another 
offensive a few years later in a much friendlier environment . 
. If Turner had actually embraced openness while CIA director, it is 
possible that he could have done something to change the irrational obsession 
with secrecy at Langley. But in choosing to become a forceful defender of 
that culture-sanctioning the lawsuit against Frank Snepp, encouraging 
Herbert Hetu's bait and switch PR tactics, and allowing Frank Carlucci to 
lqbby against the: FOIA-Turner helped set the stage for the abuses of power 
committed by his successor, William Joseph Casey. 
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CHAPTER VI 
THE CULTURE OF SECRECY UNLEASHED, 1981-1987 
By the end of the Carter administration, it appeared that Herbert 
Hetu's policies had staying power. But when William Casey became 
President Ronald Reagan's CIA director, he questioned the need for 
continuing the public relations campaign at Langley. The CIA had survived 
the scandals of the 1970s, the Republicans now controlled the White House, 
and the intelligence community's budget was no longer in jeopardy. As a 
result, Casey wondered why the Agency still found it necessary to publicly 
defend itself. He soon brought an end to the Agency's press briefings, and on 
July 1, 1981, he shut down the Office of Public Affairs. "[T]he difficulties of 
the past decade are behind us," he declared.1 Casey acknowledged that the 
public relations office served a purpose when it was first created, but he told 
employees that "the time has come for CIA to return to its more traditional 
low public profile and a leaner-but no less effective-presence on Capitol 
Hill."2 Hetu did not welcome Casey's decision/ and in August 1981, he left 
the Agency to found Hetu & Lukstat, a public relations firm. The remnants of 
1 George Lardner, Jr., "CIA Is Lowering The Blinds, Closing More Shutters," 
Washington Post, 30 June 1981, A3; "Intelligence Agency Will Abolish Office 
Providing Press Data," New York Times, 1 July 1981, A17. 
2 Lardner, A3; Joseph E. Persico, Casey: From the OSS to the CIA (New York: 
Penguin Books, 1990), 270; Bob Woodward, VEIL: The Secret Wars of the CIA, 
1981-1987 (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987), 139. 
3 According to Ronald Kessler, Hetu had previously sent Casey a memo in 
which he urged his new boss to reconsider the decision to end press briefings. 
Casey responded poorly: "I didn't ask you to debate it. I asked you to stop it. 
Now I'm ordering you to stopit. Stop it today. If you have any .scheduled 
today, cancel them." Kessler, Inside The CIA: Revealing the Secrets of the World's 
Most Powerful Spy Agency (New York: Pocket Books, 1992), 220. 
169 
his office merged with the downsized Congressional liaison staff to form a 
new division under the direction of future CIA chief Robert Gates.4 Contrary 
to Casey's thinking in 1981, however, the difficulties were only just 
beginning. In fact, his first year at Langley forced him to completely reverse 
his views on the value of public relations, and he would ultimately embrace 
the most aggressive PR tactics in the history of the CIA. He used PR to 
combat the media, to (covertly) sell the American public on the desirability of 
covert action in Nicaragua, and to convince the ACLU to endorse the CIA 
Information Act of 1984. 
Max Hugel, a businessman Casey befriended during the Reagan 
campaign, was a PR crisis waiting to happen. Hugel had never worked for 
the CIA before, but Casey decided to let him run the Directorate for 
Administration, the division in charge of personnel and management. In 
May 1981, when the clandestine services was in need of a new director, Casey 
moved Hugel into the position, a maneuver that dumfounded Agency 
insiders. Gates subsequently described Hugel as "the appointment from 
hell,"5 recalling that "[s]hort Max, with his toupee and mannerisms, his style 
of speech and dress, was put down by the Agency hierarchy-apart from 
Bill-as soon as he arrived."6 Officials in the Directorate of Operations did 
not respect Hugel, and they were determined to undermine him. "Leaks to 
the press about Hugel's rn~stakes, manneri~ms, and:faux pas began nearly 
4
."Intelligence Agency Will Abolish Office Providing PressData," A17. 
5 Robert M. Gates, From The Shadows: The Ultimate Insider's Story of Five 
Presidents and How They Won the Cold War (New York: Simon and Schuster, 
1996), 211. 
6 Ibid., 210. 
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immediately," says Gates? It also appears that disgruntled Agency 
employees helped mobilize the powerful network of former intelligence 
officers. Less than two weeks after Hugel had been selected, Cord Meyer, the 
author of Facing Reality, wrote a scathing assessment of the director's 
decision, calling it "a breathtaking gamble for which the country will have to 
pay heavily if Casey has guessed wrong."8 A week later the New York Times 
printed an editorial titled "The Company Mr. Casey Keeps" that 
compounded the negative publicity. "Who can be surprised if there are fears 
of a replay [of past abuses] in an Administration that talks loosely about 
'unleashing' the C. I. A.," asked the Times. "These fears are fanned when an 
outsider with tenuo1;1s credentials is given command of TheCompany's most 
free-wheeling div.ision."9 
Despite the b~cklash in the media and the frustration of his employees, 
~asey adamantly defended Hugel. Viewipg _Hugel as a politic~! lackey, 
skeptics at Langley were equally stubborn and somewhat merciless. 
Agency humorists even compared him to Tatoo on Fantasy Island: "What does 
Hugel say each morning to Casey? 'Boss, Boss-the plane, the plane/"'10 Jokes 
about his height undoubtedly proved embarrassing to Hugel, but the greatest 
humiliation. did .not surface until July. Washington Post reporters Bob 
Woodward and patrick Tyler had been pursuing a story about Hugel's 
7 Ibid., 211. . .. . 
8 Cord Meyer, "Casey Picks Amateur for Most Sensitive CIA Job" Washington 
Star, 15 Mayl981, A15, The Papers of Cord Meyer, Container 5, Folder 6, 
Library of Congress Manuscript Division; Persico, 245; "C. I. A. 
Acknowledges Ex-Campaign Official Is Placed In Key Post," New York Times, 
16 May 1981, 11. 
9 
"The Company Mr. Casey Keeps," New York Times, 22 May 1981, A26; · 
Persico, 246; Woodward, 133. · 
10 Woodward, 131. 
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business dealings from the early 1970s. They had received tapes from 
Thomas and Samuel McNeil that revealed Hugel had provided Thomas with 
insider information. The McNell brothers, both former high-rolling brokers 
on Wall Street, were disreputable and openly despised Hugel. But when 
}Voodward ~nd Tyler played the tapes for Hugel, he admitted that they 
contained his voice. 
The investigation ended with a sensational front-page story on July 14, 
1981. According to the article, which contained extensive quotations from the 
recorded conversations, Hugel told Thomas McNell information about 
Brother Limited that was unavailable to the public: "We originally forecast 
sales in the U.S. [at] $80 million ... We now forecast $70 million, okay, which 
is a $10 million swing."11 In a subsequent conversation, he offered details 
about a recently completed deal between Brother and another company. "I'm 
telling you confidential stuff, now," he warned, "[y]ou understand that?"12 
The tapes also revealed that Hugel had made illegal loans to the McNelis, and 
at one point, he politely advised Thomas to pay the money back, because "if 
you don't, I'll cut your balls off .... I'll get my Korean gang after you and you 
don't look so good when you're hanging by the balls anyway."13 Hollywood 
screenwriters simply could not have written a better script for the scandal. 
On the morning that the article appeared, Hugel resigned from the CIA.14 He 
11 Bob Woodward and Patrick E. Tyler, "Hugel Denies Leaking Inside 
Business Information," Washington Post, 14 July 1981, A8. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid., A9. 
14 
"Letters In Hugel Resignation," New York Times, 15 July 1981, A18; for a 
good overview of the entire Hugel affair, see Persico, 243-252; see also 
Woodward, 140-147. 
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blamed li.is demise on "the old-boy network. Some guys on the inside were 
out to get me. Some were retired guys working from the outside."15 
With Hugel out of the picture, Congress and the press increasingly 
scrutinized Casey's own business ventures. "The papers provided the grist," 
observed Joseph Persico, Casey's biographer, "and the Senate intelligence 
committee provided the mill."16 The committee selected Fred Thompson, a 
prominent attorney and future Republican Senator, to investigate the 
allegations of financial wrongdoing. Casey was one of the people charged in 
a lawsuit with deceiving the investors of Multiponics, an agricultural 
company that had gone bankrupt years earlier, and reporters discovered that 
he had withheld information from the disclosure forms that federal 
appointees are required to submit.. Casey, moreover, initially refused to put 
his massive portfolio into a blind trust.17 After the CIA director testified in 
detail to the intelligence committee about previous investments, the senators 
ruled "that no basis has been found for concluding Mr. Casey is unfit to serve 
as DCI."18 
15 Hugel quoted in Persico, 250. 
16 Persico, 268. 
17 For an assessment of the controversy surrounding Casey's finances, see 
ibid., 254-261, 267-269; Woodward, 148-152; PaulL. Montgomery, 1'Judge 
Asserts Casey, C. I. A. Chief, Misled Stock Buyers In '68," New York Times, 15 
July 1981, A1; Judith Mill~r, "Senate Panel To Review Charges On Chief Of C. 
I. A.," 18 July 1981, 8; Terence Smith, "Moynihan Assails White House On 
Casey Fil~s," New York T'imes, 22 July._l981, A1; Judith Miller, "Some Call For 
Resignation," New York Times, 25 July 1981, 1; "Financial Filings At Issue," 
New York Times, 25 July 1981, 1; Judith Miller;."Director Of C. I. A. Asking A 
Hearing To Answer Critics," New York Times, 27 July 1981, A1; Judith Miller, 
"Casey Summoned To Testify Today," New York Time~,_ 29 July 1981, All; and 
Arnold H. Lubasch, "Judge Withdraws Decision Against Casey In Suit/' 11 
November 1981, A1. 
18 Persico, 261; Judith Miller, "Senate Committee Finds Casey Fit For C. I. A. 
Job But Pursues Inquiry," New York Times, 30 July 1981, A1. 
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More than anything else, the extended controversy in 1981 convinced 
Casey that there was indeed a crucial need for public relations at the CIA. In 
1982 Casey dismantled the office he had created a year earlier; as. Persico 
explains, "[h]e went back to the arrangement that had prevailed when he 
took over the CIA, a separate lobbyist for the Hill and a separate Office of 
Public Affairs for the media."19 Charles E. Wilson, Hetu's former assistant, 
initially ran the public affairs division, but Casey ultimately selected George 
V. Lauder, a member of the clandestine service for over three decades, to take 
over the PR campaign in 1983.20 Lauder had spent years in the Middle East, 
and although he was an amateur in the realm of public relations: he knew the 
basics. For instance, CBS repeatedly approached him about the possibly of 
interviewing Casey. Given Casey's tendency to mumble, Lauder shrewdly 
declined the offer from 60 Minutes. "If you had a guy who talks like Bill 
Casey," he told them, "would you put him on television?"21 
As the CIA's top PR man, Lauder obviously communicated with Casey 
on a wide range of issues. Yet in responding to a Freedom of Information Act 
(FOIA) request filed in 2005, the CIA claimed that it was unable to find any 
correspondence between Lauder and Casey. The Agency subsequently 
turned over sixty documents in Lauder's files when confronted with another 
FOIA inquiry, but this material only included correspondence with 
individuals outside of ~e CIA. In other words, the Agency essentially took 
19 
.Persico, 300. . 
20 Woodward, 265-266. Casey named Clair George the Congressional liaison. 
~ersico, 301; Kessler, 220-222. . 
21 Lauder quoted in Persico, 455; George V. Lauder to Mike Wallace, 7 July 
1986. Released by the CIA to the author on 19 September 2006 in response to a 
FOIA request; Senator Barry Goldwater (Republican-Arizona) often referred 
to Casey as uflappy" and "flapper lips." Wo()dward, 148 . 
. ·' 
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the position that they could not locate any internal memos written by Lauder 
while he headed public affai.rs. It is difficult to re-construct how PR strategies 
were formulated in the mid-1980s given the paucity of de-classified 
information. Lauder assured a newspaper editor in 1985 that "[w]e [the CIA] 
do not lie to the American public nor do we engage in 'public relations 
flimflam to boost' our 'image' in the U. S.,"22 but the documents that have 
been de-classified do not substantiate this statement. In fact, not only did 
.. . . 
Lauder and Casey employ.PR "flimflam" to defend the CIA, they also used 
heavy-handed tactics that were undoubtedly intended to intimidate the 
media. 
Lauder routinely lambasted newsp~pers for printing articles that 
portrayed the CIA in a negative light. In October 1984, he complained to an 
editor at the New York Times about two earlier stories that had linked the CIA 
with "death squad related activities in El Salvador."23 Noting that a Senate 
investigation of the allegations had arrived at different conclusions, Lauder 
ridiculed the Times for its failure to issue a retraction: "The NEW YORK 
TIMES says it carries 'All the News Fit to Print.' Apparently, a story that 
corrects previous NEW YORK TIMES reporting isn't fit to print. I think the 
TIMES owes the Agency and its readers better than that."24 Despite the CIA's 
complaints about the articles on El Salvador, it is now clear that the Agency 
22 George V. Lauder to Emil Slaboda, 17 September 1985. Released by the CIA 
to the author on 19 September 200.6 in response to a FOIA request; Lauder's 
letter was published in The Trentonian. "CIA Response," The Trentonian, 25 
September 1985. Copy released by the CIA to the author on 19 September · 
2006 in response to a FOIA request. 
23 George V. Lauder to Max Frankel, 15 October 1984. Released by the CIA to 
the author on 19 September 2006 in response to a FOIA request. 
24 Ibid. . . 
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supported the right wing government in that country throughout the 1980s. 
CIA offiCials almost certainly knew about the violent campaigns that the El 
Salvadoran military unleashed on the opposition.25 _Two years later Lauder 
went on the offensive against the editor of the Christian Science Monitor after 
the newspaper ran a story about the downing of a plane in Nicaragua. The 
article said that the aircraft was on a CIA mission, and not surprisingly, 
Lauder rejected the accusation. "Mr. [Joseph] Harsch [the author of the story] 
owes the employees of this Agency an apology for his outrageous defamation 
of them," he declared.26 Even though the plane did not belong to the CIA, 
Lauder failed to mention that the Agency had previously supplied an aircraft 
that was used to send military equipment to Iran. 
Like most PR men, Lauder insisted .that he was not trying to 
manipulate public opinion .. When Vitaly Yurchenko, a Soviet operative, 
defected .to the United.States, William Casey used the situation to hype the 
Agency's mystique in the media. In June 1986, the New York Times provided 
details of how the CIA had leaked information to journalists. Yet Lauder 
claimed "that CIA said nothing at all about Yurchenko in other than classified 
hearings or meetings until he redefected."27 Lauder acknowledged that the 
25 See, for example, Greg Grandin, Empire's Workshop: Latin America, The 
United States; and The Rise ofThe New Imperialism (New York: Henry Holt, 
2006), Chp. 3, esp. 95; see also Michael McClintock, The American Connection: 
State Terror and Popular Resistance in El_ Salvador (London: Zed Books, 1985). 
26 George V. Lauder to Earl W. Foell, 21 October 1986. Released by the CIA to 
the author on 19 September 2006 in r~sponse to a FOIA request. 
27 George V. Lauder to Leslie Gelb, 3 June 1986. Released by the CIA to the 
~uthor on l9 September 2009 in response to a FOIA request; Lauder had 
previously issued a denial to The Wall Street Journal: "The CIA has made no 
information public concerning Mr. Yurchenko. Mo:reover, it is forbidden by 
Presidential Executive Order 12333 from propagandizing or attempting to 
influence the American public." George V. Lauder to Robert Bartley, 5 
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details on Yurchenko's short-lived defection resulted from leaks, but he 
denied that the Agency was responsible for them.28 This denial was rather 
unconvincing, especially since few individuals outside the CIA knew much 
about Yurchenko. Lauder was obviously worried about any accusation that 
the CIA had engaged in activity that violated Executive Order 12333, which 
prohibited the CIA from· engaging in domestic propaganda. When 
Washington insiders discovered that Casey had been meeting with Bob 
Woodward of the Washington Post, Lauder sent an angry letter to Woodward: 
"if you are saying or implying that we are co-collaborators [on the book] you 
are suggesting that we are in violation of the Executive Order [12333] .... We 
resent both the violations of the ground rules under which we agreed to talk 
to you and the implication that your product has our appro~al. It doesn't." 29 
Casey, of course, had most likely agreed to meet with Woodward in hopes of 
shaping how the legendaryreporter portrayed the CIA. When this strategy 
backfired, Lauder attempted to distance the Agency from the upcoming 
publication of Woodward's Veil: The Secret Wars of the CIA, 1981-1987. 
~n his correspondence with the press, Lauder frequently lectured 
editors about the sanctity of classified information .. He declared to American 
LegionMagazine that "the media must ... bear the responsibility for acting as 
a 'fenc.e' for stqlen goods and for its ihvolvement in damaging the nation's 
November 1985. Released by the CIA to the author on 19 September 2006 in 
response to a FOIA request. 
28 Lauder to Bartley,S November 1985. 
29 George V. Lauder to Bob Woodward, 20 February 1986, p. 2. Released by 
the CIA to the a:uthor on 19 September 2006 in r~sponse to a FOIA request. 
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security ."30 When USA Today ran an editorial that criticized the government's 
excessive use of classification, Lauder suggested that there was nothing 
wrong with the current system. He warned that lives were at stake: "In short, 
the press often carelessly tosses about the verbal hand grenades that a leaker 
hands it. When they explode, killing people and inflicting great damage, the 
press shrugs and says in effect, well, it's a free country."31 Despite the serious 
accusatiori.s leveled against the media, he failed to offer any specific examples 
of irresponsible journalism. 
Lauder was certainly entitled to share his opinions about the First 
Amendment, but in at least two situations, he found himself accused of 
seeking to undermine the freedom of the press. In October 1985, he 
challenged the accuracy of an article that William Gertz wrote for the 
Washington Times.32 Less than two months later, he again contacted Arnaud 
de Borchgrave, then the editor of the conservative newspaper, claiming that 
·he had been quoted inaccurately by Gertz.33 De Borchgrave, however, 
defended Gertz and wondered whether Lauder was trying to pressure the 
paper into re-assigning the young correspondent. Lauder replied that he had 
no intention of telling de Borchgrave who should be assigned to cover the 
30 George V. Lauder to Dani~l S. Wheeler, 29 October 1986, p. 2. Released by 
the CIA to the author on 19 September 2006 in response to a FOIA request. 
31 George V. Lauder to John Seigenthaler, 21 April1986, p. 2. Released by the 
CIA to the-author on 19 September 2006in response to a FOIA. request. 
32 George V. Lauder to Arnaud de Borchgrave, 22 October 1985. Released by 
the CIA to the author on 19September 2006 in response to a FOIA request. 
33 George V. Lauder to Arnaud de Borchgrave, 12 December 1985. Released 
by the CIA to the author on 19 September 2006 in response to a FOIA request. 
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CIA,34 but he also made it clear that Gertz was at risk of becoming persona 
ri.on grata at the Agency. "You should know that Gertz is the only journalist 
in Washington who consistently misrepresents what we tell him," he 
. . 
asserted. "We have arrived at a point where I have had to issue instructions 
that two of my media relations officers must be on the phone w~enever any 
of us is talking to Gertz so that we will be able to confirm what was and what 
was not said to him."35 Lauder informed de Borchgrave that the CIA would 
no longer grant background interviews to Gertz, and he lamented that the 
Washington Times was not providing friendlier coverage. "THE 
WASHINGTON POST at least quotes us accurately," he observed.36 
De Borchgrave allowed Gertz to continue covering the intelligence 
community, and he n~ver went public with his concern that Lauder was 
maneuvering to undermine the reporter. Jack Anderson, the legendary 
columnist, did not keep silent when he experienced a similar confrontation 
with the CIA's.Office of Public Affairs. On the same day that Anderson wrote 
an editorial indicating that the CIA might be involved in drug trafficking, 
Lauder sent the columnist an unusual letter. "Since you have identified your 
source," he wrote, "you should have no trouble in making the information 
available. If no such evidence is forthcoming, we will assume that you have 
none .. "37 Lauder requested that Anderson tum over evidence to the CIA, the 
34 George V. Lauder to Arnaud de Borchgrave, 27 December 1985, p. 2. 
Released by the CIA to the author on 19 September 2006 in response to a 
FOIA request. 
35 1bid., p. 1. 
36 1bid., p. 2. 
37 George V. Lauder to Jack N. Anderson, 26 December 1984. Released by the 
CIA to the author on 19 September 2Q06 in response to a FOIA request; Jack 
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Justice Department, and the appropriate· Congressional committees.38 
Anderson quickly brought the incident to the attention of fellow journalists. 
"I think the letter smacks of intimidation," he told the Los Angeles Times, "but 
it's not going to be successful."39 In his reply to Lauder's demands, Anderson 
quipped that he "would be happy to exchange sources with the CIA at any 
time .. "40 Until CIA officials divulged their informants to Anderson, in other 
words, he would never reveal his sources of information to them. He 
realized, of course, that the Agency would never agree to such a proposal. 
His reporting had angered the CIA in the past, and in the early 1970s, the 
Agency even placed him-along with his staffers-under surveillance. Yet, 
according to Anderson, it was the first time that the CIA had ever approached 
him directly about a story.41 
Lauder's confrontation with Anderson was part of a broader CIA 
effort to downplay the Agency's connection to an investment company in 
Hawaii known as Bishop, Baldwin, Rewald, Dillingham, & Wong (BBRDW). 
Ronald Rewald had established the firm in 1978, and when it collapsed five 
years later, he attemp_ted to commit suicide in a hotel room. Rewald survived 
~d ultimately went on trial for allegedly defrauding over .four hundr~d 
investors of approximately $22 million in what was .called at the time "a 
Anderson, "Ex-Agent Cites CIA Drug Scheme," Washington Post, 26 
December 1984, E8. 
38 Lauder to Anderson, 26 December 1984. 
39 David Crook, "CIA Sought His News Sources, Anderson Says," Los Angeles 
Times, 11 January 1985, E1. 
40 Ibid., E23. 
41 Ibid. 
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class~c Pon=?i scheme."~ Although BBRDW portrayed itself ~s an investment 
house that offered a 20% rate of return, only a small percentage of the money 
deposited was actually invested. Rewald embezzled millions of dollars to 
finance a high-rollil;1g lifestyle ~f. polo matches, luxury cars, and beautiful 
women.43 Rewald rejected the accusation that his company had been nothing 
more than a financial ~cam, arguing in a lawsuit that BBRDW had been the 
creation of the CIA. He said that the Agency had used the firm to finance 
arms deals with countries in the Far East and to spy on foreign leaders such 
as Ferdinand Marcos. He even claimed that the CIA had sent him on a secret 
mission to steal the designs for a Japanese bullet train.44 Although CIA 
qfficials denied most of Rewald's more sensational charges, they publicly 
a<;lmitted "aslight involvement" with Rewald's firm.45 Agency lawyers also 
made sure that the documents in the Rewald case were sealed.46 
42 Kenneth B. Noble, "Firm Citing C. I. A. Link Is Charged," New York Times, 
25 August 1984, 38. 
43 
"According to reports by bankruptcy trustees, Rewald spent $250,000 on a 
fleet of cars, including three Cadillacs,_ two Mercedes-Benzes, a Rolls-Royce 
and a Jaguar; $66,000 on boats; $82,000 on jewelry and art; $154,000 on travel; 
$102,000 on relatives; $225,000 on household help, including tutors, and 
$541,000 on horses and other polo club expenses." See Howard Kurtz, 
"Investors Say Bankrupt Firm Had CIA Tie," Washington Post, 16 April 1984, 
A3. 
~For good overviews of the Rewald affair, see Jonathan Kwitny, "Suits Focus 
On Extent Of CIA Involvement In An Alleged Fraud," Wall Street Journal, 18 
April1984, 1; Jonathan Kwitny, "House Panel Seeks Justice, SEC Records As 
Probe of Rewald-CIA Case Is Launched," Wall Street Journal, 22 May 1984, 6; 
John Kelly, "Cover to Cover: Rewald's CIA Story," Counterspy 8, no. 4 {June-
August 1984): 8-17, 48-57; Marita Hernandez, "Hawaii Investment Adviser 
Held In Fraud," Los Angeles Times, 1 September 1984, A23; and David Crook, 
"Adventures In Paradise: How ABC Enraged the CIA-and Why the CIA 
Fought Back," Los Angeles Times, 5 May 1985, R4. 
45 Kurtz, A3. 
46 1bid. 
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It is possible that Rewald was telling the truth: perhaps the CIA 
manipulated BBRDW for covert objectives and then allowed him to be the 
patsy when the scheme imploded. After all, John Peyton, the federal lawyer 
who prosecuted Rewald, was a former CIA man.47 Yet the evidence points to 
a less sinister-but more embarrassing-scenario. Rewald moved to Hawaii 
in 1977 shortly after he had been convicted of swindling two teachers in 
Wisco~sin, and it appears that he approached the CIA station chief in 
Honolulu.48 Explaining that he was an American patriot, he offered to 
provide jobs in his new company for CIA officers who needed non-official 
cover. The Agency admitted that seven officers worked for BBRDW 
subsidiaries; that Rewald was re-imbursed for around $2,700 in expenses; that 
he signed a secrecy. agreement; and that his son spied on foreign students at 
Brigham Young University's campus in Hawaii.49 When Jack Kindschi, the 
Honolulu station chief, retired from the Agency in 1980, Rewald hired him as 
a consultant, paying him an annual salary of $48,000. Kindschi' s replacement, 
Jack Rardin, met with Rewald on several occasions, visited the offices of 
BBRDW, and agreed to interfere with an IRS investigation of the firm.50 
Reporters in Hawaii also discovered "that as many as 14 CIA [officers] 
47 Jonathan Kwitny, ~'Suits Focus On Extent Of CIA Involvement Ifl An 
Alleged Fraud/' 1. 
48Jbid. 
49 Kurtz, A3; David Crook, "Adventures In Paradise: How ABC Enraged the 
CIA-and Why the CIA Fought Back," R6; Jack Anderson said that "at least 
17" CIA officers used BBRDW for cover. Anderson, "Ex-Agent Cites CIA 
Drug Scheme," E8; see also Jack Anderson, "CIA Role Was More Than Low-
Level," Washington Post, 2 November 1984, Dl2. 
50 Jonathan Kwitny, "Suits Focus On Extent Of CIA Involvement In An 
Alleged Fraud," 1. 
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invested more than a total of $300,000 in personal funds in the company."51 
While Kindschi, Rardin, and other Agency employees were investing money 
' iri BBRDW, Rewald bragged extensively that he worked for the CIA and 
promised clients that the federal government would insure all of their 
deposits. Agency officers receive extensive training in the art of deception, 
but the CIA investors apparently never worried that Rewald, a man with a 
criminal record, might be trying to scam them. 
Ronald Rewald became a household name in Hawaii in July 1983, but 
the story did not receive much attention on the mainland until the following 
spring.52 Then, in September 1984, ABC News reported a new development 
in the ongoing saga. "Not only was Bishop, Baldwin involved in selling arms 
to Taiwan, India and Syria and promoti11g financial panic in Hong Kong," 
said reporter Gary Shepard, "it was also fueling capital flight from two allies, 
Greece and the Philippines .... in exchange for intelligence information."53 
ABC claimed in a second report that the CIA had plotted to kill Rewald. The 
accusation was based on an interview with Scott T. Barnes, who h~d once 
been a prison guard in Oahu. According to Barnes, CIA officers instructed 
him to eliminate Rewald; "We gotta take him out .... You know, kill him," 
they declared.54 About a week.after ABC aired the story, the CIA insisted that 
the charges were false and requested, a retraction. 55 Peter Jennings is~ued a 
51 David Crook, "Adventures .In Paradise: How ABC Enraged the CIA-and 
Why the CIA Fought Back," R8. · . . . 
52 John Kelly, the editor of Counterspy, actually helped to ensure that the story 
received wider coverage. See David Crook, "Adventures In Paradise: How 
ABC Enraged the CIA-and Why the CIA Fought Back," R8. 
53
. Ibid., R6. 
54 Ibid., RS. 
55 
"C. I. A. Denies A Murder Effort," New York Times, 28 September 1984, B7. 
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partial retraction on "World News Tonight" in November, acknowledging 
that ABC could not corroborate Barnes's claims. 
Unsatisfied with ABC's response, CIA officials filed a petition with the 
FCC on the same day.56 The Agency argued "that ABC deliberately distorted 
the news and violated the fairness doctrine" and asked the FCC to 
"determine what corrective action should be taken by ABC."57 After 
investigating the reports, the FCC rejected both the complaint and the CIA's 
subsequent appeal.58 But although ABC prevailed in the proceedings, legal 
experts worried that the precedent established in the case could potentially 
make the media more reluctant to pursue controversial stories. In essence~ 
the FCC ruled that any government agency had the right to file a complaint 
against radio or television stations; in the event that the commission sided 
with the government, broadcasting licenses could be revoked as punishment. 
"If this (the fairness doctrine) is held to apply to a government agency," 
observed an ACLU official, "then we are concerned about the chilling effect 
56 
"Complaint By C. I. A. Over Report On TV," Nw York Times, 22 November 
1984, A25; Ward Sinclair, "In FCC Complaint, CIA Says ABC Distorted 
News," Washington Post, 22November 1984, 17; David Crook, "CIA Asks FCC 
To Probe ABC Report For Fairness," Los Angeles Times, 27 November 1984, 
G8; "CIA and ABC," Washington Post, 27 November 1984, AlB; David Crook, 
"ABC Retraction Of CIA Murder Plot Detailed," Los Angeles Times, 13 
December 1984, Ml. . . . 
57 
"Complaint By C. I. A. Over Report On TV," A25. 
58 For the FCC's response to the complaint, see George Lardner, Jr., "FCC 
Rejects CIA Complaint Of 'News Distortion' by ABC," Washington Post, 11 
January 1985, A24; and David Crook, "FCC Staff Rejects CIA Complaint 
Against ABC," Los Angeles Times, 11 January 1985, B33. For an overview of 
the CIA's appeal, see David Crook, "CIA Renews Its Charges Against ABC," 
Los Angeles Times, 9 February 1985, A14; David Crook, "CIA Comes Out 
Firing Against ABC," Los Angeles Times, 11 February 1985, Gl; and Penny 
Pagano, "FCC Dismisses CIA Charges Against ABC," Los Angeles Times, 13 
July 1985, Cl. 
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on investigative reporting."59 When faced with stories that they perceived as 
unfair or inaccurate, Lauder and Casey certainly ?-ad every right to issue a 
rebuttal. Yet the CIA's response to ABC News reflected a glaring contempt 
for the First Amendment. The FCC complaint, which undoubtedly left the 
network with significant legal costs, was not an aberration. It was consistent 
with the tactics employed against William Gertz and Jack Anderson. 
At the same time that Lauder publicly battled the media from inside 
the Office of Public Affairs at Langley, there was also a covert dimension to 
Casey's PR strategy. Robert Parry and Peter Kornbluh have persuasively 
argued that the CIA director actually helped to establish "what appears to be 
America's first peacetime propaganda ministry."60 In the summer of 1982, a 
CIA officer named Walter Raymond, Jr. joined President Reagan's National 
Security Council with Casey's direct approval. Raymond had much in 
common with David Atlee Phillips; both men had been educated at The 
College of William and Mary, and both were propaganda specialists. 61 Robert 
Parry would later describe Raymond as "a slight, soft-spoken New Yorker 
who reminded some of a character from a John le Carre spy novel, an 
59 David Crook, '"Chilling Effect' Cited In FCC Decision," Los Angeles Times, 
16 July 1985, E1. . . . 
60 Robert Parry and Peter Kombluh, "Iran-Contra's Untold Story," Foreign 
Policy 72 (Fall1988): 5. · · . . 
61 Raymond graduated from William and Mary in 1950. Phillips had attended 
the college before World War II, but in the aftermath of a wild road trip, he 
missed his exams. According to Phillips's account, "I had attended a 
weekend prom at a now defunct girls' school in Washington and accepted, 
perhaps in an alcoholic haze, an invitation from a convivial fellow to ride 
with him back to school. I slept well in his car, but unfortunately his school 
turned out to be Yale." He then enrolled at Texas Christian University. See 
Phillips, The Night Watch (New York: Ballantine Books, 1977), 3. 
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intelligence officer who 'easily fades into the woodwork' .... "62 Raymond 
initially headed the Intelligence Directorate at the National Security Councit63 
which was not an unusual assignment for an intelligence officer .. Yet his job 
description changed tremendously after Presiden.t Reagan signed National 
Security Decision Directive 77 in January 1983 .. This directive bolstered and 
centralized the administration's "public diplomacy" apparatus, defined as 
"those actions of the U.S. [g]ovemment designed to generate support for our 
national security objectives."64 While public diplomacy had been used in the 
past to build support for the United States overseas, it was now re-defined to 
include the American public. Raymond, who became the director of the 
Office of International Communications and Public Diplomacy at the NSC, 
outlined a "political action" offensive to covertly influence domestic 
perceptions of Americall. foreign policy, especially as it pertained to Central 
America,.65 
Much as Phillips had done in 1975, Raymond eventually resigned from 
the CIA to ensure that "there would be no question whatsoever of any 
contamination of this."66 He vehemently denied the accusation that Agency 
executives were involved in the public diplomacy crusade: "At no time 
62 Robert Parry, Lost History: Contras, Cocaine, the Press & 'Project Truth' 
(Arlington, Virginia: The Media Consortium, 1999), 49. 
63 Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair, 100th 
Cong., rt sess., H. Rept. 100-433, S. Rept. 100-216, Appendix B: vol. 22, 
Deposition of Walter Raymond, Jr., 155. 
· 
64 National Security Decision Directive Number 77, 14 January 1983, 
"M;anagement of Public Diplomac R~lative To National Security," 
ht : www.fas.or i offdocs nsdd nsdd-077.htm (accessed March 29, 
2008)._- ,Parry and Kombluh, 9; Parry, Lost History, 49-50; Grandin, Chp. 4, esp. 
123-124. 
6,5 Parry and Kombluh, 9; Parry, Lost History, 50. 
66 Parry and Kombluh, 9; Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating 
the Iran-Contra Affair, Deposition of Walter Raymond, Jr., 166. 
186 
during my 5 years with the NSC did I receive any instructions or guidance 
from Casey or any other sentor CIA official."67 However, as Parry and 
Kornbluh have shown, Raymond's deposition during the Iran-Contra 
investigation reveals a completely different story. In fact, he told 
Congressional staffers "that he met.w~th then CIA Director William Casey 
every Thursday between January and July 1983."68 Raymond, in other words, 
conijnueq to meet with Casey in the months following his official departure 
, 
. " . 
from the CIA in April 1983. When asked during the deposition if he talked 
about public diplomacy in these meetings, his response was woefully vague. 
"I wouldn't rule it out that we might have. I cannot remember anything 
specific on that," he said.69 Fortunately for historians, Raymond's memos, 
which were de-classified in the Congressional report on Iran-Contra, provide 
a clearer picture of events than his deposition. On August 29, 1983, for 
instance, he informed an official on the National Security Council that Casey 
had phoned him three days earlier to discuss PR strategies. Raymond 
apparently recognized that this ongoing communication with the CIA raised 
constitutional issues, and he alluded to "an effort to get him [Casey] out of 
the loop."70 
67 
"Letters," Foreign Policy 73 (Winter 1988-1989): 173. 
68 Ibid., 177; Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra 
Affair, Deposition of Walter Raymond, Jr., 70-71. 
69 Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair, 
Deposition of Walter Raymond, Jr., 71. 
70 Walter Raymond, Jr. to John M. Poindexter, "Central American Outreach," 
29 August 1983, reprinted as OLN-220 in U.S. Congress, Senate Select 
Committee On Secret Military Assistance To Iran And The Nicaraguan 
Opposition and the House Select Committee To Investigate Covert Arms 
Transactions With Iran, Iran-Contra Investigation, 100th Cong., 1st sess., 100-7, 
Part III: Appendix A (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1988), 
874; Parry and Kornbluh, 11. 
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Raymond may have wanted to establish plausible deniability for the 
CIA in 1983, but Casey was still inside the loop three years later. After 
Congress allowed the CIA to re,-commence covert action in Nicaragua, 
Raymond drafted a memo for Casey in August 1986. "It is clear we would 
not have won the House vote without the painstaking deliberative effort 
undertaken by many people in the government and outside," he declared.71 
In the same memo, he also noted that he continued to hold a weekly meeting 
on public diplomacy. Several officials attended these sessions, including "a 
representative from CIA's Central American Task Force, and key NSC 
[s]taffers."72 Raymond later defended his former boss with the unconvincing 
claim that Casey was acting "not so much in his CIA hat, but in his advisor to 
the president hat."73 .The General Accounting Office (GAO) asserted in 1987 
that the Office of Public Diplomacy for Latin America and the Caribbean at 
the State Department, which Raymond helped launch in the summer of 1983, 
had engaged in "prohibited, covert propaganda activities designed to 
influence the media and the public to support the Administration's Latin 
American policies."74 
71 Parry .and Kornbluh, 27; "They were trying to manipulate [U. S.] public 
opinion ... using the tools of Walt Raymond's trade craft which he learned 
from his career in the CIA covert operation shop," explained an anqnymous 
NSC insider.lbid., 4-5; Iran-Contra Investigation, 1001h Cong., P 1 sess., 100-7, 
Part III: Appendix A (Washin~on: Government Printing Office, 1988), 843. 
72 Iran-Contra Investigation, 100 Cong., rt sess., 100-7, Part III: Appendix A 
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1988), 843. 
73 Parry and Kornbluh, 11; Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating 
the Iran-Contra Affair, Deposition of Walter Raymond, Jr., 49. . 
74 Parry and Kornbluh, 20. They observed that "[i]n its first year alone, [the 
Office of Public Diplomacy's] activities included booking more than 1,500 
speaking engagements, including radio, television, and editorial board 
interviews; publishing three booklets on Nicaragua; and distributing 
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Raymond downplayed his relationship with Oliver North in his 
deposition: "I do know he was in contact with the contras, but beyond that, I 
was not really involved in the details of his activities."75 Yet a<;cording to 
North's checklist for the final week of Februc;~.ry 1985, he shared responsibility 
with Raymond for ."[a]ssign[ing] U. S. intelligence agencies to research, 
report, and clear for public release Sandinista military actions violating 
Geneva Convention/ civilized standards of warfare."76 Needless to say, they 
did not request intelligence reports on the human rights abuses and drug 
trafficking of the Contras. Parry and Kornbluh point out that the 
Congressional investigations could have done more to explore the 
propaganda campaign that Raymond orchestrated in collaboration with 
North, but Congressman Richard Cheney(Republican-Wyoming) skillfully 
worked behind the scenes to prevent that from happening, "arguing that the 
domestic operations were outside the committees' scope."77 
If there had been a more detailed investigation, the public ':Vould have 
undo1,1btedly learned that Casey was not an innocent bystander .. In fact, it 
turns out that he had invited PR experts to meet with him in the Old 
Executive Office Building to develop ideas on the best way "to sell a 'new 
materials to 1,600 college libraries, 520 political science faculties, 122 editorial 
writers, and 107 religious organizations." Ibid., 17. . . 
75 Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair, 
Deposition of Walter Raymond, Jr., 88. 
76 Iran-Contra Investigation, 100th Cong., 1st sess., 100-7, Part III: Appendix A 
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1988), 859; Raymond said that he 
was not involved in this effort. RepOrt of the Congressional Committees 
Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair, Deposition of Walter Raymond, Jr., 124; 
"North's calendars show some 70 public diplomacy strategy sessions with 
Raymond l?etween 1984 and 1986-though Rayrnond has asserted that North 
was 'not a regular attendee' at the meetings." Parry and Kombluh, 12. 
77 Parry and l(ombluh, 28. · 
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product'-Central America-by generating· interest across~the-spectrum."78 
William Greener, then the director of public relations at Philip Morris, was a 
key participant in the meeting. Given his work for Philip Morris, Greener 
instinctively recognized that secrecy and PR were inseparable. His company 
knew for: decades that cigarettes caused. cancer and a long list of other health 
problems, but instead of acknowledging the facts, executives at Morris 
suppressed the data~ claiming that the scientific evidence was inconclusive. 
The CIA implemented a similar strategy during Casey's tenure. Rather than 
providing a balanced view of events in Nicaragua, Raymond concocted 
blatant propaganda: "concentrate on gluing black hats on the Sandinistas and 
white hats on UNO [the contras' United Nicaraguan Opposition]," he 
instructed in 1986.79 
In his determination to win support for the Contras in Nicaragua, 
Casey went so far as to personally embark on a domestic covert operation 
against Senator Patrick Leahy (Democrat-Vermont), arguably his most vocal 
critic on the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. During Leahy's 
campaign for re-election, Casey leaked a letter that he had written to Leahy 
that criticized him for allegedly revealing sensitive information about the 
Achille Lauro hijacking.80 Casey apparently spoke with Rowland Evans and 
Robert Novak, and they subsequently wrote an article in Reader's Digest in the 
lead-up to the election. Evans and Novak argued that Leahy's alleged breach 
78 Ibid., 10; Iran-Contra Investigation, 100th Cong., 1st sess., 100-7, Part III: 
Appendix A (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1988), 875; Parry, Lost 
History, 62. 
79 Parry and Kornbluh, 5-6. 
80 Persico, 532-533; Woodward, 486-487; for background on the tense 
relationship between Casey and Leahy, see Gates, 370-371 .. 
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of national security. "is one of many showing that the current era of 
€ongressional oversight of the CIA is simply not working."81 
·Although Casey could not prevent Leahy from winning a third term, 
he found it much easier to suppress the views of former CIA officials. In 
order to combat the criticism from these insiders, he turned to the 
Publications Review Board (PRB). Ralph McGehee, who had earlier battled 
the PRB while Stansfield Turner headed the CIA, submitted an article to the 
board in 1981 that alleged the Agency was falsifying intelligence on Central 
America in order to hype the threat of the Soviet Union. McGehee provided 
examples from CIA history to illustrate what was happening in El Salvador, 
but the PRB barred him from mentioning details of previous 
~'disinformation" operations in countries like Indonesia.82 The harassment 
continued the following spring whenhe asked board members to review a 
revised version of the manuscript that they had already cleared. The PRB 
now ruled that McGehee had to delete several sections of the book, including 
his description of a sophomoric prank at Camp Peary in the 1950s "involving 
the booby-trapping of a toilet seat with a military firecracker."83 The CIA 
allowed him to re-insert passages that contained information released by 
81 Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, "Congress Is Crippling The CIA," 
Reader's Digest, November 1986, 99. . 
82 George Lardner, Jr., "CIA Is Sued Over Its Censorship Of Article On 
Fabricating Data," Washington Post, 28 March 1981, A20. 
83 George Lardner, Jr., "CIA Veteran Decries Effort to 'Reclassify' Material in 
His Book," Washington Post, 1 April1982, A12; Ralph W. McGehee, Deadly 
Deceits: My 25 Years in the CIA (New York: Sheridan Square Press, 1983; 
reprint, Melbourne, Australia: Ocean Press, 1999), 200-203. 
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Senator Frank Church's committee, and after several more disputes with the 
board, he finally managed to publish Deadly Deceits in 1983.84 
Admiral Stansfield Turner encountered similar problems after the PRB 
examined his memoir. Turner, an ardent critic of the Reagan administration, 
believed "that between 10 and 15 percent of the time it took me to complete 
the book was spent in arranging with the CIA for its clearance .... It was all 
most unreasonable and unnecessary~"85 The irony, of course, was that Turner 
had expanded the powers of the review board back in 1977. "As long as there 
is almost no check on the arbitrariness of the CIA," he warned, "it is likely 
that there will be further abuses of the public's right to knowledge about its 
govemment."86 When Frank Snepp learned about Turner's displeasure with 
CIA censorship, he criticized the former director for creating a policy that 
restricted the First Amendment rights of ex-intelligence officers: "I hate to 
think of anybody being censoredr but I think there is poetic justice in the fact 
that the architect of the C. I. A.'s censorship should now be feeling the heat."87 
In addition to worrying about criticism from former insiders like 
McGehe~ and Turner, Casey and his advisors were concerned about student 
protests against covert action in Ce:ntral A~erica. Nearly seventy student 
activists at Brown University attracted publicity by initiating a ci~zen's arrest 
of CIA recruiters in 1984, which was inspired in part by revelations of the 
84 McGehee, 200. 
85 Stansfield Turner, Secrecy and Democracy: The CIA in Transition. (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin, 1985), x. 
861b'd .. 1 ., xu. 
87 Snepp quoted in Seymour Hersh, "Ex-Intelligence Director Disputes 
Censorship Of His Book On C. I. A.," New York Times, 18 May 1983, Al. "I 
think Turner deserves everything the censors visit on him because he failed to 
recognize just how dangerous censorship was in the first place," Snepp 
remarked. Ibid. 
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Agency's illegal mining of Nicaraguan harbors.88 Casey thought that public 
relc:ttions could revitalize the Agency's recruitment efforts on campuses, and 
in 1985 he instituted the Officer in Residence Program, aPR effort that allows 
CIA employees to join college faculties for two years to teach classes related 
. . 
to their area of expertise. This program has proven especially attractive to 
universities, because the Agency pays for most of the costs. There are 
. . 
between eig.ht and twelve Officers in Residence at any given time, and more 
than fifty schools have welcomed CIA officers to their campus in the past two 
decades. According to the CIA's website, "Harvard, Princeton, Georgetown, 
University of South Carolina, University of Oregon, University of Kentucky, 
Texas A&M, Marquette University, Ohio State University and the military 
academies" are a few of the universities that have participated in the project.89 
88 
"Students Punished For Protest," New York Times, 9 December 1984, 32; 
Cory Dean, "Student Activism Alive At Brown U.," New York Times, 14 
February 1985, A18; there was also controversy involving the CIA at Harvard 
University. This scandal began in the fall of 1985 when The Harvard Crimson 
revealed that the director of the school's Center for Middle Eastern Studies, 
Nadav Safran, had taken around $46,000 from the CIA to finance a 
conference. It also emerged that the CIA had paid over $100,000 to assist him 
with the researching and writing of Saudi Arabia: The Ceaseless Quest For 
Security. See Stuart Lavietes, "Nadav Safran, 77, A Professor and an Expert in 
Mideast Politics," New York Times, 27 July 2003, 30; "C. I. A. Aid For Meeting 
Protested," New York Times, 14 October 1985, A16; Charles R. Babcock, 
"Author Defends CIA Aid For Book About Saudis," Washington Post, 15 
October 1985, A3; Colin Campbell, "Harvard Widens Inquiry In C. I. A. Aid 
To Professor," New York Times, 20 October 1985, sec. 1, 54; Colin Campbell, 
"C. I. A. Grant Raises Questions On Research Rules At Harvard," New York 
Times, 5 November 1985, A23; Fox Butterfield, "Scholar To Quit Post At 
Harvard Over C. I. A. Tie," New York Times, 2 January 1986, A12. 
89 Center for the Study of Intelligence, "Officer in.Residence Program," 
https: // www .cia.gov /library I center-for-the-study-of-intelligence I academic-
relations I officer-in-residence-program.html (16 July 2007). "CIA hopes to 
demonstrate the quality and competence of its people, and the Agency 
benefits when its officers can work in an academic environment. The officers, 
and the Agency, benefit from the substantive outreach to students, faculty, 
and administrators on US campuses." Ibid. 
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Although Officers in Residence must now acknowledge their connection to 
the CIA and are forbidden to recruit students, the venture obviously began as 
a strategy to repair the CIA's relationship with the academic community. 
Harry Fitzwater, the Deputy Director for Administration under Casey, 
explained in an August 1985 memo that a key objective was to "[a]ssist 
Agency staff recruiting efforts by placing in selected schools experienced 
officers who can spot promising career candidates, can counsel students as to 
career opportunities, and can use their knowledge and experience to address 
questions or concerns students may have regarding the Agency."90 
Casey also established PR programs for businessmen who operated 
internationally; His biographer estimates that "[b]etween 1984 and 1985, 
nearly three hundred major American business leaders carne to the Agency's 
executive seminar."91 When Casey spoke to these visiting executives, he 
typically explained that Americans "returning from overseas trips have been 
invaluable not only in providing information but in giving us leads to people 
willing to make available information which may be .critical to our national 
interests."92 Casey made little attempt to disguise that he was attempting to 
secure their cooperation. In soliciting help from corporations, he was even 
willing to do favors for them. On one occasion, he instructed CIA analysts to 
90 John Hollister Hedley, "Twenty Years Of Officers In Residence," Studies In 
Intelligence 49, no. 4 (2005), 
https: l I www .cia.gov I csi I studies I vol49no41 Officers in Residence 3.htm 
(accessed July 21,2006). 
91 Persico, 456. · 
.~ Casey quoted in ibid. 
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research the market for chocolate products in Eastern Europe, and he turned 
the results over to Mars Candy.93 
Enhancing the "culture of secrecy" was the most important objective of 
Casey's legislative agenda, and he understood that PR could be used to 
secure the passage of the lntelligence Identities Protection Act and to 
undercut the Freedom .of Information Act.94 The protection act, which made 
it illegal to knowingly reveal the name of a covert operative, was an easy sell, 
and it passed in 1982. Winning relief from the FOIA, on the other hand, was 
much more complicated. Casey recognized that the earlier campaign for an 
exemption had failed because of outrage from advocates of civil liberties. 
Admiral Turner, moreover, had allowed his deputy to lobby Congress for the 
legislation. 
Casey initiated a public relations offensive against the FOIA; in many 
of his public appearances, he talked about why the CIA could no longer 
tolerate it. During a speech in March of 1982, which was later reprinted as an 
essay in Presidential Studies Quarterly, he announced that "the presumption 
that all Government records should be accessible to the public, unless the 
Government can justify in detail a compelling national security rationale for 
withholding them, unwarrantedly disrupts the eff~ctive operation of an 
intelligence agency~"95 He did not explain that the CIA spent only a tiny 
fraction of its bt~dget on FOIA compliance, thq.t there were less than thirty 
employees assigned to process requests on a full-time basis, and that the 
93 Ibid. 
94 Ibid., 231. According to Persico, "[t]o Casey, the Freedom of Information 
Act was democracy turne.d on its head." Ibid., 290. 
95 William J. Casey, "The American Intelligence Community," Presidential 
Studies Quarterly 12, no. 2 (Spring 1982): 151. 
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Agency had never lost a FOIA lawsuit. Casey lashed out against the FOIA 
once again in a speech to the American Legion. "I question very seriously 
wh~ther a secret intelligence. agency and a Freedom of Information Act can 
coexist for very long," he proclaimed. 96 He told the audience that it was time 
to "[g]et rid of the Freedom of Information Act."97 No longer did the CIA 
want an exemption for their operational files; they now demanded a complete 
exemption from the FOIA. "Instead of nourishing paranoia," the New York 
Times complained, "Mr. Casey could ease those concerns by explaining to 
everyone how freedom of information really works."98 
Yet Casey knew exactly what he was doing. "Nourishing paranoia" 
helped win support from the American public, a tactic that had proven 
successful for him as Reagan's campaign manager in 1980. Although he 
complained that the media had "repeatedly distorted" his American Legion 
speech, he nonetheless re-iterated the "inherent incompatibility in applying 
an openness in government law to intelligence agencies whose missions must 
be carried out in secrecy."99 When read between the lines, Casey was 
essentially saying that he had no problem with the FOIA as long as it did not 
apply to the intelligence establishment. He recycled most of the arguments 
that Frank Carlucci had first used in 1979, emphasizing, for instance, that 
Congress was in charge of overseeing the CIA. He did not view the FOIA as 
an instrument of accountability, since he claimed that the CIA was already 
fully accountable to the intelligence committees. Casey even made reference 
96 
"Pious Deceptions," New York Times, 12 September 1982, E20. 
97 Ibid. 
98 Ibid. . 
99 William J. Casey, "Freedom of Information Harmful to the C. I. A.," New 
York Times, 1 October 1982, A30. 
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to Philip Agee's FOIA lawsuit by quoting a federal judge who called the case 
a "waste of resources."100 
At the same time Casey was lobbying the public to support changes to 
the FOIA, he was shrewd enough to understand that nothing could be done 
unless the Agency neutralized the ACLU. Although it is difficult to prove, it 
appears that. Casey's demand for a total exemption was a classic bargaining 
tactic. He had been a successful venture capitalist for most of his adult life, so 
he knew the importance of demanding more than you expect to receive 
during negotiations. In essence, when the CIA said that they would be 
willing to consider an exemption for the operational files, it appeared that 
they had made a concession. In reality, however, their proposal was 
comparable to the legislation introduced by Carlucci. The ACLU had 
effectively blocked the CIA's campaign in 1980, but Casey and Agency 
attorney Ernest Mayerfeld skillfully manipulated the organization. As Angus 
Mackenzie has documented, Mayerfeld met with Mark Lynch, then an ACLU 
attorney, in June .1982. Mayerfeld and Lynch established an informal 
agreement . at the meeting~ "the . ACLU would no long~r oppose the 
exemption, if, in return, the CIA would not seek to be totally exempt from the 
100 Judge Gerhardt Gesell quoted in ibid. The irony, of course, is that the CIA 
Information Act of 1984 continued to allow first-person FOIA requests. Since 
Agee was asking for information pertaining to him, the exemptions did not 
apply. See Philip Agee, On The Run (Secaucus, New Jersey: Lyle Stuart, 1987), 
42-44, 90-91, 331, 340. Frank Carlucci had used the same tactic in 1980. See 
. . 
George Lardner, Jr., "CIA Uses Agee Case In War On Freedom Of 
Information Act/' Washington Post, 15 March 1980, A2. Melvin Wult an 
attorney who represented Agee, claimed that the CIA was "working the Agee 
angle in order to destroy the Freedom.of Information Act." Ibid. 
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FOIA."101 The ACLU, in what is undoubtedly one of the most shameful 
moments in their history, reversed their earlier position. Rather than fighting 
the CIA's effort to gain a massive exemption from the FOIA, ACL U officials 
accepted its inevitability. Mayerfeld and Lynch kept in regular contact with 
each other after their initial compromise in June, and the following March 
they formalized the deal in the presence of Congressman Romano L. Mazzoli 
(Democrat-Kentucky).102 
Reports of the ACLU's negotiations with the CIA first surfaced in May 
1983/03 and on June 18, almost a year after Lynch and Mayerfeld had initially 
talked about the FOIA exemption, the Nation revealed that "the agency has 
convinced the American Civil Liberties Union to agree to exempt 'operational 
files' from the Freedom of Information Act. It's a dangerous exemption."104 
ACLU officials, however, denied the accusation, persuading the magazine to 
issue a "clarification" on July 2.105 Mackenzie soon discovered that the 
ACLU's denials were misleading, and he wrote a story about the ongoing 
negotiations between Lynch and Mayerfeld in late September. Observing 
101 Angus Mackenzie, Secrets: The CIA's War at Home (Berkeley and Los 
Angeles: University of California Press, 1997), 105; Mackenzie described the 
relationship between Lynch and Mayerfeld in the following way: "For eight 
years, while fighting against Mayerfeld in court over the FOIA, Lynch had 
grown to respect his opponent, despite the fact that the men seemed in every · 
respect such opposites-Mayerfeld, a shrewd, tough fireplug of a man; 
Lynch, tall anq fragile-looking with an unfortunately na'ivedemeanor. 
Lynch's idealism compelled him to follow his vision of what ought to be, 
while Mayerfeld was a crafter of opportunity, carefully exploiting each 
opening. Mayerfeld was expert at creating the impression that he might 
accommodate his opponent's desires-without ever doing so." Ibid., 113. 
102 Ibid., 106-107. 
103 Robert Pear, "C. I. A. Is Nearer Pact Qn Release Of Certain Files," New York 
Times, 30 May 1983, 1; Paul Taylor, "Limited Exemption For CIA Under FOIA 
Now Acceptable," Washington Post, 31 May.1983, A2. . 
104 
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that "the A. C. L. U. appears to have swallowed the C. I. A.'s 'trust us' 
argument/' he advised that "[the organization]. should tell Congress the deal 
i~ .off, and it should use its. influeru~e to kill the legislation."106 Morton 
. . 
Halperin and Allan Adler of the Center for National Security Studies rejected 
any suggestion that "the A. C. L. U. is being taken for a ride."107 They talked 
about a bill in the Senate (S. _1324) introduced by Senator Barry Goldwater 
(Republican-Arizona), but they made no reference to what was happening 
in the House of Representatives. Mackenzie has pointed out the ACLU's 
agreement "was with Congressman Mazzoli in the House. In the clever 
manner of a Capitol Hill insider, Halperin's denial was literally truthful, 
while being wholly misleading."108 Halperin and Adler, in other words, had 
parsed their words quite carefully .. 
Goldwater's.bill, which had been developed with assistance from the 
CIA and closely resembled Carlucci's legislation, began a long debate over 
the FOIA' s impact on the CIA. Agency officials had continued to argue that 
the FOIA helped explain why some foreigners were reluctant to assist them. 
When Casey testified in front of a Senate subcommittee, for instance, he 
claimed that at least two assets had recently quit because "they felt 
insecure."109 Yet Senator Leahy (Democrat-Vermont) pressed Casey to 
elaborate on how the examples he mentioned related to the FOIA, and the 
director conceded that he could not specifically blame the law: "Well, I can't 
106 Angus Mackenzie, "A C.I.A.-A.C.L.U. Deal?: The Operational Files 
Exemption," The Nation, 24 September ~983, 234; Mackenzie, Secrets, 115-116. 
107 Morton H. Halperin and Allan Adler, "There Is No Deal," The Nation, 24 
September 1983, 234. 
108 Mackenzie, Secrets, 116. 
109 Persico, 290. 
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say that. I can't say FOIA [is the reason]."11° Casey and his subordinates also 
readily admitted that they already could withhold information from FOIA 
requesters by invoking a variety of exemptions, something that Victor 
Navasky learned after he filed a FOIA request in 1976 for a list of all the 
books that had been published for the Agency prior to 1967. After the 
Agency rejected his request and subsequent appeal, he took them to court. 
The lawsuit dragged on for over five years, but the CIA ultimately prevailed 
when the Supreme Court refused to hear the case on appeal in October 1982. 
The Agency maintained that the documents that Navasky wanted had to be 
withheld to protect sources-presumably the authors and publishers of the 
books-and methods (e. g. the fact that the Agency engages in propaganda). 
Agency lawyers also claimed that releasing the book list, which was over 
fifteen-years old, would undermine national security, and "that its assertion 
on this matter need not be buttressed by evidence, even shown in camera."111 
Navasky was left to wonder "why the Director wants the C. I. A. exempted 
from a law that has yet to be seriously enforced against his agency."112 
The Agency had a flawless record in FOIA litigation, and Casey could 
not provide specific examples of agents who quit because they feared that a 
110 Ibid. 
tit VictorS. Navasky, "Why Sue The C.i.A.?,'; 26 October 1982, A29; the 
Supreme Court accepted a case involving a FOIA lawsuit against the CIA a 
few years later, ruling in favor of the Agency in 1985 (CIA v. Sims). The FOIA 
requester was seeking "the names of the institutions and individuals that had 
performed MKULTRA research." James X. Dempsey, "The CIA and Secrecy," 
in A Culture of Secrecy: The Government Versus The People's Right To Know, ed. 
A than G. Theoharis (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1998), 42. "As a 
result of the Sims case," says Dempsey, "the phrase 'sources and methods' 
[the B-3 exemption] has attained talismanic significance as grounds for 
withholding from the public information about the CIA. Protecting sources 
and methods trumps other values." Ibid., 44. 
112 Navasky, A29. 
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FOIA_ request would lead to their disclosure. When the Senate Intelligence 
Committee held hearings on the Goldwater bill in June 1983, _however, 
Deputy Director John McMahon explained that "[i]t is difficult to convince 
one who is secretly cooperating with us. that some day he will not awaken to 
find in aU. S. newspaper or magazine an article that identified him as aU. S. 
spy." 113 Rather than dwelling on the benefits that the exemption would 
provide the Agency, McMahon emphasized that the bill would significantly 
reduce the backlog of FOIA requests at the CIA. This would make it possible 
for the Agency to respond more quickly to journalists, scholars, and other 
FOIA requesters. Skeptics of the CIA remained unconvinced by McMahon's 
promises, and they were especially alarmed by the absence of judicial review 
in the Senate bill. Anna Kasten Nelson, a history professor who testified on 
J?ehalf of both the American Historical Asso~iation and the Organization of 
Ameri~an Historians, warned that the Agency might "place ever-increasing 
numbers of docum~nts in.file cabinets marked 'operational,' including those 
that might be merely embarrassing."114 Nelson was also one of the few 
observers to point out that the proposed exemption of operational files would 
be permanent. No matter how old these files were--whether three years old 
or thirty years old-they would be entirely exempt from FOIA requests.115 
Despite the concerns about the exemption, the Senate passed the bill 
by voice vote in November. The debate .over the FOIA then shifted to 
~13 McMahon quoted in ~'C. I. A. Seeks Protection Against Opening Files," 
New York Times, 22 June 1983, A16; McMahon made the same claim to a 
House subcommittee in February 1984. See "C~ I. A. Aide ComplC\ins Of . 
Deterrent to Agents," New York Times, 9 February 1984, A2. 
114 Nelson. quot~d in.Robert Pear, "C. I. A. Data. Access Runs Into Snags," New 
York Times, 4 September 1983, E16. · 
1151bid. .. . . 
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Congressman Mazzoli' s bill in the House.116 In February 1984, during an 
appearance in front of a subcommittee of the House Select Committee on 
Intelligence, McMahon repeated his assurance that the proposed legislation 
would improve the Agency's ability to process FOIA requests.117 
Congressiilan.Mazzoli asked him whether the Agency could be tempted in 
. . . 
the future to adopt a broad definition of .operational documents in order to 
stymi~ legitimate FOIA requests. "Yes . . . if we were prepared to do 
something that violated the spirit and the legality of the law, that would be 
possible," McMahon replied.118 Yet he promised that this would never 
happen; like Richard Helms, he believed that Agency employees were 
honorable men, and as a consequence, "[m]y firm belief is that .... there will 
not ever again be a repeat of the improprieties of the past."119 
Shockingly, the ACLU did not challenge the "trust-us" mentality of the 
CIA. In his prepared statement to the subcommittee, Lynch gave the 
impression that the legislation under consideration in the House was a good 
deal. "Only the operational files of the CIA's Directorate of Operations, 
Directorate of Science and Technology, and Office of Security will be exempt 
from search and review," he noted. "Thus, operational information located 
elsewhere in the Agency will be subject to search and review."120 But this 
116 Mazzoli introduced H. R. 3460, and Congressman Whitehurst introduced 
H. R. 4431. In March 1984, Mazzoli, Whitehurst, and two other Congressman 
introduced H. R. 5164, which was a compromise between the earlier versions. 
117 U. S .. House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Legislation of the 
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Legislation To Modify The 
ApJ?lication Of The Freedom of Information Act To The Central Intelligence Agency, 
98 Cong., 2d sess., 8 February 1984, 5, 14. 
118 Ibid., 15. 
119 Ibid., 14. 
120 Ibid., 39. 
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description reflected a glaring ignorance of the CIA's filing system, since few 
operational documents are found in the Directorate of Administration or the 
Directorate of Intelligence. It is true that final reports based on information 
gathered through espionage could still be requested through the FOIA, but 
this was very similar to what the CIA offered in 1979, a deal that the ACLU 
had justifiably opposed. 
Another House subcommittee held hearings on H. R. 5164, a revised 
version of two previous bills, in May. The ACLU predictably endorsed this 
bill, since "the delay in responding to requests will be reduced and no 
meaningful information which is currently released will be lost."121 Angus 
Mackenzie took issue with the ACLU's position, and he told the members of 
the subcommittee about his research on Operation MHCHAOS, the CIA 
domestic surveillance program in the 1960s and early 1970s. Although the 
House bill had specified that operational files must still be searched in the 
event that they were "the specific subject matter of an investigation by the 
intelligence committees of the [C]ongress, etc.," Mackenzie believed that this 
language was overly restrictive.122 In the mid-1970s, both the Church 
committee and the Rockefeller Commission had investigated Operation 
CHAOS, but since Congress "did not SPECIFICALLY inspect the agency's 
files on the underground press," the CIA had a "loophole" to reject any 
1
,
21 U.S. House of. Representatives, Subcommittee on Government 
Information, Justice, and Agriculture of the Committee on Government 
Operations, CIA Information Act: Hearing On H.R. 5164 To Amen.d The National 
Security Act of 1947 To Regulate Public Disclosure of In[ormation Held By the 
Central Intelligence Agency, and for Other Purposes, 98 Cong., 2d sess., 10 May 
1984 [hereafter cited as CIA Information Act], 41; Stephen Engelberg, "C. I. A. 
and A. C. L. U. Support Curb On Information," New York Times, 11 May 1984, 
A15. 
122 CIA Information Act, 84. 
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requests pertaining to the program.123 In fact, Ernest Mayerfeld 
acknowledged that Mackenzie's FOIA lawsuit might be thrown out if the 
legislation passed.124 "What the CIA needs is not this legislation to clear up 
. . 
its paperwork, but rather instructions from Congress that it must now comply 
with the FOIA/' Mackenzie told the subcommittee.125 Ralph McGehee, author 
of Deadly Deceits, had similar concerns about the legislation. He predicted 
that the Directorate of Operations (DO) would be able to claim an exemption 
for "some 80 to 90 percent'' of their records if the bill was approved.126 
The hearings in May were essentially a formality; only four members 
of the subcommittee bothered to attend. With the ACLU supporting H.R. 
5164, the protests from skeptics such as Mackenzie and McGehee could be 
ignored. The ACLU of Southern California soon complicated the situation by 
voting in June to fight against any legislation that would offer the CIA an 
exemption to the fOIA. In order to reduce the ~engthy backlog of requests at 
the CIA, the 22,000 member ACLU affiFate proposed that Congress should 
make it more difficult for the Agency to engage in "obstructive conduct."127 
One member of the affiliate complained that "[t]he New York and 
Washington offices of the A. C. L. U. seem to have become a part of the 
establishment. They have become comfortable with the Washington 
1231bid. . 
124 Ibid., 87-88. There were eleven other pending cases listed by the CIA. 
lbi&, 85. . 
125 Ibid., 88. After it became clear that Congressman Mazzoli would not allow 
the CIA to use the legislation to block pending litigation, Mackenzie received 
the Operation Chaos documents on May 15,1984. See Mackenzie, 117. 126 CIA Information Act, 89. · 
127 
"Policy Adopted by Executive Committee of the ACLU of Southern 
California on June 5, 1984," reprinted in ibid., 203. See also R. Samuel Paz 
and Ramona Ripston to Congressman Glenn English, 7 June 1984, reprinted 
in ibid., 201-202. 
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bureaucrats."128 The conflict within the ACLU became such a problem that 
Ira Glasser, the executive director of the organization, ordered a last minute 
review of the legislation in September.129 By that time, however, it was too 
late. When the bill came up for a vote on September 19, Congressman Ted 
Weiss went to the House floor, imploring his colleagues to oppose it. He had 
helped block the earlier attempt to exempt CIA operational files from the 
FOIA, but he was a voice crying in the wilderness in the fall of 1984. Only 35 
representatives joined him in voting against the bill.130 The following month 
Casey threw a party on the seventh floor of CIA headquarters to celebrate the 
CIA Information Act (Public Law 98-477). Three days later, President Reagan 
signed the law.131 He described the Information Act as "a small but important 
first step," anticipating that the relief it provided to the CIA "will become 
available to other agencies involved in intelligence, who also must protect 
their sources and methods and who likewise wish to avoid unnecessary and 
expensive paperwork."132 During the debate over the FOIA exemptions, 
128 Mae Churchill quoted in David Burnham, "The Increasing Dissent Within 
(he A. L. C. U. [sic]" New York Times, 14 August 1984, A16. . 
129 David Burnham, "A. C. L. U. Reviews Support of Information Bill," New 
York Times, 9 September 1984,24. 
130 Mackenzie, 117-118; George Lardner, Jr., "Measure Protecting CIA Files 
Blocked. In House," Washington Post, 18 September 1984, A4; "Shielding CIA 
Files," Washington Post, 20 September 1984, A3; "House Approves A Bill 
Restricting C. I. A. Files," New York Times, 20 September 1984, B22. The final 
vote was 369-36. 
131 Woodward, 383-384. 
132 
"Statement on Signing the Central Intelligence Agency Information Act, 15 
October 1984, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Ronald Reagan, 
1984, Book II-June 30 to December 31,1984 (Washington, DC: Government 
Printing Office, 1987), 1541. 
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c;ntics worried that the administration would not stop with the CIA. It turned 
out that their concerns were justified.133 
In fairness to. the ACLU, they honestly believed that the CIA 
Information Act would dramatically cut down the backlog of FOIA requests 
at Langley. Once Congress passed H. R. 5164, Casey promised the House 
Intelligence Committee that "the Agency will establish a specific program 
designed to substantially reduce, if not entirely eliminate, the current two-to-
three year backlog of Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests."134 He 
also pledged not to reduce the funding allocated to FOIA compliance for two 
years.135 Anyone who has filed a FOIA request with the Agency since 1984 
can attest that these commitments were not kept. Not only does the backlog 
re:i:nain a problem, McGehee's prophesy about DO files turned out to be 
accurate. According to James X. Dempsey, an expert on FOIA litigation, "it 
has become much more difficult, if not impossible, for FOIA requesters to 
obtain anything involving a program that was once in this directorate."136 
Moreover, one of the provisions in the Information Act requires the CIA to 
review exempted files every ten years. Congress expected that the 
exemptions might be removed for some older documents, and although this 
did happen during the first decennial review, the Agency actually 
1;33 Jeffrey T; Richelson, "Holding Back: How Agencies Thwart The Freedom 
Of Information Act," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 59 (November/December 
2003): 29-30. . 
134 William J. Casey to Congressman Edward P. Boland, 27 April1984, 
reprinted in U.S. House of Representatives, Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency Information Act, 98th Cong., 2d sess., 1 
May 1984, H. Rep. 98-726: Part I, 12-13. 
135 Ibid., 13. 
136 Dempsey, 48. 
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undermined the public's right to know by increasing the number of files 
placed off-iimits to FOIA requests in 2005.137 
Remarkably, despite all of his efforts to undermine historical 
scholarship on the CIA, William Casey continued to take steps that portrayed 
the CIA as an open institution. In 1985 he established the Historical Review 
J'rogram, but in a fitting tribute to Casey's obsession with secrecy, this 
program did not result in the de-classification of any CIA records until 1989, 
two years after Casey died of brain cancer .138 
137 1bid., 49; Steven Aftergood, "CIA Expands Operational File Secrecy," 
Secrecy News, 19 April 2006. 
138 
"Long-Secret History of C. I. A. Sheds Light on Battles Over Authority," 
New York Times, 28 November 1989, AlB. 
CHAPTER VII 
THE RISE & FALL OF THE 
NEW ERA OF OPENNESS AT THE CIA 
A popular government without popular information or 
the means of acquiring it is but a prologue to a farce or a tragedy 
or perhaps both.-J ames Madison (1822)1 
If you want a secret respected, see that it's respectable in 
the first place.-Daniel Patrick Moynihan (1996)2 
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Secrecy in Governm~nt is fundamentally anti-democratic, perpetuating 
bureaucratic errors. Open debate and discussion of public issues are vital to 
our national health.-Justice Hugo Black (New York Times v. United States, 
1971)3 
There's a big difference between openrzess and P.R.; 
what we've got here is P. R.-Steven Aftergood4 
Public relations at the CIA did not die with William Casey. If 
anything, his successors improved and expanded the PR initiative. William 
Webster used public relations to rehabilitate the Agency's image in the 
aftermath of Iran-Contra; in 1992, with the Cold War over, Robert Gates 
promised a new era of openness to assuage the concerns of CIA critics; R. 
James Woolsey and John Deutch reached out to Hollywood to ensure a more 
positive portrayal of the CIA in popular culture; and George Tenet embraced 
PR to protect the Agency's legendary mystique. Like Stansfield Turner in the 
1 Warren F. Kimball, "Openness and the CIA," Studies In Intelligence, no. 10 
(Winter-Spring 2001): 65. 
2 Ibid., 66. 
3 U.S. House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Government Information, 
Justice, and Agriculture of the Committee on Government Operations/ CIA 
Information Act: Hearing On H.R. 5164 To Amend The National Security Act of 
1947 To Regulate Public Disclosure of Information Held By the Central Intelligence 
Agency, and for Other Purposes, 98th Cong;, 2d sess., 10 May 1984 [hereafter 
cited as CIA Information Act], "Statement of Charles S. Rowe," 63. 
4 Aftergood quoted in Elaine Sciolino, "Cameras Are Being Turned On A 
Once-Shy Spy Agency," New York Times, 6 May 2001, 36. 
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late 1970s, all of these directors portrayed the CIA as an open institution. 
Gates and Woolsey even expressed a willingness to de-classify CIA records 
on covert operations. But in the final analysis, the "culture of secrecy" at 
Langley prevailed. The reforms at the CIA between 1987 and 2007-most 
notably the de-classification of millions of pages of documents-were 
primarily the result of intervention from historians, Congress, and the White 
House. 
After William Casey resigned in early 1987, it appeared for a time that 
his loyal deputy, Robert Michael Gates, would be the next CIA director. 
However, because of the ongoing controversy surrounding Iran-Contra, 
Gates withdrew his name from consideration and FBI Director William 
Hedgcock Webster got the job instead. The new director continued to utilize 
public relations during the final years of the Cold War. As Stansfield Turner 
had done a decade earlier, Webste:r:· brought an outside PR specialist to 
Langley. Bill Baker, who had perfected his craft at the FBI, re-invigorated the 
CIA's public affairs division before handing the position over in 1989 to 
James Greenleaf, a fellow G-man.5 In 1991, according to an internal report, 
public affairs fielded 3,369 telephone calls from the media, delivered 174 
background briefings, and scheduled 164 interviews with high-ranking CIA 
5 ArthurS. Hulnick, "Openness: Being Public About Secret Intelligence," 
International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 12, no. 4 (Winter 
1999): 469-470; Ronald Kessler, Inside The CIA: Revealing the Secrets of the 
World's Most Powerful Spy Agency (New York: Pocket Books, 1992), 222-227, 
232-235~ "When Baker took over the CIA's public affairs in June 1987," says 
Kessler, "he found that much of the good work Herb Hetu had accomplished 
under Turner had been torpedoed by Casey." Ibid., 224. 
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officials.6 Webster helped repair the damage that Casey had inflicted on the 
CIA's image, and unlike his predecessor, he managed to keep himself out of 
the headlines. 
But as Webster distanced himself from Casey's recklessness, the CIA 
continued its irrational obsession with secrecy. In 1989, for instance, the State 
Department's historical division released a volume in the Foreign Relations of 
the United States (FRUS) series th~t focused on American foreign policy in Iran 
between 1952 and 1954. Since the CIA refused to release documents on the 
toppling of Muhammad Mossadegh in 1953, the FRUS volume did not even 
mention the event. Diplomatic historians were outraged by the omission, 
arguing that the American role in the Shah's coup had been previously 
disclosed in the memoirs of Kermit Roosevelt, the CIA man who helped 
execute the mission. Warren Cohen, the chairperson of the historical 
advisory committee at the State Department, resigned in protest the following 
February. Cohen characterized the volume on Iran as "a fraud," and he 
described the inherent danger of "an overly elaborate, costly declassification 
process that encourages distortion and coverup."7 
.Senators Claiborne Pell (Democrat-Rhode Island), David Boren 
(Democrat-Oklahoma), and Jesse Helms (Republican-North Carolina) 
6 Members of Task Force on Greater CIA Openness to Gates, "Task Force 
Report on Greater CIA Openness," 20 December 1991, http://www.cia-on-
campus.org/foia/paOl.html (accessed March 24,.2006), 6. 
7 Warren I. Cohen," At The State Dept., Historygate/' New York Times, 8 May 
1990, A29; "History Bleached At State," New York Times, 16 May 1990, A26; for 
a superb overview of the background to Cohen's resignation and its 
complicated aftermath, see Page Putnam Miller, "We Can't Yet Read Our 
Own Mail: Access to the Records of the Department of State," in A Culture of 
Secrecy: The Government Versus The People's Right To Know, ed. Athan G. 
Theoharis (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1998), 186-210. 
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responded. with a legislative proposal to bring greater oversight to the 
publication of the FRUS.8 Senator Helms summarized the bi-partisan co~cem 
about the government's de-classification procedures when he complained: 
"too much about our foreign policy is hidden for too long from public 
~crutiny." 9 Congress eventually passed Public Law 102-138 in 1991 to change 
how the State Department compiled and published the FRUS. As historian 
Warren Kimball has explained, the legislation established a new advisory 
committee that had the power to "kick open the doors, look at the records, 
and then raise holy hell when it concluded that the bureaucrats were 
withholding 30-year-old secrets without a legitimate 'national security' 
reason .... "10 Not only did PL 102-138 establish a thirty-year rule for 
document de-classification, it also required government agencies like the CIA 
to share information with the State Department's history staff. The law was a 
stunning rebuke to the CIA's clandestine mindset. 
When Webster stepped down in1991, President George H. W. Bush 
boldly decided to replace him with Gates. The confirmation process was 
brutal. A group of Gates's colleagues testified that he intentionally 
politicized intelligence while running the Agency's analytical division 
between 1982 and 1986. According to Melvin Goodman, a retired CIA 
analyst,, Casey and. Gates had selectively used analysis to support 
"operational commitments" in Central America, Afghanistan, and the Middle 
East, while simultaneously manipulating the evidence to present a more 
8 Miller, 195; Kimball, 66-67. 
9 Helms quoted in Miller, 199. 
10 Kimball, 66-67. 
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pessimistic interpretation of the Soviet Union.11 CIA veteran Harold Ford 
substantiated Goodman's accusations, arguing that Gates's actions went 
"beyond professional bounds and clearly constitute a skewing of intelligence, 
not in the fields of military and strategic issues, but chiefly concerning Soviet 
political matters and the Soviets and the Third World."12 Gates, in other 
word,s, only interfered with CIA analysts in certain situations. As former CIA 
~nalyst Jennifer L. Glaudemans explained at the hearings, "politicization is 
like fog .. Though you cannot hold it in your hand or nail it to the wall, it is 
real. It does exist. And it does affect people's behavior."13 Gates adamantly 
denied the accusations, and the Senate ultimately confirmed his nomination. 
Even before the controversy over the alleged politicization began, 
however, Gates promised the senators on the intelligence committee that he 
intended to make the CIA more accessible to Congress and the American 
public. He acknowledged that Langley continued to have an image problem, 
and from his perspective, "changing perceptions first requires greater 
openness by the Agency."14 As the opposition to his nomination mounted, 
Gates repeated his promise of increased openness, even writing Senator Sam 
Nunn (Democrat-Georgia) a letter in which he described his strategy for 
11 U.S. Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, Nomination of Robert M. 
Gates, To Be Director of Central Intelligence, 102d Cong., JB1 sess., 3 vols. 
(Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1992), 11:143. 
12 Ibid., 193. 
13 Ibid., 261; see also Angus Mackenzie, Secrets: The CIA's War at Home 
(Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1997), 183. 
14 Nomination of Robert M. Gates, To Be Director of Central Intelligence, 1:444; for 
Gates's assessment of the confirmation process in 1991, see Robert M. Gates, 
From The Shadows: The Ultimate Insider's Story of Five Presidents and How They 
Won the Cold War (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996), 545-552. . 
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leading the CIA into the post-Cold War world.15 There was obviously an 
element of self-interest involved in Gates's proposals for the future; in fact, he 
admitted to committee members that the Agency had to evolve in order to 
justify its existence: "CIA and U.S. intelligence must change, and be seen to 
change, or confront irrelevance and growing sentiment for their 
dismahtlement.1' 16 
On November 18, 1991, just six days after he was sworn-in as CIA 
director, Gates sent a memo to his director of public affairs, Joseph R. 
DeTrani, requesting the establishment of a task force to examine the Agency's 
existing policies on openness. Gates wanted the group to complete its study 
by December 20, asking them to formulate "additional proposals for making 
more information about the Agency available to .the American people and to 
give greater transparency to our organization .... "17 DeTrani wasted no time 
in assembling· what became known as the Task Force on Greater CIA 
Openness. Four days later he reported to Gates that a task force of seven CIA 
officials had been formed with himself as chairperson, noting that the group 
planned "to meet with John Scali of ABC, Jack Nelson of The Los Angeles 
15 Gates, 551. . . . . . 
16 Nomination of Robert M. Gates, To Be Director of Central Intelligence, 1:444; for 
backg:round on th~hearings, seel~ich(,rr.~ L. Berke, "Bradley Goes.One-on:' 
One With Gates," New York Times, 18 September 1991, A14; Elaine Sciolino, 
'~Gates Almost a Side Issue in Hearings," New York Times, 1 October 1991, . 
A19; and "Excerpts From Senate Hearing on Nomination of C. I. A. Chief," 
New York Times, 2 October 1991, A16. . . 
17 Robert M. Gates to Joseph R. DeTrani, "Greater CIA Openness," 18 
November 1991. Released by the CIAto the author on November 29,2005. 
This memo had been previously de-classified in response to a FOIA request; 
Mackenzie, 184. 
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Times, Dav:id Ignatius of the Washington Post, and Jerry Seib of The Wall 
Street Journal, and others."18 · 
The task force first met on November 25, and during this session, they 
I · •. ' 1 
started to· brainstorm ideas. Although it remains unclear ~hether De Trani 
and his colleagues were aware of the recommendations that a simil~r ad hoc 
group had offered to William. Colby sixteen years earlier, they developed 
suggestions that sounded much the same. For instance, the task force advised 
that it would be useful to seek outside assistance in defending the CIA. Not 
only should the Agency "get our customers to speak for us on the value of 
our work/product," the members wanted to "do more with and through 
professional organizations."19 They also believed that the Agency must 
"aggressively respond to 'cheap shots' by the media with op-ed pieces or 
letters to the editor and if they aren't printed, work [the response] into public 
statement by DCI."20 
The task force solicited comments on the their project from both 
insiders and outsiders. During the first week of December, they held 
discussions with Agency employees, and at their second meeting, the group 
listened intently to an invited guest named George Tenet, then staff director 
18 Joseph R. De Trani to Gates, "Task Forces on Greater CIA Openness and 
Internal Agency Communication," 22 November 1991, p. 1. Released by the 
CIA to the author on November 29, 2005. This memo had been previously 
de-classified in response to a FOIA request. With the exception of De Trani's, 
all of the names of task force participants are redacted from the document. 
Ibid., 1. A task force on Internal Agency Communication was established at 
the same time, but the group had different members. John Hedley became its 
chairperson. Ibid., 2. 
19 Joseph R. De Trani to Gates, "Report of First Meeting of Task Force on 
Greater CIA Openness," 26 November 1991. Released by the CIA to the 
author on November 29, 2005. This memo had been previously de-classified 
in response to a FOIA request. 
20 Ibid. 
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for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI), DeTrani told Gates in 
a detailed memo that Tenet provided them with several "admonitions"; of the 
ten that DeTrani listed, the first was undoubtedly the most significant: "keep 
the mystique-we could lose if we are perceived as an ordinary bureaucracy 
(in resource game and in public image)."21 Instead of de-mystifying their 
clandestine activities, in other words, Tenet encouraged them not to sacrifice 
the CIA's mystique. This recommendation unwittingly highlighted the 
fundamental contradiction of CIA public relations since the "Year of 
Intelligence" in that the Agency had consistently viewed openness in terms of 
self-preservation rather than the public's right to know. "[G]ive the public a 
better understanding of what [the CIA does], the quality of [CIA] people and 
the risks they take," Tenet advised," ... keep openness institutional rather 
than issue:-oriented."22 In keeping with this sycophantic tone, he observed 
"that Doug MacEachin, Bob Blackwell and George Kolt are the 'best show in 
town' on the Soviet Union and should be seen and heard more widely."23 
Tenet further advised the Agency to reach out to academics by possibly re-
evaluating classification rules and "packaging information on former denied 
areas to get some credit for past efforts."24 As the staff director of the senate 
21 Joseph R. DeTrani to Gates, "Task Force on Greater CIA Openness - Week 
Two," 6 December 1991, p. 1. Released by th~ CIA to the author onNovember 
29, 2005. This memo had been previously de-classified in response to a FOIA 
request. 
22 Ibid., 2; Angus Mackenzie contends that '"[o]penness' [for Gates] meant 
adopting a well-crafted public relations scheme aimed at the most important 
opinion makers in the nation." Mackenzie, 187. 
23 Joseph R. DeTrani to Gates, "Task Force on Greater CIA Openness - Week 
Two," 1. 
24 Ibid. De Trani outlined additional recommendations from Tenet in his 
memo: "whatever path we pursue on openness, be consistent ... if we aren't 
consistent, o-q.r efforts could be seen as manipulation or politicization"; 
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oversight committee, Tenet had a responsibility to ensure the CIA's 
accountability to Congress. Yet his recommen~ations were dominated by a 
focus on PR, eerily foreshadowing his tenure at the CIA. 
In the week following Tenet's visit, officials on the task force kept a 
busy schedule. They journeyed to Washington Post headquarters for a 
meeting; they listened to presentations from CIA officials; and they had 
conversations with scholars, retired CIA director Richard Helms, and 
reporters such as Wolf Blitzer and Doyle McManus.25 After gathering at least 
twice to discuss their findings, the group submitted their final report to Gates 
on December 20 for his review. On the second page of this document, the 
authors borrowed several of Tenet's ideas without attributing them to him, 
advising Gates to "preserve the mystique."26 The following page of the report 
was reminiscent of the "Telling the Intelligence Story" memo that had been 
sent to Colby in 1975. "We have an important story to tell," the task force 
announced, "a story that bears repeating. We are the most open intelligence 
agency in the world which is proper in our form of democracy."27 Yet despite 
this pre-existing openness, they worried, "many Americans do not 
understand the inteHigence process and the role of intelligence in national 
security policymaking. Many still_operate with a romanticized or erroneous 
"admit when we are wrong and work to find ways to cover dissent in our 
product''; "recognize the dilemma in the intelligence success/policy failure 
sequence and how to deal with that as an e;xecutive branch agency"; and "be 
excellent in what we do in public." Ibid. 
2~ Joseph R. DeTrani to Gates, "Task Force on Greater CIA Openness - Week 
Three," 13 December 1991. Released by the OA to the author o:h November 
29, 2005. This memo had been previously de-classified in response to a FOIA 
request. · 
26 Members of Task Force on Greater CIA Openness to Gates, "Task Force 
Report on Greater CIA Openness," 2. 
27 Ibid., 3.. . 
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view of intelligence from the movies, TV, books and newspapers."28 In 
essence, the report suggested that only the positive elements of the CIA 
mystique were wort;h protecting. 
The Task Force on Greater CIA Openness described for Gates a variety 
of "steps we can take which will benefit us and the American people," 
offering him a total of 30 recommendations to either approve. or reject.29 The 
media should be a top priority for the PublicAffairs Office, the task force 
concluded, and they believed it would be beneficial to "[p]rovide more 
background briefings, when practical, to a greater number of print and 
electronic media journalists" and to encourage the media to interview top 
CIA officia~s.30 Their report then mentioned the possibility of allowing 
reporters to do ."individual profiles" on CIA employees to "help personalize 
the world of intelligence in broad circulation newspapers or magazines," 
which might also demonstrate "the growing number of women and 
minorities in each directorate and increasingly in more senior positions."31 
Gates accepted almost all of the ideas for improving media relations, telling 
DeTrani that "[c]areful records should be kept of such contacts (with the 
press]."32 In responding to proposals outlined in another section of the report, 
Gates supported the production of more PR-type material, expr_essed an 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid., 7. 
31 Ibid., 8. 
32 Robert M. Gates, "Task Force Report on Greater CIA Openness," 6 January 
1992, p. 2. Released by the CIA to the author on November 29,2005. This 
memo had been previously de-classified in response to a FOIA request. Gates 
prohibited his subordinates from offering "groups of reporters unclassified 
background briefings when there is a major international event'' unless given 
approval from him. Ibid., 3; Mackenzie, 186-187. . 
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interest in making television appearances, and agreed that "[t]he Agency's 
briefing program for the full range of potential audiences should be expanded 
as opportunities arise."33 
For anyone familiar with the history of CIA public relations, it is 
obvious that the majority of recommendations in the report were not new. 
The task force apparently thought they had developed a new idea when they 
advised Gates to invite CEOs to Langley for seminars, but in reality, Casey 
and other CIA directors had previously encouraged such visits.34 Moreover, 
the speaker's bureau that Herbert Hetu initiated over a decade earlier was 
revived prior to Gates's arrival, and according to the task force, Agency 
employees had made over sixty public appearances in 1991. Accepting the 
report's advice, Gates called for the program to be expanded.35 In addition to 
reviewing the recommendations that were approved in January 1992, it is 
important to consider those that were rejected. Generally speaking, Gates 
viewed the program as a chance to sell the Agency's image to a wide 
audience. He concurred with the task force "that our objective is to make CIA 
and the intelligence process more visible and understandable rather than to 
seek inevitably incomplete or unattainable openness on specific substantive 
issues."3~ When translated into practice, this mentality helps to explain why 
Gates did not approve a recommendation to enco_urage the intelligence 
33 Robert M. Gates, "Task Force Report on Greater CIA Openness," 6 January 
1992, p. 2. Gates also supported the attempt to publish an anthology of 
selected articles from the CIA's in-house journal, Studies In Intelligence. Ibid. 
34 Members of Task Force on Greater CIA Openness to Gates, "Task Force 
Report on Greater CIA Openness," 12; Mackenzie, 187. 
35 Robert M. Gates, "Task Force Report on Greater CIA Openness," 6 January 
1992, p. 4. 
36 1bi.d., 1; see also Mackenzie, 184. 
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committees to "issue an unclassified annual report on the performance of the 
Intelligence Community."37 Gates wanted better PR, not accountability. 
Less than a week after Gates issued his assessment of the task force's 
report, Elaine Sciolino broke the story on the front page of the New York 
Times.38 DeTrani sent a memo to Gates about the article on the following day. 
"Given the fact that Sciolino insisted on running this story now despite my 
best efforts to convince her to hold off," he wrote, "I think the story is about 
as good as we could have hoped for." 39 DeTrani was most likely hoping to 
keep the task force's existence under wraps until Gates could publicly 
announce the CIA's new policy on openness. In a speech to the Oklahoma 
Press Association on February 21, 1992, about five weeks after Sciolino's 
article, Gates formally outlined his strategy. At the beginning of the talk, he 
jokingly compared his situation to the scene in Indiana ]one~ and the Last 
Crusade (1989) where Jones must cross.to the other side of a. deep canyon o~ 
faith alone. "I will now step out into,that chasm [of credibili.ty] on faith," he 
said, "the faith that what I have to say will persuade you of our seriousness of 
purpose and action."40 Although Gates acknowledged that there had been 
previous attempts at greater openness, he noted that "all of this took place 
against a backdrop of over9ll continuing and undifferentiated secrecy .... 
37 Members of Task Force on Greater CIA Openness to Gates, "Task Force 
Report on Greater CIA Openness," p. 11. 
38 Elaine Sciolino,uPanel From C. I. A. Urges Curtailing Of .Agency Secrecy," 
New York Times, 12 January 1992, A1; Michael Isikoff, "CIA Task Force Urges 
Speedier De<;lassifications," Washington Post, 13 January 1992, Al. 
39 DeTrani to Gates, "RE: Stories on Openness Task Force," 13 January 1992. 
Released by the CIA to the author on November29, 2005. _This memo had 
been previously de-classified in response to a FOIA request. 
40 Robert M. Gates, "CIA And Openness," Oklahoma Press Association, 21 
February 1992, p. 2. Released by the CIA to the author on November 29, 2005. 
This memo had been previously de-classified in response to aFOIA request. 
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[t]his is going to change."41 He focused on three aspects of the task force 
report-the media, academia, and de-classification policies-and assured the 
audience "that these measures, taken together, represent a real shift on CIA's 
part toward greater openness and sense of'public responsibility."42 
By proclaiming greater openness at the CIA, Gates won excellent 
' ' 
publicity for the.Agency. His promise to de-classify more documents was 
especially well received at the time~. Yet the praise quickly turned into 
embarrassment when Agency officials refused to show the press a copy of the 
Task Force Report On Greater CIA Openness.43 The Center for National 
Security Studies at the ACLU soon filed a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) 
request for the document, but the FOIA office ruled that "[it] must be 
withheld in its entirety."44 Gates would later contend that the report had 
been withheld initially "because some of the people who signed it were under 
cover."45 This explanation was somewhat misleading. On March 18, Gary 
Foster, DeTrani's replacement at public affairs, told a Congressional 
committee that in addition to the names of the signers, other information in 
the report had to remain classified. He claimed that the unclassified sections 
41 Ibid., 11. -
42 1bid., 25; for coverage of the speech in the press, see "CIA May Lift Its Veil," 
Houston Chronicle, 22 February 1992, A1; George Lardner, Jr., "Gates Acts to 
Promote CIA Openness," Washington Post, 22 February 1992, A4. 
43 De Trani told Angus Mackenzie on January 14 that the report had to remain 
classified, since Gates had not finished reviewing it. In reality, as Mackenzie 
observes, Gates had completed this review eight days earlier. See Mackenzie, 
186. 
44 George Lardner, Jr., "CIA Report On Openness Oassified Secret," 
Washington Post, 23 April1992, Al. 
45 Handwritten note from Gates to Congressman Lee H. Hamilton, 13 April 
1992. Released by the CIA to the author on November 29, 2005. This 
document had been previously de-classified in response to a FOIA request. 
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"wouldn'.t mean much to anybody."46 Gates, however, ultimately overruled 
Foster, and in early April, he de:-classified the internal study and his memo of 
January 6, choosing simply to redact the relevant names while allowing most 
everything else to become public. 
After looking over the recommendations of the task force, an ACLU 
official dismissed the report as little more than "an internal discussion of how 
we [the CIA] can get people to like us."47 Steven Aftergood, editor of the 
Secrecy & Government Bulletin [now Secrecy News], had previously quipped 
that the CIA was "invulnerable to irony."48 For why else would the Agency 
classify as secret a study on greater openness to the public? CIA officials 
moflt likely were worried about disclosing aspects of the report that evaluated 
previous PR efforts. In the section on the media, for example, the authors of 
the study boasted that the "PAO [Public Affairs Office] now has relationships 
with reporters from every major wire service, newspaper, news weekly, and 
television network in the nation. This has helped us tum some 'intelligence 
failure' stories into 'intelligence success' stories .... "49 They observed that 
"[i]n many instances, we have persuaded reporters to postpone, change, hold, 
or even scrap stories that could have adversely affected national security 
46 Foster quoted in Lardner, "CIA Report On Openness Classified Secret," A1; 
Mackenzie, 186. 
47 Leslie Harris quoted in Lardner, "CIA Report On Openness Classified 
Secret," A1. · 
48 Secrecy & Government Bulletin, no. 7 (February 1992). Aftergood also . 
remarked that "[t]he major change is that Director Gates is on TV a lot more, 
and has testified at several open Congressional hearings." He cited one · 
source as describing the openness· policy as 'media puffery.' Ibid. 
49 Members of Task Force on Greater CIA Op_enness to Gates, "Task Force 
Report on Greater CIA Openness," 6;see also Lardner, "CIA Report On 
Openness Classified Secret," Al. 
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interests or jeopardized sources and methods."50 The report also mentioned 
that public affairs routinely mailed material to around 700 professors, held bi-
annual events at Langley for college administrators, and was then in the 
pro.cess of "building a database of information about Agency contacts with 
academia: ... "51 
Three days before Gates announced the new policy in Tulsa, DeTrani 
issued an update on what had been accomplished so far. He informed his 
boss that a video entitled "In America's Interest" was nearing completion; 
that briefings for the press had been expanded (twenty-eight during the 
month of January); and that planning was underway for CEOs to tour the 
CIA.52 DeTrani's office had also hosted several guest speakers, including an 
astonishing visit from Norman Mailer.53 Even though Mailer had once 
accused the CIA qf manipulating ~he stock exchange and eviscerating 
' A.mericart radicalism, he published a book about the Agency in 1991 called 
•. ? 
Harlot's Ghost that depicted the Agency as "a company of the elegant, secretly 
gathered to fight a war so noble that one could and must be ready to trudge 
for years through the mud and the pits.'' 54 During his promotion of the epic 
novel, which totaled over 1,200 pages, Mailer did not hesitate to share his 
personal views of the CIA. "I could have been in the CIA," he remarked. 
50 Members of Task Force on Greater CIA Openness to Gates, "Task Force 
Report on Greater CIA Openness," 6; Mackenzie, 185. 
51 Members of Task Force on Greater CIA Openness to Gates, "Task Force 
Report on Greater CIA Openness," 8. 
52 Joseph R. De Trani to Gates, "Progress Report on 
Actions/Recommendations Relating to the DCI Task Force Report on Greater 
CIA Openness," 18 February 1992. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Mary V. Dearborn, Mailer: A Biography (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1999), 
409. 
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"And I probably would have been pretty good at it."55 He also condemned 
his participation in the Fifth Estate, telling Vanity Fair "I cringe when I think 
of the name now."56 Then, shortly before the nineteenth anniversary of his 
Four Seasons debacle, Mailer visited CIA headquarters, delivered a speech, 
and met with top CIA officials in Robert Gates's conference room. The size of 
the audience was comparable to the turnout in 1973, but unlike the apathetic 
party guests, the CIA employees were thrilled with the speech, offering 
Mailer "standing ovations several times."57 In his speech inside the "the 
Bubble," Mailer announced that the Agency should assassinate Saddam 
Hussein. He emphasized the importance of espionage in the aftermath of the 
Cold War. "Now that the cold war is over," he observed, "the C. I. A. can get 
out of the beartrap of ideology and begin to provide serious and needed 
intelligence on the rest of the world."58 
In addition to the obvious PR component of Gates's new policy, 
scholars were promised a radically different approach to the de-classification 
of CIA records. The task force had outlined a proposal to "[e]stablish a senior-
led, Agency-wide group to review the Agency's policy and practices related 
to declassification and release of records under the Historical Review and 
FOIA ·progr~ms . . . . with a view to accelerating ¢-e process," and they 
followed this wit;h a recommendation to de-classify "historical materials on 
specific events, particularly those which are repeatedly the subject of false 
allegations, such as the 1948 Italian Elections, 1953 Iranian Coup, 1954 
55 Ibid., 410. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Ibid., 414; Elaine Sciolino, "Mailer Visits C. I. A. and Finds He's in Friendly 
Territory. Really," New York Times, 3 February 1992, A10. 
58 Sciolino, A10. 
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Guatemalan Coup, 1958 Indonesian Coup and the Cuban Missile Crisis in 
1962."59 In his speech to the Oklahoma Press Association, he confessed "that 
the results of our historical review program have been quite meager-the 
consequences of low priority, few resources, and rigid agency policies and 
procedures heavily biased toward denial of declassification."60 Gates, 
however, selected his words very carefully that evening. He announced "a 
new approach" to increase the number of records de-classified, but in the 
same sentence, he added an important caveat: the program would abide by 
the CIA Information Act of 1984.61 This meant that operational records would 
be exempt from the review process. 
Of all the records that the task force listed for possible de-classification, 
Gates only approved the release of documents pertaining to the Cuban 
Missile Crisis. CIA officials organized a conference at Langley on the missile 
crisis to commemorate its thirtieth anniversary, and during this event, "[the 
Agency] issued a handsomely printed volume of documents tracing the 
history of the crisis."62 As James X. Dempsey has observed, however, it was 
59 Members of Task Force on Greater CIA Openness to Gates, "Task Force 
Report on Greater CIA Openness," 3-4. 
60 Robert M. Gates, "CIA And Openness," Oklahoma Press Association, 21 
February 1992, p. 20. 
61 Ibid. For background on the law, see "Archive Calls on CIA and Congress 
to Address Loophole Shielding CIA Records From the Freedom of 
Information Act," The National Security Archive,l5 October 2004, 
http:/ /www.gwu.eduf,..,nsarchiv /NSAEBB/NSAEBB138/ (accessed May 25, 
2006). 
62 James X. Dempsey, "The CIA and Secrecy," in A Culture of Secrecy: The 
Government Versus The People's Right To Know, ed. Athan G. Theoharis 
(Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1998), 53; Nick Cullather, Secret 
History: The CIA's Classified Account Of Its Operations In Guatemala, 1952-1954 
(Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1999), xii; Karl E. Meyer, 
"Inside the C. I. A~: A Bit of Sunlight on the Missile Crisis," New York Times, 
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not accidental that the CIA selected the missile crisis as the subject of its 
inaugural symposium; after all, the Agency's handling of the nuclear standoff 
is widely considered to be one of its finest moments.63 Given the obvious PR 
concerns about accentuating the positive, the Agency hierarchy rejected a 
plan to hold a conference on the Team B ,episode.64 Such an event would 
inevitably raise questions about the politicization of intelligence, a topic that 
Gates and his subordinates most likely wanted to avoid. 
R. James Woolsey, who served as President Bill Clinton's first CIA 
director from February 1993 through January 1995, attempted to cultivate the 
support of the American public using the same techniques as Gates. In order 
to more effectively convey the CIA message during television interview~ and 
other public appearances, he even lll,red a PR consultant to provide pointers 
on public speaking.65 He told Congress that he would continue the openness 
initiative, promising a "warts and all" approach to the de-classification of 
older documents.66 In September 1993, he testified about plans to release 
documents '?n several covert operations from the Cold War. The CIA would 
:r:nove forward with Gates's "plans tq declassify records on the Bay of Pigs 
24 October 1992, 22; Zachary Karabell, "CIA Clings to Secrecy," Christian 
Science Monitor,.23 February 1993, 18. 
63 Dempsey, 54. 
64 Cullather, xii. 
65 Charles Fenyvesi, "Washington Whispers," U.S. News & World Report, 22 
August 1994, 22; for background on Woolsey, see Michael R. Gordon, 
"Campus Activist to Insider: Journey of the C. I. A. Nominee," New York 
Times, 11 January 1993, A1; for the details of Woolsey's troubled relationship 
with the Clinton White House, see Tim Weiner, "Tension With White House 
Leaves C. I. A. Chief Out In The Cold," New York Times, 25 December 1993, 
A10. 
66 Douglas J ehl, "C. I. A. Releases Files on Korea and Cold War," New York 
Times, 1 October 1993, A7; Tim Weiner, "C. I. A. Opening Files On Cold War 
R.ole," New York Times, 29 August 1993, A7. 
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operation, the coups against President Arbenz of Guatemala and. against 
Prime Minister Mossadeq in Iran, and operations in the Dominican Republic 
and the Congo," said Woolsey, and another six operations would be added to 
the list: "France and Italy in the 1940s and 1950s ... Support to anti-Sukarno 
rebels in Indonesia in 1958; Support to Tibetan guerillas in the 1950s and early 
1960s; Operations against North Korea during the Korean War; and, 
Operations in Laos in the 1960s."67 
But despite these assurances, Woolsey's primary concern was the 
improvement of public relations. While previous directors had reached out 
to the media and academia, Woolsey understood that the CIA also needed to 
focus attention on the entertainment industry: In 1994 he agreed to enter 
negotiations with Television Production Partners (TPP), a production 
company financed by advertising firms that was interested in developing a 
series based on the CIA. Interestingly, plans for a CIA television show had 
been kicking around for nearly three decades. During his retirement, Allen 
Dulles hoped that CBS might develop a series on the CIA similar to "The 
F. B. I." (1965-1974), a fictional show about the bureau that J. Edgar Hoover 
enthusiastically supported.68 The proposal re-surfaced during the "Year of 
Intelligence," and although William Colby was intrigued by the idea, George 
H. W. Bush reportedly had no interest in pursuing the project after his arrival 
67 U.S. House of Representatives, Permanent Select Committee On 
Intelligence, Increasing Accessibility To CIA Documents, 103rd Cong., rt sess., 28 
September 1993 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1994), 4. 
68 John Kelly, "CBS as CIA," Counterspy 5, no. 1 (Nov. 1980-Jan. 1981): 3-4; 
"Hollywood Plots A CIA 1V Series," Washington Post Magazine, 17 August 
1980,2. 
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at the CIA in 1976. CBS began to develop a similar program in the summer of 
1980 with the support of the AFI0.69 
It remains unclear whether Woolsey was aware of these earlier 
projects, but even if he did know about them, he clearly wanted to take a new 
approach; The agreement the Agency signed with TPP at the end of 1994 
reflects Woolsey's desire to directly involve the CIA in the production 
process. It gave the CIA the authority to 'ireview and approve or deny all 
stories and scripts produced. In exchange for this extraordinary control, CIA 
... granted TPP the right to use the CIA name and seal in the production and 
to state that the stories are fictional accounts based on actual CIA files." 70 
According to Dennis Boxx, then Public Affairs Director at Langley, "[t]his 
project presents an unprecedented opportunity for CIA to influence the 
portrayal of this Agency and US intelligence in a potentially high profile and 
successful television series reaching millions of Americans. It has been 
briefed to and has the support of both congressional oversight committees."71 
In order to adequately evaluate the scripts for the show, Boxx proposed the 
establishment of an internal review board that "may include an Associate 
Deputy Director from each directorate as well as the General Counsel and the 
Director of Public Affairs [Boxx]."72 
69 
"Hollywood Plots A CIA TV Series," 2. . 
70 Dennis R. Boxx to Executive Director~. "CIA Television Series," 16 April 
1996, 1. Released by the CIA to the author on 21 December 2005 in response 
to a FOIA request. 
71 Ibid., 1. 
72 Ibid., 2. 
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Since· the CIA has only de-classified two memos pertafning to the 
agreement with TPP,73 what happened to the project remains a mystery. John 
Deutch~ President Clinton's second CIA director, shared Woolsey's interest in 
shaping the CIA's image in popular culture. CIA officials on the "seventh 
floor" approached a case officer named Chase Brandon with the idea of 
starting the first film liaison office at the Agency. After initially declining the 
offer, Brandon, who has family connections to the film industry, subsequently 
re-considered and made the decision in 1996 to come out of the cold and into 
the spotlight.74 He remained in the position until the summer of 2007.75 
Brandon began his career at the Agency in the early 1970s, shortly 
before the CIA entered the contentious "Year of Intelligence." "[The] CIA and 
I were both born in 1947," he proudly explained in 2005, "and I was recruited 
into its organizational ranks when :we were both 25 years old."76 Brandon 
holds a Ph.D. in linguistics and spent over two decades in the Directorate of 
Operations. The details of his clandestine work for the CIA are obviously 
classified, but it is known that he participated in paramilitary operations in El 
Salvador and other Central American locations during the 1980s. By the mid-
1990s, the Agency hierarchy had selected him to run the CIA station in 
73 In addition to Boxx's April1996 memorandum, another memo was released 
to the author <;>n 21 December 2005. [R~dacted] to Dennis Boxx, Vin Swasey, 
[Redacted], "CIA Television Series Project," 3 October 1995. 
74 Chase Brandon, telephone interview by author, September 8, 2005. 
75 Paul Barry took over as the entertainment industry liaison in June 2007. See 
Amy Argetsinger and Roxanne Roberts, "The CIA H~s A New Man On A 
Special :Mission-To Hollywood," Washington Post, 5 June 2007, C3; Press 
Releases & Statements, "CIA Names New Entertainment Liaison," 4 June 
2007, https: I I www .cia.gov I news-information I press-releases-
statements/ cia-names-new-entertainment-liaison.html (accessed August 3, 
2007). 
76 Chase Brandon, e-mail to author, 24 May 2005. [In author's possession]. 
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Houston. Brandon remained undercover while serving as the Houston 
station chief, and he appears to have worked closely with oil companies with 
· .. · 
interests in Latin America. In fact, he sometimes distributed business cards 
that indicated he was the Vice President of Patriot Petroleum in Baytown, 
Texas.77 In reality, of course, Patriot Petroleum was simply a CIA front 
company. 
·Between 1996 and 2007, Brandon participated in a long list of movies 
and television shows. He described his philosophy of the liaison job by 
paraphrasing a famous line from The Field of Dreams: "if I give them a phone 
number, they will call."78 By implementing a strategy he called the "three 
legs of a stool approach" (i.e. documentaries, movies, and television shows), 
Brandon attempted to "showcasegood qualities" of CIA employees in hopes 
of improving the CIA's public image.79 When determining whether to offer 
CIA assistance to a project, he examined outlines and scripts to make sure 
that they were "fair and balanced."80 He openly admitted to withholding 
support from proposals that might have portrayed the Agency in a negative 
light: "if there is something wrong or maliciously ugly about us, they can 
correct the part that's factually wrong or temper whatever is maliciously 
ugly, and maybe they can film here. But if they have cliches about us as 
rogue assassins, I'm sorry, but we're not going to let them come film here and 
77 Robert Dreyfuss, "Left Out In The Cold," Mother ]ones, January /February 
1998,. http: I I www .motherjones.com /news I feature I 1998/01/ dreyfuss.html 
(accessed July 20, 2006). 
78 Chase Brandon, telephone interview by author, September 8, 2005. 
79 Ibid. 
80 Ibid. 
229 
use otir people, because that's not what we are."81 Dan Neil, a Los Angeles 
Times columnist, says that Brandon essentially replaced "tradecraft" with 
"image craft," arguing that "Brandon's job dangerously stokes two of 
America's most outsized appetites, for fantasy and authority." 82 Neil believes 
that the CIA should simply not get involved with "producers who want to 
make quasi-propaganda .... "83 
The issue of assassination is especially sensitive for CIA officials, and 
when In The Line OfFire was released in the summer of 1993, they found it 
horrifying that the deranged assassin (John Malkovich) in the movie was 
scripted as a former CIA man. Brandon, for instance, turned down the 
producers of The Bourne Identity (2002), a film starring Matt Damon as a 
deadly CIA assassin on the run from Langley bosses who are trying to kill 
him. "By page 25 [of the screenplay]," Brandon recalls, "I lost track of how 
:many rogue operatives had assassinated people. I chucked the thing in the 
bum bag."84 Brandon also avoided projects that suggested the CIA topples 
foreign governments. "There is always some ugly representation of us as a 
·conspiratorial government-overthrow apparatus," he complained.85 The film 
liaison office is apparently interested in falsifying the historical record, for in 
truth, the Agency has de-stabilized and overthrown the elected leaders of 
numerous countries over the years. 
81 David L. Robb, Operation Hollywood: How The Pentagon Shapes and 
Censors the Movies (Amherst, New York: Prometheus Books, 2004), 150. 
82 Dan Neil, "Spy vs. Lie," Los Angeles Times, West Magazine, 28 May 2006, 45. 
83 1bid. 
84Josh Young, "Spook Shows," Entertainment Weekly, 23 March 2005, 
http://www.ew.com/ew/report/0,6115,254697 7%7C29166%7C%7CO 0 ,00 
.html (accessed July 20, 2006). 
85 Robb, 149. 
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According to the late Angus Mackenzie, "[f]or the average outsider, 
being taken into the CIA's confidence can be breathtaking."86 Mackenzie 
recognized that CIA officials often use the basic strategies of agent 
recruibnent for PR purposes. Interestingly, Brandon was once an instructor 
at "the Farm," the CIA's not so secret training facility at Camp Peary on the 
outskirts of Williamsburg, Virginia.87 Winning a person's trust is something 
that comes naturally to him. Recognizing that Hollywood celebrities are 
often distrustful of the CIA, he frequently invited writers, actors, and 
directors to visit Langley. He skillfully used these VIP tours to promote the 
Agency's mystique. For instance, after Patrick Stewart journeyed through the 
halls of the CIA in December 1997, headmitted that "[t]his visit has certainly 
s~fted my perceptions and made me review my attitudes toward the Agency 
and my conditioning from previous reading about you [most notably, Harvey 
Weinstein's book on MKULTRA]."88 Since he and his fiancee planned on 
forming a production company, Stewart promised that he would be willing to 
consider "projects that give a more positive view of the good work of your 
organization."89 In fact, he was so impressed with the Agency that he even 
offered to make a subsequent visit to deliver a lecture in the Bubble on acting 
in espionage films.90 Will Smith, Robert DeNiro, Ben Affleck, Dean Cain, and 
Dan Ackroyd are just a handful of other actors who have toured the CIA with 
86 M;3.ckenzie, 186. 
87 Chase Brandon, telephone interview by author, September 8, 2005. 
~8 "Patrick Stewart Visits CIA Headquarters," What's News At CIA, no. 483 (24 
December 1997). Released by the CIA to the author on 21 December 2005 in 
response to a.FOIA request. 
89 Ibid. 
90 Ibid. 
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Brandon.91 Like Stewart, Affleck commented on how normal the CIA seemed 
during his visit to prepare for the role of JackRyan in The Sum Of All Fears 
(2002): "It wasn't some kind of cloak-and-dagger operation, but more like an 
office with a very diverse group of people-highly competent and very smart 
people-who are dedicated, patriotic Americans."92 Of course, ne~ther 
Affleck nor Stewart appears to have considered that their tour of Langley was 
undoubtedly carefully managed from start to finish. 
Having once encouraged Agency officials to maintain their mystique, 
it is not surprising that George Tenet ardently supported the film liaison 
office when he became CIA director in 1997. He soon took an interest in a 
project that Brandon had undertaken with Robert Cort, a successful 
Hollywood producer who briefly worked as a CIA analyst in the early 1970s. 
Cort had written a story about a fictional CIA operation, and Roger Towne, 
the screenwriter of The Natural (1984), was enlisted to prepare an adaptation. 
Actor Tim Matheson, best known . to moviegoers as the unforgettable Eric 
"Otter" Stratton in Animal House (1978), signed on as the film's director. As 
plans for the television movie began to crystallize, Matheson, Cort, and David 
Madden, the co-producer, visited Langley where Tenet personally welcomed 
them. Matheson explained that he fully intended "to capture on film the 
91 
"Dan Ackroyd Developing Television Series On CIA," What's News At CIA, 
no. 358 (24 October 1996); "Mr. Smith Goes To CIA," What's News At CIA, no. 
488 (21 January 1998); "Superman Visits Headquarters," What's News At CIA, 
no. 799 (10 October 2000). The CIA released all three articles to the author on 
21 December 2005 in response to a FOIA request. 
92 Sum of All Fears, Production Notes, . 
http:// www.contacbnusic.com /new /home.nsf/ webpages I fearsproductionx 
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professionalism, dedication, and patriotism which CIA truly represents and 
which the American public little understands."93 
Matheson and the producers made arrangements for several of the 
actors in the movie to receive similar tours. Tom Berenger, who in the film 
portrays a CIA officer sent to North Korea on a covert operation, went to the 
CIA for two days, meeting with Tenet and at least one top official in the 
Directorate of Operations. Ron Silver, the actor selected for the role of DCI, 
also visited CIA headquarters to prepare for the film. Silver said that Tenet 
provided him with invaluable advice: "There's no way I could have ever 
prepared as thoroughly for this role without talking to Mr. Tenet. His 
responsibilities are enormous and I deeply appreciate the time and insights 
he gave me-both will better enable me to portray the DCI in this movie."94 
Then, on June 20, 1998, two months after the start of principal photography, 
Matheson spent the entire Saturday at CIA headquarters filming scenes in the 
lobby, hallways, and rear entrance. Over fifty CIA employees participated as 
"extras," because it would have been too time-consuming for the Office of 
Security to obtain clearances .for civilians.95 
93 Matheson quoted in "DCI Meets Director of 'The Agency' [In The Company 
of Spies]," What's News At CIA, no. 519 (May 5). Released by the CIA to the 
author on 21 December 2005 in response to a FOIA request. 
94 Silver quoted in "The Agency's Lead Characters Visit Headquarters," 
What's News At CIA, no. 528; Alice Krige also journeyed to the CIA. See 
"Actress Alice Krige Visits Headquarters," What's News At CIA, no. 532. The 
CIA released both articles on 21 December 2005 in response to a FOIA 
request. 
95 Chase Brandon, "LIGHTS ... CAMERA ... ACTION!," What's News At 
CIA, no. 538. Released by the CIA to the author on 21 December 2005 in 
response to a FOIA request. 
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When the editing of the Showtime movie was completed, Tenet 
arranged for In The Company of Spies96 to premiere a~ the CIA in Oct~ber 1999. 
1\r()t only did Agency officials literally roll out the red carpet for the event, 
they also positioned klieg lights near the entranceway to welcome about five 
hundred invited guests.97 Tenet had claimed only a year earlier that the 
Agency simply could not afford to continue its voluntary de-classification 
program, but he somehow managed to find room in the budget for the 
extravaganza. Tenet commended the production team, happily noting that 
"[t]hey were great to work with. They portray us in a good light, and I want 
the American people to know the values we believe in. Our work is secret 
and it will always be secret. But every now and then, we should take the 
opportunity to portray ourselves. A little. bit of fun-there's nothing wrong 
with that."98 The CIA director had good. reason to be .thrille~ with what he 
saw on the screen inside "the Bubble" that evening, and for the rest of his 
tenure, he commonly described In The Company of Spies as "our movie."99 At 
the beginning of the film, a senator thanks Ron Silver's character for his 
96 The original title was The Agency. 
97 Vernon Loeb, "The CIA's Operation Hollywood," Washington Post, 14 
October 1999, C1; Charles Strum, "The C. I. A. As (Surprise!) The Good 
Guys," New York Times, 24 October 1999, TV63; "Agency Hosts Movie 
Premiere and Sneak Preview," What's News At CIA, no. 683. Released by the 
CIA to the author on 21 December 2005 in response to a FOIA request; 
Central Intelligence Agency, Press Releases and Statements, "Central 
Intelligence Agency Host~ Premiere Screening Qf Showtime And Paramount 
Network Television Spy Thriller, 'In The Company of Spies,'" 14 October 
1999. Released by the CIA to the author on 21 December 2005 in response to a 
FOIA request; "Showtime Movie A Hit," What's News At CIA, no. 685. 
Released by the CIA to the author on 21. December 2005 in response to a FOIA 
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?? Tenet quoted in Loeb, Cl. . . . . 
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honest testimony in front of the Senate Intelligence· Corrimittee. "We are, 
after all, entering a neW era of openneSS and aCCOUntability," he observes.100 
The movie perpetuates the idea that the public only learns .about the CIA's 
failures. After the mission in North Korea is p~rfectly executed, the 
president is over-awed with the CIA's brilliance:. "By God, when the agency is 
good, it's spectacular. And n~ one even knows!"101 CIA critics, however, 
w~re less than impressed with the ~ovie' s message. "For pepple who get 
their information from government documents, not from television and the 
movies, there has actually been a reduction in accountability," said Steven 
Aftergood. "They're going to have to do better than TV movies."102 
Given the success of In The Company of Spies, Brandon continued to 
assist television producers. The Agency, a show that offered a fictionalized 
view of Langley operations, premiered on CBS in 2001. The production team 
received guidance from CIA officials, and they were allowed to film inside 
Agency headquarters in April 2001. CBS apparently retained creative control 
over the episodes, but the evidence also suggests that the CIA's willingness to 
provide assistance to the network helped ensure that they were portrayed 
positively. In a letter thanking Agency personnel for their support, the 
production manager boasted that a scene from the pilot, which was filmed on 
the first floor of Langley, "could be a recruiting movie for the CIA."103 
Brandon must have been thrilled with this compliment. 
100 Loeb, C1. 
101 Ibid; Elaine Sciolino, "Cameras Are Being Turned On A Once-Shy Spy 
Agency," 36. 
102 Aftergood quoted in Loeb, C1. 
103Herb Adelman quoted in "'The Agency' Gets The Green Ught," What's 
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Brandon served as a consultant to ABC's Alias (2001-2006), a television 
show about an Agency operative named Sydney Bristow Gennifer Gamer). 
Bristow is a full-time graduate student, but when she is not writing papers, 
she wears tight outfits, hunts down the enemies of the United States, and then 
punishes them with spin-kicks. Brandon acknowledges that Garner's 
character is far-fetched, but he believes that Bristow displays many of the 
qualities that the Agency looks for in potential recruits. Most importantly, he 
says, Bristow is "rock solidly patriotic."104 In 2003 he recruited Gamer for a 
CIA recruitment video; this advertisement appealed to the patriotism of 
young Americans: 
I'm Jennifer Gamer. I play a CIA officer on the ABC TV 
series Alias. In the real world, the CIA serves as our country's 
first line of defense in the ongoing war against international 
terrorism. [The] CIA's mission is clear and direct: safeguard 
America and its people. And it takes smart people with 
wide-ranging talents and diverse backgrounds to carry out 
this mission ... people with integrity, common sense, 
patriotism and courage .... Today, the collection of 
foreign intelligence has never been more vital for national 
"ty lb§ secun .... 
Having established connections in Hollywood, Brandon pursued 
movie projects as well. He helped Roger Towne write another screenplay 
December 2005 in response to a FOIA request;. Elaine Sciolino, "Cameras Are 
Being Tum~d On A Once-Shy Spy Agency," 1; Duncan Campbell, 
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about the Agency, sharing information about his experiences as an instructor 
a.t Camp Peary. The Recruit (2003) centers on the recruitment and training of 
Ja:m~s Clayton (Coli;n Farrell), a computer genius who graduated from MIT at 
the top of his class. When Walter Burke (AI Pacino ), a veteran CIA officer, 
attempts· to sign him up, Clayton is initially uninterested, mocking the CIA as 
"a bunch of fat, old white guys who fell asleep when we needed them 
most."106 Clayton, however, believes that his father was working for the CIA, 
not an oil company, when he died in a plane crash in 1990. He reconsiders 
Burke's offer in hopes of learning what actually happened to his dad, and he 
begins his training at "the Farm." One might argue that Burke's 
proclamations are directed at both the actors and the audience; "Our failures 
are known," he says,."our successes are not."107 He also reminds the recruits 
that "our cause is just," and that enemies of the United States are "all around 
us."1os. 
Reviewers were not kind to The Recruit . .A. 0. Scott jokingly des.cribed 
the movie as an "AI Pacino crazy· mentor picture," noting that "what. Mr. 
Pacino provides is an acting lesson, one that Mr. Farrell would do well to 
heed."109 Stephen J1unter of the Washington Post went so far as to argue that 
the rpovie "clinically illustrates everything wrong with the modern American 
motion picture [italics original]."110 Although Brandon concedes that the final 
106 The Recruit, DVD, directed by Roger Donaldson (2003; Burbank, California: 
Touchstone Home Entertainment, 2003). 
107 Ibid. 
108 Ibid. 
109 A. 0. Scott, "Hard Lessons in a Devilishly Devious C. I. A.," The New York 
Times, 31 January 2003, E1, E23. 
110 Stephen Hunter, "'The Recruit': Haven't We Met Somewhere Before?," 
Washington Post, 31 January 2003, C1 .. 
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CUt was "not nearly as good as the story was originally," he claims that The 
Recruit is "hugely popular" at the CIA.111 In fact, he says that since the movie 
was released, all of the recruitment classes are required to watch it during 
training.112 
The CIA does not sign contracts with filmmakers they are assisting; on 
the contrary, the film liaison office prefers to establish "a gentlemen's 
agreement."113 When he discovered a problem in a script, Brandon simply 
p'resented filmmakers ·with alternative options. For. instance, during a 
conference call with Universal Studios about Meet The Parents (2000), he says 
that the production team asked him what the CIA's kidnapping and torture 
manuals might look like, because they wanted Ben Stiller's character to find 
them on a desk to establish that his soon to be father-in-law was a CIA 
operative. Uncomfortable with the idea, Brandon proposed that they make 
the CIA connection by showing "a panoply of photographs" of Robert 
DeNiro's character with several international figures.114 The Universal 
executives loved the suggestion, and they decided to write it into the 
screenplay. 
As Tenet expanded the scope of the Agency's PR crusade, he showed 
little interest in releasing historical records. He essentially viewed the de-
classification process as an extension of its PR efforts; since documents had 
the potential to undermine the CIA's .mystique, they needed to be .withheld 
from the public. In May 1997, during his Senate confirmation hearing, Tenet 
111 Chase Brandon, telephone interview by author, September 8, 2005. 
112 Ibid. 
i 13 Robb, 152. 
114 Chase Brandon, telephone interview by author, September 8, 2005. 
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warned about the perils of too much historical inquiry: "the new challenges 
rushing toward us make it dangerous, frankly, to keep looking over our 
snoulders."115 Later that month the Nw York Times ran a story ~bout a speech 
that George Herring had delivered at a historical conference.116 Herring, a 
well respected diplomatic historian and an expert on the Vietnam War, 
belonged to the Agency's Historical Review Panel from 1990 until 1996 when 
he was asked to step down. Reflecting on his experiences, he felt "a nagging 
sense of frustration and a persisting anger at having, on occasion, been 
used."117 After the panel first met in August 1990, he revealed, it did not meet 
again for another four years. Herring was outraged that the CIA projected an 
image of openness throughout the committee's lengthy hiatus: "Now I'm 
from Kentucky, and I'm not supposed to be swift, but it didn't take too long 
even for me to realize that I was being used to cover the agency's ass w~ile 
having no influence. The fact was that ; ... the CIA panel had no chair, met at 
the whim of the Agency, exerted no real influence, and at times was used as 
window dressing."118 He described Gates's openness initiative as "a brilliant 
115 U. S. Senate, Select Committee On Intelligence, Nomination Of George J. 
Tenet To Be Director Of Central Intelligence, 1051h Cong., 151 sess. (Washington, 
DC: Government Printing Office, 1998), 55; for a discussion of Tenet's 
t~stimony, see Jonathan Nashel, "The Rise of the CIA and American Popular 
Culture," in Architects of the American Century: Individuals and Institutions in 
Twentieth-Century U.S. Foreign Policymaking, ed .. David F .. Schmitz and T. 
Christopher Jespersen (Chicago: Imprint Publications, 1999), 77; see also 
Cullather, xv. . 
116 Tim Weiner, "C. I. A.'s Openness Derided As A 'Snow Job,'" Nw York 
Times, 20 May 1997, A16. . 
117 George C. Herring, "My Years With The CIA," Newsletter of the 
Organization of American Historians,.May 1997, 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/eprint/herring.hbnl (accessed May 20, 2006). 
118 Ibid. 
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public relations snow job" that established "a carefully nurtured myth that 
was not at all easy for me to dispel."119 
Tenet· and his advisors responded to Herring's attack with a 
demonstration of their PR tactics. Nick Cullather, who joined the CIA's 
history_staff about five months after Gates announced the openness initiative, 
wrote a classified history of Operation PBSUCCESS, the covert venture that 
led to the overthrow of President Jacobo Arbenz in 1954. Although Cullather 
had completed the study before leaving the Agency in 1993, it remained 
locked away inside Langley along with the thousands of pages of primary 
documents on the operation. Suddenly, two days after the Herring story 
appeared in the Times, the CIA notified Cullather about the impending de-
classification of his project. The CIA had been promising to release the 
documents on PBSUCCESS since 1992, but nothing was de-classified until 
Herring slammed the Agency for its intransigence. Rather than turning over 
all the files to the National Archives, the CIA initially retained almost 
everything,. In fact, Cullather estimates that "less than 1 percent of the total 
collection" emerged in 1997.120 (A. large percentage of the remaining 
. . . . 
documents were finally released in 2003 as part of the FRUS series.) 
By releasing Cullather's study, the CIA ho,ped to deflect the ct?tic;ism 
directed at the Agency's de-classification process. Yet it remained obvious 
that the Agency had not honored the promises that had been maqe in 1992 
and 1993. In attempting to explain the failure of the openness initiative, CIA 
officials claimed many of the documents had been destroyed. Less than two 
1191bid. 
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weeks after the article on Herring's speech, the Times reported that most of 
the records documenting the coup against Mossadegh were long gone.121 But 
··~-:· 
in April2000, a front-page article in the newspaper revealed that the CIA had 
been distorting the truth. Approximately 1,000 pages of the material on the 
covert operation in Iran remained.- James Risen, the story's author, also 
received a classified history of the operation that had been completed by 
Donald Wilber in early 1954.122 Wilber, one of the CIA operatives involved in 
the coup, had been frustrated by the lack of attention given to his study, 
writing in his memoirs that "[i)f this history had been read by the planners of 
the Bay of Pigs, there would have been no such operation."123 
Interestingly, although Gates had pledged in February 1992 to de-
classify documents on the Bay of Pigs invasion, nothing had been released by 
1996. A non-governmental organization housed at George Washington 
University called the National Security Archive decided to file multiple 
Freedom of Information Act requests for the records, and after stalling for 
two years, in February 1998 the CIA finally released the internal report on the 
operation written by Lyman Kirkpatrick, the inspector general of the CIA 
between 1952 and 1963.124 The Kirkpatrick Report presented a scathing 
assessment of the Bay of Pigs, and the CIA had burned most of the copies. If 
the report ever became public, officials worried about what would happen to 
121 Tim Weiner, "C. I. A. Destroyed Files on 1953 Iran Coup," New York Times, 
29 May 1997, A19; "CIA Says It Is Trying To Determine Extent Of Document 
Destruction," St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 30 May 1997, A12. 122 James Risen, "How A Plot Convulsed Iran in '53 (and in '79)," New York 
Times, 16 April 2000, 14. 
1231bid. 
124 Bay of Pigs Declassified: The Secret CIA Report On The Invasion of Cuba, ed. 
Peter Kombluh (New York: The New Press, 1998), 5, 10. 
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the mystique that Allen Dulles had so painstakingly created during the 1950s. 
"In unfriendly hands," warned the CIA's deputy director in December 1961, 
"[the Kirkpatrick Report] could become a weapon unjustifiably [used] to 
attack the entire mission, organization, and functioning of the Agency ."125 
In July 1998, about five months after the release of the inspector 
general's report, Tenet shut down all de-classification projects at the CIA not 
mandated by law. 126 Nick Cullather perceptively described the article in the 
Times on Tenet's decision as "an obituary for the openness program."127 Since 
the CIA was unwilling to voluntarily release information, Congress found it 
necessary to pass the Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act in 1998. The CIA had 
long downplayed the use of former Nazis during the Cold War, but the 
documents released in response to the law proved the skeptics had bee~ 
correct.128 In June 2006, the media reported that the Agency had been told in 
1958 the alias of Adolf Eichmann and that he was hiding in Argentina. Even 
though they knew that Israel had been searching for Eichmann, Agency 
officials did not tum over the info1;111ation. It took the Mossad another two 
125 1bid., 15. 
126 Tim Weiner, "C. I. A., Breaking Promises, Puts Off Release of Cold War 
Files," New York Times, 15 July 1998, A13; George Lardner, Jr., "CIA Won't 
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years to capture him.129 Researchers also learned more about Heinz Felfe, an 
ex-Nazi that the CIA trusted to run counterintelligence in West Germany. 
Felfe had actually been a classic double agent, betraying American secrets 
and personnel to the Soviets.130 
Within a year of the War Crimes Disclosure Act, President Clinton's 
National Security Council ordered the intelligence agencies to "review for 
release ... all documents that shed light on human rights abuses, terrorism 
and other acts of political violence during and prior to the Pinochet era in 
Chile."131 The CIA released around six hundred documents in June 1999, but 
they initially refused to de-classify records on the American effort to de-
stabilize Chile in the years prior to the 1973 coup against Salvador Allende. 
As Peter Kornbluh bluntly observed at the time, 11[CIA officials] have decided 
to sabotage this commitment to openness with the same degree of success 
they used to sabotage the economy in Chile. The CIA is directly challenging 
the president of the United States and the integrity of this White House-
mandated project."132 
Despite the fact that the CIA was now mandated to participate in the 
Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) series, Tenet allowed his 
subordinates to obstruct historians at the State Department. According to 
129 Scott Shane, "C. I. A. Knew Where Eichmann Was Hiding," New York 
Times, 7 June 2006, A3; Christopher Lee, "CIA Ties With Ex-Nazis Shown," 
Washington Post, 7 June 2006, A21. 
130 Shane, "C. I. A. Knew Where Eichmann Was Hiding," A3. 
131 Peter Kornbluh, The Pinochet File: A Declassified Dossier On Atrocity And 
Accountability (New York: New Press, 2003), 472. 
132 Kornbluh quoted in Vernon Loeb, "Top CIA Officials Won't Declassify 
Some Chile Files," Washington Post, 11 August 2000, A23; for more on the 
conflict between the White House and Langley, see Kornbluh, The Pinochet 
File, 472-476. 
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Page Putnam Miller, a scholar who has carefully examined the CIA's 
interference with the FRUS, "[t]he most troubling, unresolved barrier to 
ensuring publication of .an accurate and comprehensive account of U. S. 
foreign policy remains the CIA's lack of cooperation."133 The CIA refused to 
turn over documents on the Agency's operations in Japan for the FRUS 
volume on Northeast Asia (1961-1963). The advisory committee, frustrated 
by Langley's continued intransigence, warned readers in the preface of the 
volume "that this published compilation does not constitute a 'thorough, 
accurate, and reliable documentary record of major United States foreign 
policy decisions,' the standard set by Public Law 102-138 .... "134 
In 2000, four years after the release of the Northeast Asia volume, the 
CIA once again intervened with the publication of the series. CIA officials 
successfully blocked for three. years the release of the volume covering 
American foreign policy in Greece in the mid-1960s, and a few officers even 
claimed that the revelations would lead to a resurgen~e of Greek terrorism.135 
The following spring the CIA used similar tactics to prevent the distribution 
of a FRUS compilation on Indonesia. Yet the Government Printing Office 
(GPO) had already sent copies to several libraries. The documents on 
Indonesia did not contain any information that could damage national 
security, but they did reveal how the American government had turned over 
lists that helped Indonesian officials track down and violently eliminate left-
133 Miller, 206. 
1~ Ibid., 203; Demps~y, 55; Karla Haworth, "Historians' Panel Faults CIA For 
Delays In Declassification," Chronicle of Higher Education, 5 September 1997, 
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wing opposition in the country.136 A retired State Department official 
lamented the CIA's power to withhold its history: "It's basically a case of the 
CIA putting pressure on State and the State's bureaucratic culture being 
wimpy. CIA usually gets its way.-n In truth, the CIA is now a far more 
open institution than it was in 1992, but this openness resulted more from 
external forces than the policies of Gates and Woolsey. Executive Order 
12958, which President Clinton issued in April 1995, attempted to mandate 
the release of government records over twenty-five years old.138 This order 
began with good intentions, but it soon became clear that the Agency wanted 
exemptions for over 60% of its records.139 The most important result of EO 
12958 was the establishment of the CIA Records Search Tool (CREST) at 
National Archives II in College Park, Maryland. The CREST system is an 
electronic database of de-classified CIA material that researchers can search 
using four computers located on the third floor of the Archives building. 
CREST contains over half a million CIA documents prior to 1982, which total 
around ten million pages.140 . Unfortunately, most of the documents in the 
~36 For more information on the Indonesia volume, see "CIA Stalling State 
Department Histories: Archive Posts One Of Two Disputed Volumes On 
Web," The National Security Archive, 27 July 2001, 
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database are not from the Directorate of Operations.141 The CREST system 
also includes thousands of pages of clipping files, articles from newspapers 
afid magazines that CIA personnel have routinely compiled. This so-called 
open source intelligence is often valuable to researchers, but by de-classifying 
old stories from newspapers like the Washington Post and New York Times, the 
CIA can inflate the number of documents that they release annually in 
response to EO 12958. Even though the database is undeniably a positive 
development, it is important to keep in mind that the Agency continues to 
withhold literally millions of pages in its archives older than twenty-five 
years. 
The basic axiom of CIA public relations is that the Agency's failures 
are known while its successes are secret. But if this statement is indeed true, 
it would seem that the de-classification of older records would actually help 
the Agency's public image. In reality, the documents released so far have 
routinely undermined the Agency's mystique; the evidence that has emerged 
from the archives on CIA operations_ in countries such as Iran, Guatemala, 
and Chile has vividly shown that missions once viewed as successes 
frequently_ had tragic long-term consequences. As Agency officials point out, 
they have the power to keep secrets for reasons of national security. The 
National Security Act of 1947 also requires the CIA director to protect 
intelligence sou.rces and methods. No o"J;>server would questio~ ~at there are 
very good re~sons{or classifying documents. Too often, however, the CIA 
141 For scholars interested in studying other divisions of the CIA, CREST 
proves quite useful. See, for instance, the footnotes in Chapters 4-7 of this 
study for citations to documents found in the database dealing with CIA 
public relations. 
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has' invoked "sources and methods" to keep embarrassing information out of 
the hands of scholars. · 
As Thomas Powers explained in The Man Who Kept The Secrets, the 
forces of secrecy at Langley .have repeatedly distorted the Agency's history: 
''CIA people are cynical'in most ways, but their belief in secrets is almost 
metaphysicaL In their bones they believe they know the answer to that 
ancient paradox of epistemology which asks: If a ~ee falls in the forest 
without witness, is there any sound? The CIA would say no. It would agree 
with historian David Hackett Fisher that history is not what happened but 
what the surviving evidence says happened. If you can hide the evidence 
and keep the secrets, then you can write the history."142 
Sadly, not enough has changed at the CIA since Powers made this 
observation in 1979. 
142 Thomas Powers, The Man Who Kept The Secrets: Richard Helms and the 
CIA (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1979), 344. 
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CONCLUSION 
Although the National Security Act of 1947 specifically prohibits the 
CIA from engaging in domestic operations, the Agency has not always 
abided by the law. During the Vietnam War, it is now known that the 
Agency spied on American citizens in· a. program called MHCHAOS. The 
CIA has also repeatedly targeted the American public with propaganda since 
the early years of the Cold War. Allen Dulles orchestrated an extensive PR 
effort in the 1950s to ensure that the CIA remained unaccountable to 
Congress; two decades later William Colby used similar tactics to prevent the 
abolition of covert operations. After the intelligence investigations of the 
mid-1970s, CIA officials embarked on a public relations campaign to 
rehabilitate the Agency's damaged image. They promoted the CIA's 
mystique to defend against challenges to the "culture of secrecy." This study 
has demonstrated that there has been overwhelming continuity ~n CIA public 
relations between 1977 and the present. While CIA directors have created the 
myth of greater openness, they have simultaneously obstructed legitimate 
inquiry of the Agency's past. . 
It will be recalled that in 1977 Herbert Hetu arranged for ABC's "Good 
Morning America" to film segments at the CIA and to interview Stansfield 
Turner. Not only did he hope to win favorable publicity for the Agency on its 
thirtieth anniversary, he also saw the program as an opportunity to put a 
posi1;ive spin on secrecy. In November 2005, twenty-eight years after Hetu 
first invited ABC inside Langley, "Good Morning America" returned. 
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Instead of launching a thorough and balanced investigation of the CIA, ABC 
accepted the Agency's PR at face value. Reporter Charles Gibson even 
parroted the CIA's favorite PR mantra, reminding viewers at the top of the 
show that " [the CIA's] successes by nature have to. remain secret."1 Gibso~ 
had earlier taped an interview with then CIA Director Porter Goss, which was 
briefly shown. Gibson asked a few tough questions about a CIA 
interrogation method known as water-boarding, but when Goss pleaded 
ignorance on the topic, Gibson did not press the issue. From that point 
forward, ABC's coverage descended into an elaborate publicity festival that 
had been carefully scripted by the CIA's Office of Public Affairs. 
Gibson next participated in a scavenger hunt that the CIA had clearly 
designed to sell the Agency's mystique to viewers at home. The Agency left a 
hidden clue for Gibson outside of the headquarters building in a piece of 
wood under a tree-a classic illustration of a "dead drop." He subsequently 
executed a "brush pass" with an unidentified Agency employee in a hallway. 
As he walked past this individual, Gibson received a pen with an enclosed 
message. He read the word that was written ("Kryptos"), 2 crumpled up the 
paper, and placed it in a bottle of water. Much to the amusement of Barbara 
Walters back in the New York studio, Gibson proceeded to drink out of the 
bottle to demonstrate how quickly the message had dissolved.3 
But ABC',s.J:'lard-nosed reporli:ng on the CIA did not end there. The 
producers .of the show ~ade sure to include. Cl(;l.ire Shipman'~ pre-taped 
1 ABC, Go~d Morning America, 29 November 2005, "U~dercover Live Inside 
The CIA: Security, Secrets, Spies." , 
2 Kryptos is a monument on the grounds of the CIA. 
3 ABC, Good Morning America, 29 November 2005. 
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discussion with a former CIA disguise expert named Bob Barron. After 
retiring from the Agency, Barron devoted himself to helping people with 
severe faciai injuries. The segment revealed how Barron has used his covert 
training to re-constrUct countless faces, and by any standard of measurement, 
his results are impressive. The profile on Barron masterfully re-enforced the 
CIA's mystique, and the Viewers were left to imagine all of the breathtaking 
missions he must have participated in during his years of service. If he can 
re-build the faces of skin cancer victims, one is left with the impression that 
perhaps Mission: Impossible might not be so far-fetched after all.4 
Gibson also talked about how effectively the CIA destroys records. 
However, rather than examining the historical implications of the Agency's 
often reckless document destruction, he enthusiastically observed that "it is 
almost impossible to recreate any kind of a document that has been shredded 
c.oming out of [the Langley shredder/incinerator]" and noted that the 
machine is taxpayer friendly since it helps to heat and cool the headquarters.5 
ABC did not report on the CIA's long-standing co~tempt for the public's 
right to know and its appalling backlog of FOIA requests. From Gibson's 
perspective, Americans apparently have no need to worry: the CIA might 
eviscerate secrets, but at least it is energy efficient.6 
4 Ibid. 
5 1bid. 
6 Ibid. At the end of the program, Gibson did a live interview with Chase 
Brandon; He asked a few questions about the CIA's use of assassination as 
depicted in Stephen Gaghan's Syriana (2005), but Brandon politely refused to 
answer them. Brandon re-iterated that he only assists projects that are "fair 
and balanced," and he also plugged In The Company Of Spies as one of the 
most realistic espionage films. Ibid. 
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As the CIA conveyed an image of openness to Charles Gibson and 
ABC viewers, Langley was actually in the midst of a covert operation directed 
against scholars. The CIA, along with other government agencies, had been 
secretly re-classifying documents at the National Archives since the late 
1990s. In essence, although George Tenet claimed that the CIA could not 
afford de-classification expenses, he had no problem finding a way to finance. 
the re-classification project. This program expanded after President George 
W. Bush took office in 2001/ and audits have revealed that over 50~000 pages 
were re-classified in following years.8 Instead of telling researchers what was 
happening, the CIA signed a secret Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) 
with the National Archives that instructed Archives staff to embrace .the 
principle of plausible deniability. "NARA [National Archives and Records 
Administration] will not attribute to CIA any part of the review or the 
withholding of documents from this exposed collection," said the MOU.9 
7 In March of 2003, President Bush signed Executive Order 13292. This order 
amended EO 12958, making it easier for the government to keep material 
classified. It also gave the vice president increased power to classify (and de-
classify) government records. 
8 Scott Shane, "U.S. Reclassifies Many Documents In Secret Review," New 
York Times, 21 February 2006, A1; Jeffrey R. Young, "How The National 
Archives Struck A Secret Deal With The CIA," Chronicle of Higher Education, 5 
May 2006, 43; Matthew M. Aid, "Declassification In Reverse: The U.S. 
Intelligence Community's Secret Historical Document Reclassification 
Program," The National Security Archive, 21 February 2006, 
http:/ /www.gwu.eduf.·--nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB179/ (accessed May 25, 
2006); Idem, "The Secret Reclassification Program," OAH Newsletter 34, no. 2 
(May 2006): 1, 10, 18-19; Bruce Craig, "Historians Expose Government 
Reclassification Effort," Perspectives 44, no. 4 (April2006): 29-30. 
9 
"Memorandum of Understanding Between The National Archives and 
Records Administration .And The Central Intelligence Agency," October 2001, 
2. The National Security Archive, "Secret Agreement Reveals Covert 
Program to Hide Reclassification from Public," 11 April 2006, 
http://www.gwu.eduf ..... nsarchiv/news/20060411/index.htm (accessed 
March 24, 2008). 
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Matthew M. Aid, an expert on the National Security Agency, became 
suspicious when he noticed that records formerly available to researchers at 
the National Archives had been withdrawn. He also .discovered that the CIA 
had removed documents. from the CREST system.10 Thanks to his 
determination and investigatory skills, the New Yo~k Times broke the story in 
February 2006. Subsequent reports demonstrated that the . CIA had re-
classified files for reasons unrelated to national. security or sources and 
methods. In fact, many of the CIA records removed dated to the early years 
of the Agency. Personnel from Langley arrogantly believed they had the 
right to re-classify material that detailed an unsuccessful Cold War mission to 
distribute propaganda in Eastern Europe using balloons; an inaccurate 
prediction that China would not enter the Korean War; and an angry 
response from the CIA director in 1948 about the negative publicity that 
resulted from his analysts being unable to anticipate anti-American violence 
in Colombia.11 In 1999 the official in charge of the Office of Information 
Management at the CIA had proudly explained that the de-classification of 
the Korean War document was evidence of Langley's greater openness to 
scholars; Langley would not withhold material simply because it might prove 
embarrassing, he declared.12 Needless to say,_ the covert re-classification team 
at the National Archives obviously disagreed. 
10 Aid, OAH Newsletter, 19n9. 
11 Ibid., 18; Craig, 30. . . 
12 Edmund Cohen, "The CIA and the Historical De-Classification of History 
Programs," International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 12, no. 3 
(Fa111999): 341; the Agency's decision to unveil the documents from the 
Korea!) War had receivedcoverage in.The N.ew York Times. See .Douglas Jehl, 
"C. I. A. Releases Files on Korea and Cold War," New York Times, 1 October 
1993, A7. 
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Nothing better illustrates the CIA's obsession with secrecy than the 
clandestine withdrawal of records between .1999 and 2006. When the Times 
exposed the operation, it became abundantly clear that the Agency's rhetoric 
about valuing de-classification, which had been perpetuated by every CIA 
director since Robert M. Gates, was PR flimflam. General Michael Hayden 
took over at the CIA a few months after the expose, and he recognized that 
the Agency .needed to tC?-ke action. to regain t~e trust of the academic 
community. He delivered a speech in June 2007 to the Society for Historians 
of American Foreign Relations (SHAFR) in which he spoke of the "CIA's 
social contract with the American people."13 While making no reference to 
the scandal at the National Archives, he claimed that the Agency's right to 
operate in secrecy was "[n]ot a grant of power, but a grant of trust. Each day, 
we have to earn that trust-as our democratic system demands-by acting as 
our fellow citizens expect us to: Skillfully, boldly, and always in keeping with 
the laws and values of our Republic. That's our social contract."14 
As Gates had done in February 1992, Hayden expressed a willingness 
to release documents of historical value. De-classifying records, he explained, 
"is in CIA's interest: We want our history and our role in key decisions to be 
written accurately and fairly." 15 He pledged that the CIA would continue to 
release material. for the State Department's FRUS series; that officials would 
review classified CIA documents housed in the libraries of former presidents; 
and that more National Intelligence Estimates and Cold War reports would 
13 
"Genderal Hayden's Remarks at SHAFR Conference," 21 June 2007, 
https: II www .cia. gov I news-information I speeches-testimony I 2007/ general-
hayden-remarks,-at-shafr-conference.html (accessed March 26, 2008). 
14 lbid. 
151bid. 
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be de-classified.16 The audience also received complimentary copies of a 
volume that contained "147 documents amounting to more than 11,000 pages 
of analysis done between 1953 and 1973" on the Soviet Union, China, and 
their often tense relationship with each other.17 Hayden's gifts, however, 
were overshadowed by an announcement he made at the beginning of the 
speech: the "Family Jewels," an infamous collection of memos and other 
documents assembled in the early 1970s that detailed illegal CIA activities, 
would soon be turned over to the public. 
In the media frenzy surrounding the release of the "Family Jewels," 
most reporters failed to mention that a FOIA request had been filed for the 
collection as early as 1992.18 The Agency should have de-classified the 
documents at that time, since it is now obvious that none of the records 
would have undermined national security or jeopardized sources and 
methods. But in the.years following the end of the Cold War, there were calls 
in Washington for the CIA to be dismantled. Perhaps CIA officials worried 
that the scandals outlined in the "Family Jewels" would provide too much 
damaging ammunition for their critics. Whatever the motivation, the CIA 
161bid. 
17 1bid. This volume was later posted on the CIA's website. See "The 
CAESAR, POLO, and ESAU Papers: Cold War Era Hard Target Analysis of 
Soviet and Chinese Policy and Decision Making, 1953-1973," 
http:// www.foia.cia.gov I cpe.asp (accessed March 26, 2008). 18 For newspaper accounts of the "Family Jewels," see Scott Shane, "C. I. A. to 
Release Documents On Decades-Old Misdeeds," New York Times, 22 June 
2007, A16; Karen DeYoung and Walter Pincus,"CIA to Air Decades qfits 
Dirty Laundry," Washington Post, 22 June 2007, Al; Mark Mazzetti, "C. I. A. 
Chief Tries Preaching A Culture Of More Openness," New York Times, 23 June 
2007, All; Karen DeYoung and Walter Pincus, "CIA Releases Files On Past 
Misdeeds," Washington Post, 27 June 2007, Al; and Mark Mazzetti and Tim 
Weiner, "Files on Illegal Spying Show C. I. A. Skeletons From Cold War," 
New York Times, 27 June 2007, Al. 
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brazenly stonewalled the FOIA petition for fifteen years. Despite the blatant 
violation of federal law, however, Hayden had the audacity to characterize 
the CIA's processing of FOIA requests as "very successful."19 Hayden 
neglected to mention that the CIA· won the non-profit National Security 
Archives~ "Rosemary Award" in 2006 for the worst FOIA compliance of any 
federal agency.20 
It should be clear to all observers that Agency officials want to 
withhold historical files from the public in order to prevent embarrassing 
revelations from undermining the PR offensive started in the mid-1970s. 
Hayden proclaimed in June 2007 that the "Family Jewels" records "provide a 
glimpse of a very different time and a very different Agency."21 His spin 
evoked memories of the tactics that had been employed to secure passage of 
the CIA Information Act; you can trust us, the Agency told Congress, the 
improprieties of the past will never happen again. Yet these promises have 
been broken on many occasions. The most recent betrayal occurred in 2005 
when the head of· the clandestine service ordered the destruction of 
videotapes that showed the interrogations of two AI Qaeda prisoners. After 
the story leaked in December 2007, Hayden unconvincingly argued that the 
tapes were eliminated to protect the identities of Agency operatives. The 
investigative reporting of Scott Shane and Mark Mazzetti has shown that, in 
reality, the Agency wanted to protect its image: "every action in the 
19 "Ge~deral Hayden's Remarks at SHAFR Conference," 21 June 2007. 
20 
"CIA Wins 2006 'Rosemary Award' for Worst Freedom of Information 
Performance by a Federal Agency," 13 March 2006, · 
http: II www.gwu.edu 1-nsarchiv I NSAEBB I NSAEBB182 I rosemary.htm 
(accessed March 26, 2008). 
2~ "<;;enderal Hayden's Remarks at SHAFR Conference," 21 June 2007. 
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prolonged drama of the interrogation videotapes was prompted in part by 
worry about how its conduct might be perceived-by Congress, by 
prosecutors, by the American public and by Muslims worldwide."22 To 
guard the "culture of secrecy," the Agency once again destroyed the historical 
record. 
The concerns about image are not unique to the CIA. Long before the 
(:lA modernizedits Office of Public Affairs, the Pentagon had mastered the 
art of public relations. More recently, public relations and secrecy were the 
cornerstones of President George W. Bush's eight years in the White House. 
An advisor to President Bush brilliantly described the White House's PR 
strategy: "We're an empire now, and when we act, we create our own reality. 
And while you're studying that reality-judiciously, as you will-we'll act 
again, creating other new realities, which you can study too, and that's how 
things will sort out. We're history's actors ... and you, all o~ you, will be left 
to just study what we do."23 In creating their "own reality," the Bush 
administration withheld secrets from the public that might have undercut 
their assorted PR campaigns. This, after all, was the president who flew on a 
fighter jet to an aircraft carrier in May 2003 to deliver a speech in front of a 
~'Mission.Accomplished" banner.24 
22 Scott Shane and Mark Mazzetti, "Tapes By C. I. A. Lived and Died To Save 
Image," New York Times, 30 December 2007, Al. For the initial story on the 
tapes, see Mark Mazzetti, "C. I. A. Destroyed 2 Tapes Showing 
Interrogations," New York Times, 7 December 2007, Al. · 
23 Ron Suskind, "Without A Doubt," New York Times Magazine, 17 October 
2004. 
24 Frank Rich, The Greatest Story Ever Sold: The Decline and Fall of Truth From 
9/11 to Katrina (New York: Penguin, 2006), 88-91. 
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But even as most Americans have learned to disregard President 
Bush's PR schemes, the CIA's mystique continues to thrive. A Harris Poll in 
November 2004 revealed that 53% of Americans questioned ranked the CIA's 
performance as either "excellent" or "pretty good." Only 11% of those 
surveyed said that the Agency was doing a "poor" job.25 Perhaps more 
tellingly, 70% of respondents in June 2002 agreed that "the C.I.A. (Central 
Intelligence Agency) should .... work secretly inside other countries to try to 
weaken or overthrow governments unfriendly to the United States .... "26 
Yet is there any evidence to suggest that the CIA's PR has influenced 
its public image over the years? Some observers would say no: approval 
ratings are impossible to control and tend to fluctuate unpredictably over 
time. In October 1975, at the height of the "Year of Intelligence," 53% of 
Americans polled gave the CIA a positive rating,27 exactly the same level of 
public support that the Agency would have nearly three decades later. This 
study, however, adopts an alternative interpretation of the polling statistics. 
It contends that the Office of Public Affairs should be given at least part of the 
credit for maintaining the CIA's image over the years. By focusing on the 
positive and diverting the public's attention from the negative, CIA officials 
have protected both covert operations and the culture of secrecy. In 
reviewing a book about American public diplomacy in France after World 
25 Harris Interactive, "Ratings of Federal Agencies," 24 November 2004, 
http: I I www .harrisinteractive.com/ harris poll I index.asp ?PID=524 (accessed 
August 9, 2007). . 
26 CBS News/New York Times Poll, 21 June 2002. Polling the Nations, 
http:// poll.orspub.coml document.php?id=quest02.out 5557 &t;ype=hitlist&n 
um=6 (accessed March 24, 2008)~ 82% of Republicans answered yes, while 
62% of Democrats responded affirm~tively. Ibid. 
27 Cynthia M. Nolan, "Seymour Hersh's Impact on the CIA," The International 
Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 12, no. 1 (1999): 21. 
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War II, Christopher Endy has pointed to the power of ambivalence. He 
noted that the book's author acknowledged that public diplomacy did not 
change French opinions of the United States, prompting Endy to ask an 
insightful question: "what if ambivalence was all the United States needed to 
obtain its goals? Ambivalence, after all, was not a coherent call to reject U.S. 
1ri.fluence."28 A similar argument could be made about the CIA's PR efforts 
since the mid-1970s. Although the public often says that other agencies are 
doing a better job-even the Internal Revenue Service-they tend to forgive 
the CIA for its transgressions. In the aftermath of scandals like Iran-Contra 
and the arrest of CIA mole Aldrich Ames, the poll numbers typically drop 
before ultimately rebounding. 
In the final analysis, Americans do not always trust the CIA, but they 
have been convinced of the Agency's mystique; this mythology, which is not 
supported by the historical evidence, has protected the Agency's "culture of 
secrecy." A key result of this culture has been, in the words of historian 
Jonathan Nashel, the creation of a vast "warehouse of hidden histories" 
inside ~angley.29 If these "hidden histories" .are ultimately revealed, how will 
they change our understanding of American foreign relations since 1947? 
Will they. indicate that American policymakers have spread democracy and 
uplifted the downtrodden, or will they provide even greater evidence for the 
existence of what revisionist historians have termed the "American empire"? 
28 Christopher Endy, "The Empire Sneaks Back," review of Remaking France: 
Americanization, Public Diplomacy, and the Marshall Plan, by Brian Angus 
McKenzie, Diplomatic History 31, no. 4 (September 2007): 763. 
29 Jonathan Nashel, "The Rise of the CIA and American Popular Culture," in 
Architects of the American Century: Individuals and Institutions. in Twentieth-
Century U.S. Foreign Policymaking, ed. David F. Schmitz and T. Christopher 
Jespersen (Chicago: Imprint Publications, 1999), 77. . . 
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Warren Kimball complained in 1998 that the CIA's unwillingness to abide by 
their legal obligations to· de-classify older records for State Departinent 
historians made it increasingly likely that the FRUS series could become "an 
officiallie."30 Needless to say, this "official lie" almost always supports the 
orthodox interpretation of American foreign policy while concealing the 
darkness on the edges of empire: the coups that have toppled democr~tically 
elected leaders and replaced them with authoritarian regimes, the inter-
locking relationships between the intelligence establishment and American 
multi-national corporations, and the frequent manipulation of foreign 
elections. 
It is time for Congress to force the CIA tothoroughly de-classify the 
older records in its archives. It, of course, remains uncertain how future 
revelations will influence the field of diplomatic history, but it seems likely 
that more documents will only strengthen revisionist scholarship. After all, if 
the records promised by Robert Gates and R. James Woolsey in the early 
1990s would improve the CIA's approval ratings, why haven't officials de-
classified them yet? The answer to this question, and to many others, remains 
classified. 
30 Kimball quoted in Aid, OAH Newsletter, 10. 
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